

T No 9335. 1a 291



GIVEN BY

U.S. SUPT. OF DOCUMENTS

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Blue book
PYS 46-57

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE
UNITED STATES

NOVEMBER 14 AND 15, 1956

PART 46

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1957

*3303
8*

December 8, 1958
#9335.4A291
pts. 46-57

Boston Public Library
Superintendent of Documents

JUL 25 1957

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr., Missouri
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
PRICE DANIEL, Texas
JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, Wyoming
MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia

ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota
WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
HERMAN WELKER, Idaho
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr., Missouri
PRICE DANIEL, Texas

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
HERMAN WELKER, Idaho
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland

ROBERT MORRIS, *Chief Counsel*

J. G. SOURWINE, *Associate Counsel*

WILLIAM A. RUSHER, *Associate Counsel*

BENJAMIN MANDEL, *Director of Research*

CONTENTS

	Page
Witness:	
Hazafi, Arpad -----	3196
Laszlo, Istvan -----	3182

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE
TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:05 a. m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Olin D. Johnston presiding.

Present: Senator Johnston.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; J. G. Sourwine, associate counsel; William A. Rusher, associate counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; and Robert McManus, research analyst.

SENATOR JOHNSTON. The subcommittee will come to order.

We have an oath here that we will ask the interpreter to listen to very carefully.

Do you solemnly swear that you will truly interpret to the witness the questions directed to him, and will truly interpret the answers given by the witness, to the best of your ability, so help you God?

MISS LOW. I do.

SENATOR JOHNSTON. Counsel, you may proceed with the witness.

I think, before we start, I want to say that it is very important that we get a true picture of what is going on in Hungary at the present time. All good Americans and all people in America that believe in our way of life—and I am glad to say that most of the people in the United States do—are very much interested in this matter of Hungary at the present time, or any other activities that may be going on here in America or elsewhere by the Communists.

We want to know how they go about it, in order to keep the Communists from breaking down our way of life.

MR. MORRIS. Senator, we have here today a young man—he will give his age as 21—who was the head of a large student organization in one of the westernmost counties of Hungary. When the revolution took shape, despite the fact that he had only 2 months' military training, he was elected to be the head of 6,000 men.

These are facts that he will testify to, Senator, as we go along today.

But he has been chosen by the Hungarian fighters to come to the United States, and the subcommittee heard about his presence in the country, and we asked him to come here today to give testimony along the lines that you have described, Senator.

SENATOR JOHNSTON. And I suppose that that is the reason that you have him masked at the present time.

MR. MORRIS. The reason for the mask, Senator, is that this man has a family in Hungary. Accompanying him this morning are two peo-

ple who want to stress the security aspects of his visit today. One of them is acting as interpreter here today. They point out that, if this man's picture appears in the press, or if it is picked up on any of the motion-picture or television cameras, that will, naturally and very understandably, possibly jeopardize the lives of his family.

Rather than take that responsibility, we have agreed that he would appear with this mask that you see here. It is strictly for the protection of his family, who are still in Hungary and subject to reprisal for what he may say here today.

Senator JOHNSTON. I think that is very appropriate, and that explains why he comes here masked today.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you stand and raise your right hand?

Will the interpreter ask him to repeat after you the oath that the Senator will administer?

Senator JOHNSTON. Do you swear the evidence you give to be the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

The INTERPRETER. He says "Yes."

Mr. MORRIS. Now, this witness, Senator, will not give his right name here today; he has identified himself in executive session, but he will give us a name which he is using in connection with his visit here to the United States.

What is that name?

TESTIMONY OF ISTVAN LASZLO (AS INTERPRETED BY MARIAN LOW)

The INTERPRETER. Istvan Laszlo.

Mr. MORRIS. Your name is Marian Low?

Miss Low. Marian Low.

Mr. MORRIS. In what city do you reside?

Miss Low. Cambridge, Mass.

Mr. MORRIS. And when did you first meet the witness here today?

Miss Low. I first met him on Sunday night when he spoke at a rally in Boston, a protest rally for Hungarian relief, given by the International Rescue Committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Laszlo, you resided in the western part of Hungary, did you not?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you were active in student affairs, were you not?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What county did you reside in?

The INTERPRETER. Sopron.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you could point to that county, Sopron County, on the map of Hungary that appears on the chart.

Mr. LASZLO. Yes [indicating on map].

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what your student activity was during the month of October of this year.

The INTERPRETER. Before the revolution, or after, or during?

Mr. MORRIS. We want to lead up to the revolution. Tell us, in the first place, what is your age.

The INTERPRETER. 21 years.

Mr. MORRIS. And, during the month of October, prior to the uprising, you were engaged, as you have just told us, in student activities; is that right?

The INTERPRETER. Before the revolution he was enabled to work in student affairs because he was shut out of the Communist Youth Organization. A few weeks before the revolution, however, his student friends demanded that something should be done, and this is how he got the leadership.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there, therefore, prior to the revolution, some agitation for broadening the scope of the student activity?

The INTERPRETER. He says there was the Petofi circle, a Hungarian youth group, which actually gave the idealistic leadership of this revolt.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about the circumstances leading up to the first outbreak.

The INTERPRETER. The entire youth group in the university was dissatisfied with the activities of the Communist Youth Organization; that is, the DISZ.

Mr. MORRIS. You say the student body at the university became dissatisfied with the Communist leadership of the student organization. And then what happened?

The INTERPRETER. The youth groups throughout the country left the Communist Youth Organization and set up a list of demands, and when the Hungarian radio in Budapest refused to read these demands, the entire country, the youth groups decided to revolt.

Mr. MORRIS. What form did the revolt take? This is the revolt of the students?

The INTERPRETER. That is right.

The revolt started when the youth group went to the radio station without arms and only with stones, and just threw stones at the radio station. The AVH, the Hungarian security police, shot at the students, at which point the Hungarian students and workers in Budapest went out to the arsenal.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give a date for each one of these occurrences.

The INTERPRETER. The 23d.

Mr. MORRIS. The 23d of October?

The INTERPRETER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. That was the date that the students were refused the radio facilities for their demands?

The INTERPRETER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And at that point they decided to engage in this revolt?

The INTERPRETER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And that was, you say, on the 23d of October. Now, will you tell us in detail what happened in each one of these steps. At this point had you elected a student leader?

The INTERPRETER. By this time he was the head of the youth council in his town, in the county which he mentioned.

The next day the students took over the leadership of the town itself.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, when you were first elected student leader, how many students so elected you?

The INTERPRETER. There were 1,000 students selected him as their leader.

Mr. MORRIS. And then after the revolt took place, was the organization that you were in charge of broadened to include others than students?

The INTERPRETER. The organization itself was not broadened. However, the revolt was joined first by the workers and then by the army itself, and, he says, in fact, the entire country.

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would give us each stage of this broadening. In other words, at the beginning there were just a few thousand students, with you as the leader; is that right?

The INTERPRETER. The thousand students were the entire university, all the university students, and they elected him, and he will now give it step by step.

Mr. MORRIS. We are not asking you to name the university, because naturally that will identify you, because you were selected as the leader for a particular university.

The INTERPRETER. He says that he was in constant communication with the head of the student group in Budapest, and that they coordinated all their steps according to what was going on in Budapest.

Mr. MORRIS (to the interpreter). May I break in. Will you try to translate this in the first person. You are using the third person; if you will use the first person I think it will be better for our record.

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

The workers in Budapest broke into the arsenal and fought the army with just simple arms, that is, just guns.

In Budapest the army went to the side of the rebels. At the same time, in the county of Sopron, we organized the entire town, the workers and the students, and at this time we were still unarmed, and I sent this group out to defend the town.

Mr. MORRIS. At this point, you were now in command of how many people?

The INTERPRETER. At this time I was head of the student regiment, which was about 800 students.

Mr. MORRIS. But you also broadened this command of yours to include others than students; did you not?

The INTERPRETER. Various delegations from factories went to the student council, which was leaving the county, and asked them to give them arms and to join them, they wanted to go to Budapest to help the rebels there with arms. But this was impossible at this time, because the students themselves did not have arms yet.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the date of this occurrence?

The INTERPRETER. The 25th.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did any of these workers whom you have described thereupon join your group?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, the workers in the entire neighborhood joined the students, and not only the workers but peasant delegations came up and promised all the help that they could give.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, the ranks swelled to what number after these people joined you?

The INTERPRETER. In the entire county, about 80,000 people.

Mr. MORRIS. 80,000?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And what was the number of the group that you commanded?

The INTERPRETER. Until the revolt became armed in this county, a council was running the county affairs. But when they formed the county into army units they made me the military leader, and I had about 5,000 men under me.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, how did you obtain arms?

The INTERPRETER. When the army units in the county saw that the workers and the students were organizing, they came to us—they took down the red stars from their caps and put on red, white, and green, the national colors, on their caps. And when we saw that this was happening, we asked, the council asked the heads of the police, the border guards, and the army in the county to come to us and to give us arms.

Some of them were reluctant, but the police head was the first to give them to us, and later on the others also acceded to our demands.

We received larger arms from units near our town—

Mr. MORRIS. Military units?

The INTERPRETER. Military units near our town, where there were larger army divisions who also joined our revolt.

Mr. MORRIS. At this time how much military training had you had?

The INTERPRETER. I had only 2 months' military training, which I received as a university student, but I was only a foot soldier there and I had no officer's training whatever.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, after you and your group obtained arms; what did you do?

The INTERPRETER. We set up military regiments, formed of students and other groups, and we sent them out to defend a 6-mile line.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us roughly where this 6-mile line is on that map?

Mr. LASZLO. Yes. [Pointing.]

Mr. MORRIS. You are very near the border; are you not?

(Mr. Laszlo points on the map.)

Mr. MORRIS. Now, up until this point had there been any bloodshed?

The INTERPRETER. No; up to now there was no bloodshed.

Mr. MORRIS. And all the people that you encountered, the police and the Hungarian military forces and the border patrol, none of them offered you any resistance?

The INTERPRETER. Not only did they not resist, but I have to say that when the Soviet memorial statue was thrown down, the police commander himself, the commander of police officers, helped to bring it down.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, when did Soviet or Russian forces first appear on the scene, as far as you are concerned?

The INTERPRETER. Around the 30th of October.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you said that you and your group went forth to defend the particular area that you have described. Did you establish some kind of a military formation?

The INTERPRETER. There were three lines along the 6-mile line that I pointed out. The first one was the artillery, the second the students, and the third the workers. They each formed separate regiments.

Mr. MORRIS. And you were the commander of that particular formation?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, when did the Soviet forces first appear?

The INTERPRETER. On the 30th, 30 tanks came from the city of Györ toward the town where I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell that city, please?

The INTERPRETER. G-y-ö-r; there are two accents on the "ö." The name usually used on foreign maps is Rab.

Mr. MORRIS. So Györ is often called Rab?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; it is.

(Pointing on map:) The Soviet tanks came toward the town, and they were stopped before one of the villages because they met our units there. After a brief firing, the Soviet commander declared an armistice and moved back from the county.

They went back in the direction of Györ, which is where they came from.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what had your experiences been with Russian military forces occupying Hungary?

The INTERPRETER. Those Russian troops which came into the country then and which were in the country then agreed with the revolutionists and were on the side of the rebels.

I will tell of several instances to prove this.

Mr. MORRIS. Please tell us those instances.

The INTERPRETER. Many of the Soviet soldiers told us that they were sent to fight Fascist uprisings, but when we told them, and when they saw they were actually fighting against the people, they refused to fight us, they refused to shoot us, and they asked the Imre Nagy government to give them asylum.

In Budapest, it happened that an officer commanding a tank got out of his tank with a white flag and gave the tank to the Hungarian rebels.

It also happened in Budapest when one of the tank units was going down Andrassy Avenue that the first, the leading tank, turned its gun on the Soviet tanks behind it and shot at his comrades.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what you did when you were the commander of this group which you have described, when the Russian tank commander declared an armistice, when he put up a white flag and declared an armistice: will you tell us what you did then?

The INTERPRETER. When the armistice was declared, a large Soviet tank unit came to the outskirts of our town, where they faced our armed units. I went to meet them with a white flag to ask them why, since there was an armistice, they came to us. And although I came with a white flag, the Russian soldiers greeted me with a tommy gun and took me to their commander.

I asked them what they were doing there, and he said they had good news for me, the Russian troops were leaving Hungary, they were actually just there to prevent Western armed help from coming through the border.

The interpreter, the Russian interpreter who was with me, gave the officer one of the pamphlets which he had printed in Russian, with our demands. The Russian officer read this—

Mr. MORRIS. What were these pamphlets that you refer to?

The INTERPRETER. The pamphlet stated in Russian, asked the Russians to leave the country, since they were fighting an entire nation of people that merely wanted its freedom.

Mr. MORRIS. How many such pamphlets were prepared?

The INTERPRETER. We printed 4 kinds of pamphlets, and we got 1 from the Radio Free Europe Committee.

Mr. MORRIS. And in what quantity were these produced?

The INTERPRETER. We printed 4,000, and we got about 1,000 from Free Europe.

Mr. MORRIS. What were the demands that you set forth in these pamphlets?

The INTERPRETER. I have already told what we said in our pamphlets, that we wanted liberty, we wanted the Russians to leave the country. The Free Europe pamphlet demanded that there should be a revolt in Russia itself, addressed to Russia, and that the Russians should not oppress and suppress Hungary's fight for freedom.

Mr. MORRIS. And what were the limits of your demands?

The INTERPRETER. This was the demand, that they should leave the country. And I think we stated that this was a nation fighting and not Fascist groups.

Mr. MORRIS. And that was the extent?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would tell us at this time what the general conditions were in the country that gave rise to this uprising.

The INTERPRETER. I would not say that the first cause of the revolt was material. I would say that the most important was idealistic, and mental oppression. But I would add that a material depression and economic problems added to it, as well.

To prove that the main cause was not material, when the Kadar government promised double wages to the workers to stop the general strike, nobody stopped the strike.

Mr. MORRIS. You had a security police in Hungary; did you not?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; there was a security police, the AVH, which terrorized the entire country continually. And it proved by its actions that it represents only the Rakosi government, or the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the makeup of these security police? Were they mostly Hungarian nationals, or were there Russians and other nationals involved?

The INTERPRETER. The AVH consisted mostly of Hungarians, but the top leaders are Russians. One of the leaders was Mihaly Farkas.

Mr. MORRIS. Those leaders that you mentioned, were they Hungarian?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; they were Hungarian.

Mr. MORRIS. For the most part, though, the leaders were Russian; is that right?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; the leaders were mostly Russian, and both Farkas, as well as Ernest Gero, had Soviet citizenship.

Mr. MORRIS. Ernest Gero had Soviet citizenship?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you could tell me what the makeup of the Soviet police, or the AVH, as you call them, was in your particular county.

The INTERPRETER. Before the revolution it was difficult to know who the top leaders were, and during the revolution we shut them up in order to hold a trial later and to examine their cases. Among them there were Russians.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us in detail how you shut them up, as you say; tell us of that.

The INTERPRETER. When we received arms, we went out to arrest the members of the AVH. We found them in different places, some-

times hiding in attics and sometimes trembling, coming to us and giving us their arms. We also arrested a number of AVH men who were coming armed in their cars from Budapest trying to get to the West.

Thus, we disarmed and arrested about 250 members of the security police, whom we shut up in the town prison.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you then inspect their headquarters?

The INTERPRETER. Yes. During the revolution, the people broke into the AVH headquarters in my town, as well as in Györ and in Budapest, as well as other towns in Hungary. Here they found torture instruments, which prove the statements I made about them before. Among these was a small chamber with a roof that could be pushed down so that the person in this chamber was completely crushed.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you see that with your own eyes?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what other instruments of torture you personally experienced? After a while you went to Budapest, did you not? I don't want to get ahead of the story, but later on you went to Budapest; is that right?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; I was in Budapest for 1 day.

Mr. MORRIS. And there you also saw some of the headquarters of AVH, did you not?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; there I saw a security-police crematory.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, all together, will you tell us, both in your own town and in your own county and in Budapest, what torture instruments and torture chambers that you did see that were maintained by the AVH?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

I saw one chamber in which they hanged people by their feet, about half a meter from the ground. And at the left of their hands there were two steel plates which moved toward each other. The situation was all right when they could hold their hands next to their body, but as soon as their hands fell down they were crushed by these two steel plates.

The beginning of this torture was usually that people were made to stand against a white wall with their feet pushed against the wall and their hands behind their bodies, and had to stand there for hours, which was both physically and mentally true torture.

As far as physical hurt, that is, beatings, and so forth, that was just the beginning of such a process.

Mr. MORRIS. And these instruments of torture which you have described you personally saw after the initial success of your uprising?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, is there anything else you can tell us about that particular subject, that is, the AVH at this point, up until this point? This is now October 30, is it not?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

When the Hungarian Government declared the armistice and the Soviets themselves were holding the armistice, the AVH alone did not put down their arms, because they knew that they themselves could expect nothing but death or prison.

As far as my personal experience is concerned, I myself spent some time at AVH headquarters, and I myself went through this standing against the white wall.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean, you personally had been arrested by the AVH?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. When was that?

The INTERPRETER. One year ago—in January, last year.

Mr. MORRIS. And why were you apprehended by the AVH?

The INTERPRETER. It is a long story, but I think I can just say that our university had traditions that went back to Hungary's freedom fight at other times. And I wanted to bring back these traditions, although the Communists had forbidden them. And for this I was first shut out of the Hungarian Communist Youth Organization, and then taken to the AVH and given this going over.

Mr. MORRIS. How long were you detained by the AVH?

The INTERPRETER. I was there 2 days, and after that I had to report to them for observation.

Mr. MORRIS. And you were subjected to torture, as you have described?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, may we go back to this truce formation in which you and your forces were arrayed on one side against the Soviet tanks on the other, you had this truce, and you approached the Russian tank commander. What happened after that?

The INTERPRETER. After we went up there—

Mr. MORRIS. After there was this truce.

The INTERPRETER. After that our delegation went back to the town by car, and since there was an armistice we went to bed in peace for the first time in 2 weeks.

The next dawn I was awakened by the news that the Russians have started a general offensive against Hungary, and that new tank units were coming toward our town from the direction of Györ.

Mr. MORRIS. Were these the same tank units that you had encountered earlier?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, they were.

Mr. MORRIS. Proceed. Tell us what happened.

The INTERPRETER. When we heard the general offensive we mobilized all our units and sent them out to the point where the Russian tanks were coming. The entire headquarters was in an uproar, and our telephone connections with the entire country were stopped. Therefore, we were depending entirely on our own forces.

Firing began between our forces and the Russian tanks, and they brought news from the border that Anna Kethly, who had been in Vienna, was trying to get back to the country and was coming to our town.

I asked all the leaders of the military units to come to headquarters, and I also asked Anna Kethly to participate in our talks.

Anna Kethly said that if she was unable to reach Budapest because of the fighting, she would return to Vienna, and from Vienna go to New York and try to tell the U. N. that the Kadar government was not the legal government, and that the Nagy government was demanding that the Russian troops leave Hungary.

Somebody in the council decided that somebody from our group should go to the U. N. with Anna Kethly to represent all Hungarians, and they elected me to be this person.

My task was not to stay in America for a long time; I was merely to go to the U. N. and represent our cause there.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you then proceed to the United States?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

This was Sunday at noon, and in the afternoon we took a plane——

Mr. MORRIS. This was a week ago Sunday?

The INTERPRETER. Yes. And on Monday we were in New York, on the 5th.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, would it be violating any security to say how you left Hungary and got into Austria?

The INTERPRETER. I can say. I got in the first car, Imre Szelig got into the second car, and Anna Kethly got into the third. And until the border, I was watching with arms, because I was not sure that we would not be attacked.

On the way we were not attacked, and the Austrian Minister of Interior gave the order to allow us to pass the border.

Mr. MORRIS. May I recapitulate here. The first truce had been effected between you and the tank commander, and that was observed for a period of 1 day; is that right?

The INTERPRETER. No; the armistice lasted more than 1 day, and this event of which I told you happened on the last day of the armistice.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did the armistice last, from what date to what other date in October?

The INTERPRETER. The armistice lasted about 4 days, from the 30th to the 3d. And during that time we sent Red Cross units to Budapest with a convoy.

Mr. MORRIS. And you yourself went to Budapest; did you not?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. What date did you go to Budapest?

The INTERPRETER. I am afraid I can't remember that. It must have been about the middle of the armistice.

Mr. MORRIS. And you stayed there for only 1 day?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what conditions did you observe in Budapest?

The INTERPRETER. I saw the city was in ruins, which was bad as after 1945. In fact, in the last days of the revolution some more of this had taken place, so, at the moment, the city is in ruins more than after the Second World War.

Now, I shall tell what I myself saw. The streetcar lines are either bombed or mined or taken up. For quite a while in some places you could not see a single house. The Soviet tanks which pass on the streets looking for rebels turn their guns on the houses and fire into the houses.

These were the things which I saw.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you were elected by the council to go to the United Nations on what date?

The INTERPRETER. On the 4th.

Mr. MORRIS. On the 4th. That is when the large Soviet counter-offensive began?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what have you done, since you have come to the United States, by way of presenting the case of the people you repre-

sent and who designated you to come to the United States, to the United Nations?

The INTERPRETER. Unfortunately, I was unable to appear before the U. N. Anna Kethly was able to arrange for an interview with Dag Hammarskjold, but I came a few minutes later and I was not allowed to enter.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you seen any U. N. officials?

The INTERPRETER. Unfortunately not. I was in the U. N. Building, and all I saw was delegates going up the stair to a meeting.

Mr. MORRIS. You have tried, however, persistently, have you not, to present your case?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, I did. And what I could not do before the U. N., I tried to do before the others to present my case.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, do you still have hopes of carrying out your mandate, from the forces you represent, to the United Nations?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; if somebody enabled me to do this, I would be glad to do it, because the U. N. is the first and the United States is the second that can force the Russians to leave Hungary, if not with arms, with their moral strength.

My only wish, the Hungarian people's only wish, is that the U. N. should force the Russian troops to leave Hungary. We can forge our freedom ourselves.

I want to say, furthermore, that the Hungarian people do not want fascism, and they do not want the pre-World War II Government back. They want freedom and democracy.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you could answer this question.

If Soviet forces withdrew from Hungary, knowing the temper of the Hungarian people as you do, do you think there would be any chance that Hungarian Communists could keep your country attached to the Soviet empire?

The INTERPRETER. If the Russians left Hungary there would be free elections, and I do not believe that there are such Communists in Hungary today who would want to keep or could keep Hungary in the Soviet bloc. Hungary wants to live in freedom with all countries but not belong to any bloc.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you gave us some details about the Russian officers and the Soviet officers being well disposed and friendly to the Hungarian people. Are these the same Soviet forces that have brought such devastation on Hungary now?

The INTERPRETER. No. Since then, two Mongolian divisions have come from the Soviet Union, and from Czechoslovakia more divisions have arrived to replace the units that were friendly with us.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that the Soviet occupation military forces were withdrawn and these which you have mentioned, two Mongolian divisions, among others, have been used to crush Hungary?

The INTERPRETER. Nobody was taken out of Hungary, they are all there, but they have been increased by the Mongolians.

And those Russian troops which have been friendly to Hungary before are now terrorized by their commanders into obeying.

Senator JOHNSTON. I believe your statement was, if the Soviet troops were to leave Hungary you would be willing to abide by the results that would follow?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Senator JOHNSTON. It is your belief, then, that if they were to leave Hungary—that is, the Soviet troops—you would then probably carry out the objective you had when you started your revolution?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Senator JOHNSTON. And you do not fear, then, that they have a sufficient number of Communists that are loyal enough to give you any amount of trouble?

The INTERPRETER. From my talks with Hungarian workers and former Communists, I am quite certain that there are not such Communists who could do that.

Senator JOHNSTON. So the only thing you wish at this time is to be left alone to act, as your people see fit?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Senator JOHNSTON. That being so, I think, personally—and I am speaking individually now, not for the committee—I think the United Nations should have some committee to interview you and get your line of thought, for it might be real helpful in the future as to what the United Nations action might be.

Any other questions?

Mr. MORRIS. I have two questions, just for the record.

There is one point that the witness brought out in executive session that I would like to ask him about here, because I think it is rather interesting for our record.

You yourself personally arrested many of the AVH people, did you not?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you told us at one point how you and 6 others captured 13 of these AVH people, even though they were armed; walked into their headquarters?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would just give us that episode for the record, please.

The INTERPRETER. When the revolt started and we did not have arms yet, we sent six university students out to the Hungarian Communist Party headquarters, which we heard was unoccupied at the moment. However, it was not unoccupied; there were six party secretaries meeting in one of the rooms. They were armed.

The students simply locked the door on the armed party secretaries, and when other secretaries were coming in to join this meeting they showed them this room; they asked where the meeting was, and they were led to the room, and they were allowed to enter the room, and the door was immediately locked again, and in this way we captured 13.

Mr. MORRIS. How many Hungarians died in this revolt, to your knowledge?

The INTERPRETER. About 25,000.

Mr. MORRIS. How many of those died prior to the time that you left on November 4?

The INTERPRETER. That number referred to the number of people who died before November 4. How many died since then, I know only from newspapers in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there much bloodshed in your own county that you experienced?

The INTERPRETER. After the fight, 80 percent of my university escaped to Vienna. That 80 percent represented the remaining living part of our university, because the rest had died in the fight.

Mr. MORRIS. When did they die, specifically, at what one of these stages that you have described? You haven't told us of any bloody fighting where all those people could have died.

The INTERPRETER. In the first invasion, there was not much bloodshed, because it was mostly between the infantry and tank units. Some of the army died. In the second general offensive, a great number of students, workers, and members of the army died. I don't know exactly how many, but I know that two to three hundred definitely died in this battle.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the battle in your own county?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, in my county.

Senator JOHNSTON. Were there very many of the secret police killed?

The INTERPRETER. In Budapest, yes; in our town, no, because we did not want terror trials, we did not want to besmirch the revolution with such an act.

Senator JOHNSTON. What happened to the people that you arrested?

The INTERPRETER. When I left Hungary they were still arrested, locked up in the town prison. Since then the Russians probably have let them out.

Senator JOHNSTON. How many Russian soldiers were killed?

The INTERPRETER. In my county or in the entire country?

Senator JOHNSTON. The entire country, if you know.

The INTERPRETER. About 2,500 people in the entire country. And in my county, about 5 or 6 tanks, which means about 30 to 40 people.

Mr. MORRIS. Thirty to forty Russian soldiers?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, there have been reports about Soviets deporting trainloads of Hungarian youths and trainloads of Hungarian workers. Did you personally observe any of that?

The INTERPRETER. No, I only heard about it.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I have no more questions of this witness.

Senator JOHNSTON. Any other questions?

(No response.)

Senator JOHNSTON. I believe that completes the testimony of this particular witness at this time. So we will adjourn the meeting, at the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)



SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3 p. m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Olin D. Johnston presiding.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William Rusher, administrative counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; and Robert McManus, research assistant.

Senator JOHNSTON. The committee will come to order.

We will begin the hearing.

Mr. Morris, you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Johnston, we have arranged for the witness here today to come into the country, and he arrived in the United States during this present week. He has come from Budapest.

Now, again, Senator, we must say that, because this man has a family, and a rather extensive family, still in Hungary, that we cannot take the responsibility of identifying him, or in this particular case, identifying the job that he had in Hungary. We can say that he was a government worker. His age is between 30 and 40.

As I say, he has come into the country during this past week, and even the method of his arrival in the country we cannot say, for security purposes.

And with those limitations, we can offer his testimony for the record.

Now, Senator, he has written a short chronicle of the events leading up to the revolution and of some of the events subsequent to the outbreak of the revolution. He wrote in Magyar, his native language. It has been translated for him, and it appears here in the form of a statement. It isn't even finished yet; we worked on it until late last night.

I suggest, Senator, with your approval, that we allow him to read from this—his English is fairly good—and, as he is reading we can break in and get supplemental information, as our own purposes require.

Senator, we have here present someone who is in a representative capacity with the American Hungarian Federation, who is acting as this man's sponsor while he is in the United States. He is going to be available in the event that we may need some interpreting.

I think, Senator, that just to anticipate such a possibility, that we might begin the hearing by swearing in the interpreter, who is ready to testify now.

Senator JOHNSTON. Will you raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear that you will truly interpret to the witness the questions directed to him and will truly interpret the answers given by the witness, to the best of your ability, so help you God?

Mr. RONTO. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your name?

Mr. RONTO. John J. Ronto, John Joseph.

Mr. MORRIS. In what city do you reside?

Mr. RONTO. Washington, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you.

(To the witness.) Will you stand and raise your right hand, please?

Senator JOHNSTON. Do you swear the evidence you will give before this subcommittee to be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HAZAFI. I do.

TESTIMONY OF ARPAD HAZAFI, ACCCOMPANIED BY JOHN JOSEPH RONTO, AMERICAN HUNGARIAN FEDERATION

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, this man has given us his name in executive session, and we are keeping it classified. For the purposes of his testimony here, he has given us the name of Arpad Hazafi, and he will testify under that name today.

Senator JOHNSTON. We understand all the conditions under which you are testifying, and we will try to keep from having you recognized as much as possible.

Mr. MORRIS. Arpad, will you commence to read this statement, and we will break in as we go along and ask you questions.

Mr. HAZAFI. As I am writing these lines, the struggle for liberty is still continuing in Hungary. The nation, even if only for a few days, won their liberty and now it is ready to sacrifice its life rather than renounce freedom.

Only a few days ago I was myself in the thick of the fighting of Budapest, therefore as a witness I can tell the world about the revolutionary events.

Let my writing be conducted with the clearest objectivity, although it is difficult to suppress my hate and prejudice. I cannot give you my true name as I have beloved ones at home and I fear vengeance. I am no coward, but I am filled with fear on account of the suppressing trampling on our rights which lasted for 8 years.

I would like to give a short picture of the revolution, and its precedents, which raised the tension and finally caused the events of October 23, 1956, to erupt.

Let my documentary writing be also the S O S call of my nation, as I cannot stand idly by, to see the prophecy expressed by one of our poets, who died a 100 years ago, fulfilled. He wrote:

The grave, in which a nation sinks, is surrounded by other nations, and tears fill the eyes of millions, and millions.

I am no chauvinist, but now I am proud to be the son of this small nation. I was always afraid that, in time of danger, people would get scared, and they would cowardly and spinelessly submit to their fate. I am glad I was wrong. They fought with courage and united, and they still fight on for a free and independent Hungary.

To this struggle, against tyranny and slavery, I beg the help of every nation and creed.

Ever since 1948, the Soviet-directed MDP (Hungarian Communist Party) conducted Hungary's interior policy and foreign affairs. How they conducted it is evident before everybody.

The situation became worse and worse every year. The Communist government, year after year, talked about the raising of the living standard but always the opposite happened. The economic situation worsened every day.

A very substantial portion of the nation's income was spent to increase the newly established army, and later for its maintenance.

The greatest part of the produced goods was transported to the Soviet. What was left was sold by the state in the West and its value, whether in cash or goods, again enriched the Soviet. The barest minimum only was left for the Hungarian people.

The main principle of the regime was that everyone in a family should work, the husband, wife, and also the children who finished school. However, their joint income does not equal the average earned by a single person in the Western World.

Taking into consideration the most important life necessities-rent, heat, light, gas, transportation, food, clothing—the monthly earning of a skilled worker amounted to \$35-\$45 and those in leading positions made about \$50.

Beside the low earnings, one of the principal causes of trouble was the Soviet type norm system. Essentially, a task wage (piecework) which was changed from time to time so that the workers' wages could not rise.

The introduction of the norm system caused the constant deterioration of the quality of production. The goods which could not satisfy the internal demands could be, even with greater difficulty, sold abroad, and this only augmented the already existing misery of the people.

The forcibly executed economic plans—3- and 5-year plans—seemingly transformed an agrarian country, poor in industrial raw material, into an industrial nation, but the plans were frustrated by the continuous lack of raw materials.

Out of the small community of Dunapentele they created Sztalinvaros (Stalin City) and its ironworks. The Communist regime proudly announced that this was the workers' city and the regime's glory. How far this was from the truth is proven by the fact that Dunapentele's workers even today fight with arms against the Soviet. During the last 8 years they tried to fool the workers with constant propaganda actions.

Communist Party members went from house to house trying to convince the people that life in Hungary is superior to that in the West, where they claimed capitalism was on its last legs, and where, with the exception of a small layer of big capitalists, the masses of people were starving. Not even the agitators believed that, and those to whom they spoke believed it even less.

The bosses of the regime sometimes started spectacular things in an effort to pacify public opinion. It was for this reason they started to build the Budapest subway network, upon Soviet advice and pressure.

It was well known for a long time that the warm springs under Budapest make such undertaking geologically impossible, yet against the strong protests of the Hungarian engineers, they started this project, with Soviet support. This construction project lasted for 4 years

and had to be finally abandoned. Entire city blocks to alleviate the great need for houses in Budapest could have been built with the money and manpower wasted on that project.

Mr. MORRIS. May I break in at this point and just ask you to say for the record whether, up until very recently, you have been working for the Hungarian Government.

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Continue.

Mr. HAZAFI. The forced industrialization was protested even by Zoltan Vas on the Communist Party paper in a memorable article. Vas lost favor with the Communists but in times of trouble was always reinstated because of his organizational ability.

The Communists in general follow the old Roman custom : "Panem et Circenses," and this they followed in Hungary, too. They built the Peoples' Stadium and, through holding frequent sporting events, attempt to divert the attention of the people and the outside world from the widespread economic and social misery.

The Soviet Union and its satellites frequently sent their best sportsmen and artists, under political guardians, to western lands in an effort to prove the superiority of the Communist system. These events frequently dazzled the free world but we, behind the Iron Curtain, knew well the face hiding behind the smiling mask.

With the worsening of the economic situation, the dissatisfaction of the workers grew in direct proportion. The peasants were also forced into kolkhozes, called collective farms, and those that did not join were constantly pressured with extreme food production quotas.

Mr. MORRIS. May I break in at this point. All during this period of time you are telling us about, you were residing in Budapest; were you not?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And all of these experiences you were seeing daily; is that right?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You are now telling us about the experiences you yourself observed while living in Budapest with your family?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you were a Government worker?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Proceed.

Mr. HAZAFI. The Communist leaders, to maintain and secure their dictatorship, organized, in addition to the regular army and police organs, the cruel AVH (Allamvedelmi Hatóság), Authority for the Protection of the State.

This organization spread fear throughout the entire country and in all the people, who were already suffering greatly from economic depression. The slightest disapproval of the regime, correspondence with Western relatives or friends, sometimes baseless accusation was sufficient to cause arrest, torture, or even death for the people, without court trial or verdict. They were imprisoned most times for years.

In May and June 1951, from Budapest alone, about 60,000 people were deported to the countryside, regardless of age and religion. Their apartments were confiscated and given to people serving the regime.

Mr. MORRIS. May I break in there, Arpad?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. When they were deported to the countryside, that does not mean they were deported outside of Hungary; does it?

Mr. HAZAFI. No.

Mr. MORRIS. They were deported to a certain region of Hungary.

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us where that region was?

Mr. HAZAFI. It was near the Soviet border, but not out of the country, about in the district of Debreen, Miskolc, Bekescsaba, Nyiregyhaza.

Mr. MORRIS. Did some of the people return after they had been deported to that area?

Mr. HAZAFI. In 1953.

Mr. MORRIS. In 1953 they began to let some of them back?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes; but not to Budapest.

Senator JOHNSTON. What kind of work did they do when they were moved to this countryside?

Mr. HAZAFI. They weren't obliged—they had not to work in the countryside, they could live there without working if they had money enough. But somebody who had no money, he had to work to earn some money.

Mr. MORRIS. Proceed.

Mr. HAZAFI. The population lived in a fear entirely unknown in the free world, as no one knew if a knock on the door meant the appearance of AVH men and subsequent imprisonment. In 1953, when the Rakosi regime for a short time turned over power to Imre Nagy, the deportees were permitted to leave their places and return to their homes but not to Budapest.

Senator JOHNSTON. When you say they returned to their homes; did they get their homes back?

Mr. HAZAFI. No; they could return to the district of Budapest, but not to Budapest itself. They could live in the district of Budapest.

Senator JOHNSTON. But the property that had been confiscated, what happened to that, when they forced them out?

Mr. HAZAFI. Their apartments were taken on the day of deportation, in 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. After the apartments were confiscated, what happened?

Mr. HAZAFI. In 1953?

Senator JOHNSTON. In 1951, when they were forced out of Budapest.

Mr. HAZAFI. Those people that were faithful to the Communist regime they gave the apartments.

Senator JOHNSTON. The apartments had been taken away from them and given to someone else who was loyal to them?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes; to the Communist regime.

Senator JOHNSTON. Proceed.

Mr. HAZAFI. But Moscow disliked even that small measure of democratization brought on by the Nagy regime, and therefore these acts were soon followed by the Rakosi darkness.

Life in Hungary became a hopeless treadmill. The much advertised Soviet culture showed its influence in Hungary, too. We could not secure a good book to read and between 1949 and 1955 very seldom would the Russians let a good film in. The theaters had excellent actors but no plays.

The campaign and propaganda departments of the Communist Party puts its stamp on literature, theater and film, and directs all

fields of the art with "socialist realism." It is not a good painting or a statue that does not depict a worker or peasant during work.

It is understandable that, under such circumstances, people do not care to live and struggle. The Communist system completely extinguishes every individual initiative, the state expropriating without compensation every individual idea or invention. The people live from one day to the other without spirit, goal, or reason.

After Stalin's death and the XXth Soviet Party Congress, no changes were noted for a long time. Suddenly, as if the Kremlin pushed a button, the so-called "democratization" process of the Communists started.

The Moscow puppets, who until then followed the Stalin line, now started to dance backward, vilifying Stalin and his system, outbidding each other in doing so. At the same time the press criticized Stalin and his methods, it nevertheless continued to express the Communist spirit.

The real democratization was actually started by the intelligentsia. It is also an interesting symptom of the times, that young men filled with Communist ideology were the first ones who dared to give voice to non-Communist ideas.

The DISZ—Federation of the Working Youth—which was a Communist youth organization, started a debating circle called the Petöfi Kör. At these debates only young people took part at the start. However, later, they were joined by the writers, newspapermen, and scientists.

Many speakers, while of Communist belief, criticized sharply the sins of the Stalin era and objectively criticized also the mistakes of the "new look." Well-known writers, like Tibor Déry, Tibor Tardos, Sándor Fekete, public personalities like Géza Losonczy took part in this activity.

The Moscovite Communist also let its orators speak: Márton Horváth, chief editor of the Szabad Nép, Sándor Nógrádi, chief of the party's propaganda department, as well as Zoltán Vas, member of the Central Committee.

After a few days, upon the personal request of Mátyás Rákosi, the Szabad Nép in several articles condemned the debates, and later, on the basis of a decision of the Central Committee, the Petöfi circle was dissolved.

The embers continue to glow under the ashes. Great excitement and mixed feelings were caused by the publication that László Rajk and his companions were innocent when they were executed in 1949, on the basis of false accusations.

The people, while they cannot express it, believe that Rákosi and his clique are the murderers. They arranged, 6 years after the murder, a tragically looking funeral in the Kerepesi-ut cemetery. Over the metal coffins the falsely sounding unctuous funeral orations were held by the murderers themselves.

The press began to get more and more courage. It was hungry for truth, and men who were cut off from the voice of the press fought furiously for a copy of the Irodalmi Ujság—Literary Gazette—in which Gyula Hay, Judith Máriássy, Klára Fehér, and the rest criticized with courage, and with erupting force.

The "Hétföi Hirlap"—Monday News—appeared on the streets. Although it was edited by the same Ivan Boldizsár, who formerly

edited Communist papers, and who was the author of the Blue Book against Rajk, yet the people clamored for the new newspapers which promised a "new slate."

This clean slate was stained by blood and terror of the Russian forces that interfered in the internal affairs of Hungary.

While in our Hungary the elimination of the mistakes of Stalin and his dedicated disciple Rákosi had only started, events in Poland followed each other much faster. Wladislaw Gomulka, the Polish László Rajk, who during the Stalin era spent years in prison, took over the leadership of the United Polish Workers Party and immediately started to fight for the independence of his country. This is the pattern which will eventually develop in all the enslaved countries because humanity will not forever stand for tyranny and despotism.

MR. MORRIS. Now, Arpad, it might be said of you that you are an amateur photographer, or one who has a hobby of photography; is that right?

MR. HAZAFI. Yes.

MR. MORRIS. And when this uprising began, you used your camera a great deal, did you not?

MR. HAZAFI. Yes.

MR. MORRIS. Senator, the witness here today has brought in several hundred negatives of shots he has taken.

MR. HAZAFI. I beg your pardon; not myself only, but others, too, and I have some negatives I took myself.

MR. MORRIS. Of the approximately 300 you have given us, what percentage have you personally taken?

MR. HAZAFI. About 75 percent.

MR. MORRIS. And the rest were taken by people that you know, of scenes that you know about?

MR. HAZAFI. Yes.

MR. MORRIS. And you have come to the United States, have you not, in order to show the free world these pictures that you and your comrades have taken of the uprising?

MR. HAZAFI. Yes.

MR. MORRIS. Senator, we have blown up 10 of these. These photographs will accompany the narrative as we go along, and they will tell rather graphically precisely how the uprising began.

Will you read the next paragraph? I think you are going to begin with the second paragraph on the next page, are you not? How did it start?

MR. HAZAFI. Yes.

MR. MORRIS. You are skipping that first paragraph?

MR. HAZAFI. Yes.

How did it start? How did a peaceful demonstration of sympathy change into a revolution? Where did they get the arms? How is it possible to fight heavy tanks with small arms? These were the first questions to which people expected an answer. But let us take the events as they occurred:

Stalin's prediction. No matter how paradoxical it may sound, Stalin himself predicted the Hungarian events, even if he imagined them in a different way. In one of the works of the bloody handed dictator we read the following:

A revolution can only break out where a revolutionary soil already exists.

Well, this revolutionary soil really very much existed in Hungary. The peoples' bitterness, the 11-year terror and dictatorship, a hopeless future, the exposure of the leaders, the constant lies, the disregarding of public opinion, the complete agony of the economic situation, all were slowly burning in the individuals, waiting for the spark to put it into flames. This was the revolutionary soil, wetted by tears and blood, and plowed through by wounding and humiliating laws.

The spark. In the forenoon of October 23, 1956—

Mr. MORRIS. May I break in there. Is this photograph that you have of the demonstration the first one?

Mr. HAZAFI. That is the first.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the scene. You took this picture yourself, did you not?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the scene, then?

Mr. HAZAFI. The scene is Bem Square.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Bem was a Polish general, was he not?

Mr. HAZAFI. Polish general in the 1848 revolution in Hungary against the Hapsburg monarchy, when the Russians came to help the people defeat the Hapsburgs in the Hungarian revolution at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. This was a demonstration that was somewhat Polish in content?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes. It became that because the university students showed sympathy for the Polish people.

Mr. MORRIS. And just prior to this was the uprising in Poland which brought the Gomulka government into power; is that right?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And this demonstration was in sympathy for that?

Mr. HAZAFI. Sympathy demonstration.

Mr. MORRIS. And that was on October 23?

Mr. HAZAFI. In the afternoon, about 3 p. m.

Mr. MORRIS. And this is in Bem Square?

Mr. HAZAFI. Bem Square.

Mr. MORRIS. And Bem is a Polish general.

Now, what does that picture show?

Mr. HAZAFI. The picture shows the Bem statue, in the upper left the Danube River, and our Parliament House. This is the Foreign Ministry of Hungary, and there, where you cannot see, is a great barracks, military barracks.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, the name Budapest, the city takes its name from Buda on one side of the Danube, and Pest on the other side?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And this is in the Buda section?

Mr. HAZAFI. The Buda section.

Mr. MORRIS. How many people participated in that demonstration?

Mr. HAZAFI. About 25,000.


Mr. MORRIS. 25,000.

Senator, may this picture go into the record at this time?

Senator JOHNSTON. That will become a part of the record.

(The picture referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 411" and appears on the opposite page.)

EXHIBIT No. 411



Sixty thousand students gather at the Bem Statue in Budapest on the afternoon of October 23, to demonstrate peacefully against Soviet control of our country and in sympathy with the Poles. In the background is the Foreign Ministry Building, and in the distance the Parliament House.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything that you want to add, or have you told us the story about that?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

In the forenoon of October 23, 1956, everybody knew, although no newspaper or radio published it, that there will be a demonstration at the Petofi monument, at 3 p. m. The demonstration was organized and led by the university students. They were preparing already in the morning the signs which contained sympathy slogans for the Poles and which also demanded that Imre Nagy be reinstated in a leading State position.

Mr. MORRIS. You said, Mr. Hazafi, that was Bem Square. What is Petofi Square?

Mr. HAZAFI. Petofi is another part of Hungary, on the Pest side; they gathered there, and after that they went to Bem Square.

On some signs it read:

Let's talk with the Russians but on equal basis.

Some other signs said this:

Let the Russian troops be withdrawn from our land.

At the entrance of the university the students established a guard to prevent, that—for actual provocations—the authorities prohibit the meeting, the demonstration. This, notwithstanding Laszlo Piros, Minister of Internal Affairs, sent messengers and announced through the radio the prohibition of the youth movement.

This was the moment when it was decided whether the hated AVO is stronger or whether the youth of Hungary has retained its traditional desire for freedom. Peter Kucka, the poet, who is also a Communist, but was silenced during the Rakosi regime—Peter Kucka answered in the name of the young that the demonstration will take place regardless of the prohibition.

Mr. MORRIS. You have taken a picture of Peter Kucka, have you not?

Mr. HAZAFI. Not of Peter Kucka; he is Peter Veres.

Mr. MORRIS. You will come to him later?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes. At 2 p. m. the first deputy of the Minister of Internal Affairs was obliged to announce before the assembled people at the Technological University that the "collective" of the Interior Ministry decided to let the demonstration take place, but warned the young people of excesses.

Fekete tried to get at the head of the crowd but he was called down. The parade was ready. And the long-awaited demonstration began.

Waving multitude of the youth, for the first time, dared to carry signs with slogans which we until then dared only to express to the immediate members of our family, and not even that in every family:

"Get Rakosi before a court."

"Out with the Russians."

"Let's have independence," et cetera, et cetera.

Men and women on the street stopped and waved to the orderly marching youth.

At the Petofi monument-statue, Imre Sinkovitz, a young actor, declaimed Petofi's national song. The mass of the people with tears in their eyes repeated with the actor the refrains of the poem:

"We swear, we swear, we no longer will remain slaves." The voice of the people was terrifying, yet elevating. No police are in sight. Order is maintained by the youth wearing armbands.

Let us go to the Bem monument-statue. Events start to move more rapidly. The first flag appears, its center cut out, where the hated emblem stood, signifying colonial fate, satellite position.

At this moment we could have numbered about 60,000. One after another new flags appear until someone remembers to put the old Kossuth coat of arms on the flag in lieu of the cutout Communist emblem. A new flag was made by the mass.

In the meantime we all sang the Hungarian National Hymn, the Szozat appeal to the nation. This was followed by Peter Veres, who from the top of a loudspeaker car read the demands of the Hungarian writers, which on the whole corresponded with the demands of the young people.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a photograph. In this photograph Peter Veres is the gentleman with the mustache, just to the left of the right hand clenched?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes, he is Peter Veres, who is the leader of the writers' association in Hungary.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you take that photograph, too?


Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, may that photograph go into the record?

Senator JOHNSTON. Hearing no objection, it will be made a part of the record.

(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 412" and appears on p. 3206.)

EXHIBIT No. 412



Peter Veres (mustached man whose head is partly hidden by the clenched hand in foreground) in the midst of demonstrating students at Ben Square.

MR. HAZAFI. Tibor Deri, head of the Hungarian writers, intended to speak, but on account of the narrow space could not reach the car.

Let's go to the Parliament. Again we started and marched in orderly lines, now only with Hungarian flags, the new Hungarian flags, to the Parliament. During the march we were joined by workers returning from work so that, before the Parliament, already 150,000 men shouted their rightful demands. They were in a boiling mood.

Put out the red star on the Parliament roof! Notwithstanding the fact that many young men called to attention that the red star also is a symbol of the workers and the proletariat, those in the Parliament building put out the red star's light. Those in the Parliament did everything possible to calm the mass. But they have lied too much in the past, and they were clumsy, too.

Thirdly, just those who for years talked about the people and the workers, have failed to recognize the strength of the mass.

"We won't move from here until we hear from Imre Nagy that our demands will be fulfilled."

A crowd of 150,000 stood there like one man. The streetcars stopped on Kossuth Lajos Square. The Parliament is deaf. Then a thin voice is heard from the Parliament:

"Give us 20 minutes. Comrade Imre Nagy is on the way, and the loudspeaker is being set up."

It became dark in the meantime. Various cars with loudspeakers are among the crowd, but the people did not let everyone speak.

The 20 minutes are up and another characteristic deceit takes place. Instead of the promised loudspeakers by which the situation could have been saved, had Imre Nagy been at the microphone, the street lighting went out on Kossuth Lajos Square, 150,000 people stand there, stamping on each other, choking in the crowd and in darkness. Who could have thought of such abysmal meanness. Whoever he was, he did not realize what a mass can do if they really want something.

This baseness is characteristic of the Communists, of their depravity and cynicism, but better yet how they underestimate men. They figured that the crowd, like a little child, with the coming of darkness, will decide to quit and go to bed. Instead, clever young men improvised torches from newspapers. It was a wonderful sight to see 10,000 lighted torches.

Imre Nagy is constantly delayed, the crowd becomes more and more impatient. Let us go to the Stalin monument but no longer to declaim poems but to pull it down.

In the meantime, Imre Nagy arrives.

"Comrades"—he starts to speak but the crowd interrupts him. "There are no more comrades. We all are Magyars—Hungarians. Let us have some light on Imre Nagy." The lights of three pocket electric lamps now shine on Imre Nagy, who continues his speech.

In the meantime, someone else spoke through the Hungarian radio, someone who was hated by the entire Hungarian nation. It was Erno Gero, who made a speech calling the demonstrating university students Fascist mob and bandits.

MR. MORRIS. Do you know, as a matter of fact, whether Erno Gero was killed? There are reports that he was.

Mr. HAZAFI. I have heard that he was killed, but I am not sure that he was.

He did this at the same time while Imre Nagy declared from a Parliament balcony loudspeaker that the demand of young people and the Hungarian workers—no longer comrades—were justified.

"Imre Nagy to the radio" was the new slogan. Many marched to the radio station. Now the demonstration is held simultaneously in three places. At the Parliament, where Imre Nagy speaks, at the radio station where tear-gas bombs were thrown at the defenseless crowd and at the Stalin monument, where they unsuccessfully tried to pull down the statue with three tractors. God knows from where they got a couple of torch pistols, and now they try to cut down the statue of the hated dictator.

The first Soviet tanks appear but they are only onlookers. It is somehow characteristic of the entire political situation as the Stalin statue leans and leans, yet it is still held by its boots. It's pulled strongly by the tractors, the torch pistols work feverishly and the statue while bending, still stands. The crowd erupts in cheers.

In the meantime, news continues to flow from the Parliament, from the radio station, brought by civilian motorists or shouted from motor-trucks. At the radio station people were shot at. We go there by truck. Looking back from the Dozsa Gyorgy Street we still see how the Stalin statue falls forward with a tremendous noise to the ground.

So far I have written down myself. In a few days I will have finished about the revolution.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Hazafi, were you yourself ever a Communist?

Mr. HAZAFI. No.

Mr. MORRIS. How is it that you never joined the Communist Party, even though you worked for the Hungarian Communist government?

Mr. HAZAFI. I hadn't because I hated the idea myself, and I heard by my father that communism is slavery. And so I understood after 1949 that it wouldn't be a good thing to be a Communist, to work for the—I don't know if I could speak better English, but perhaps you understand what I am saying.

Senator JOHNSTON. Did the ones in authority over you know that you were not a Communist?

Mr. HAZAFI. I have never been a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. The Senator asked if your superior knew that you were not a Communist.

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes, they knew.

Mr. MORRIS. They knew what the Communist Party rolls were?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And they knew that you were not a Communist?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What percentage of all the people were Communists, under a Communist regime, roughly what percentage?

Mr. HAZAFI. Communists, or party members?

Mr. MORRIS. Party members.

Mr. HAZAFI. I don't know. About, I think, 15, 20 percent.

Mr. MORRIS. About 15 or 20 percent?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes. But I am not sure; perhaps more, perhaps less.

Mr. MORRIS. You have described here the original outbreak of this Hungarian revolution?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any knowledge that the United States or any foreign government took part at all in causing this original demonstration?

Mr. HAZAFI. Ask it once more.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the United States or any other government outside of Hungary spark or give rise to this revolution?

Mr. HAZAFI. No. I knew that this revolution was not for foreign interests, it was for Hungarians, made by Hungarians themselves, and it was quite spontaneous.

Mr. MORRIS. You say it was spontaneous?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you have described the spontaneity of it in this paper that you have prepared for us?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I wonder if we may get back to the photographs here. These tell the next part of the story, do they not, Arpad?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the third photograph. Was this taken by you?

Mr. HAZAFI. This photograph was taken by me on the 24th, after the day of the outbreak of the revolution, and shows the Stalin statue on the ground.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, this was torn down, as you told us in your narrative, on the night of the 23d, and it was taken by tractor over to the National Square?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

This is the most traffic point of Budapest. It is before our National Theater on the corner of Dozsa Gyorgy Street.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, there are marks on the statue?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes, there are descriptions. For instance, "W. C." means "water closet."

Mr. MORRIS. And what does "STRKI" mean?

Mr. HAZAFI. I cannot tell—

Mr. MORRIS. You told us in executive session it was a "low gigolo."

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And that is somewhat censored?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And is there anything else now about that photograph that you think we should know?


Mr. HAZAFI. I cannot tell about that.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, may this photograph go into the record?

Senator JOHNSTON. Hearing no opposition, it will be made a part of the record.

(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 413" and appears below:)

EXHIBIT NO. 413



Mr. HAZAFI. This photograph was made on the same day.

Mr. MORRIS. This is still October 24?

Mr. HAZAFI. 24th of October.

And this tank was taken from the Soviet Army. It is a T-34 type Soviet tank, with the Hungarian flag on the top of the tank. And they went with this tank to the Parliament House at noon, and before the Parliament House they demanded their rights, 30,000 people were demonstrating there on the Kossuth Lajos Square. And then the

Students and workers gather around the demolished Stalin statue in Budapest. The statue of the despised dictator was cut off at the knees by Hungarian patriots using acetylene torches, attached to tractors with ropes, and dragged 2 miles from Stalin Square to the corner of Ring and Rakoczi Streets—center of the heaviest traffic in the city. On the face of the statue is chalked the letters "W. C." (water closet).

people were surrounded by Soviet tanks, and from the roof of the upper house, it was the Ministry of Agriculture, the AVO shot the people.

Mr. MORRIS. This, now, is a captured tank—we call this photograph No. 4—this is a Russian tank, a T-34 type—

Mr. HAZAFI. I am not really an expert, but I think it is a T-34 type.

Mr. MORRIS. This was captured—

Mr. HAZAFI. By the freedom fighters.

Mr. MORRIS. By the freedom fighters, and there some of them are mounting it, and they are en route to the Parliament House where there is a demonstration taking place; is that right?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And in front of the Parliament House already 30,000 people have gathered?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes; there have been about 34,000 people.

Mr. MORRIS. While these people were demonstrating in front of Parliament House, Russian people opened fire on the crowd?

Mr. HAZAFI. The AVO people.

Mr. MORRIS. They first fired on the crowd?

Mr. HAZAFI. From the roof of the Ministry of Agriculture.

Mr. MORRIS. Then did the Russian tanks open fire?

Mr. HAZAFI. The Russian tanks opened fire onto the square.

Mr. MORRIS. And how many people were killed and wounded?

Mr. HAZAFI. About 600 people were killed and wounded.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything else now about that photograph No. 4 that we should know?

Mr. HAZAFI. I can relate, perhaps, that on the opposite side is a drug store fired out in the night, during the battle, during the night from the 23d to the 24th, there was a drug store there.

Mr. MORRIS. You took this photograph, did you?


Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, may this go into the record?

Senator JOHNSTON. This will be made a part of the record.

(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 414" and appears below:)

EXHIBIT No. 414



October 24. People have captured tank, placed on it the Hungarian national flag, and are taking it to Parliament House where 30,000 gathered to demonstrate.

Mr. MORRIS. That is photograph No. 5.

Mr. HAZAFI. No. 5 shows a window shop on about the 26th-27th, with the inscription:

"Free Election With U. N. Supervision."

The people wanted free elections, but they knew that unless it was with United Nations supervision, it wouldn't be free.

Mr. MORRIS. And a literal translation of that is "Free election with U. N. supervision"?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And this was taken on what date?

Mr. HAZAFI. The 26th or 27th, I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. And the window is on Rakosi Square?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And who was Rakosi?

Mr. HAZAFI. Rakosi was the 17th century great Hungarian revolutionist and freedom fighter, who led revolutions in the 17th century.

Mr. MORRIS. And he needs to be distinguished from the Rakosi who is one of the Communist leaders of Hungary?


Mr. HAZAFI. He is not the same.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, may picture No. 5 go into the record?

Senator JOHNSTON. This will become a part of the record.

(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 415" and appears below:)

EXHIBIT NO. 415



Another sign which was chalked on windows throughout Budapest during the early days of the freedom rebellion : "A Free Election With U. N. Supervision." This sign I photographed in a shop window on Hakoski Square.

Mr. MORRIS. Photograph No. 6.

Mr. HAZAFI. This photograph shows a bookstore on Kossuth Square.

Mr. MORRIS. And the building on the right is what building?

Mr. HAZAFI. This building is the Hungarian-Soviet Friendship House, and that is a bookstore from which the people order Soviet books and newspapers, they were taken to the street and put to flame.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the name of the bookstore?

Mr. HAZAFI. Horizont.

Mr. MORRIS. Translated, "Horizon" in English?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And what is depicted in that scene? What do you see there?

Mr. HAZAFI. The people have put out from the store all the Russian books and newspapers in the street, and it was put to flame.

Mr. MORRIS. Burned up?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you take that particular photograph?

Mr. HAZAFI. I don't remember; I was there, but I don't remember whether it was mine or some of my friends'.

Mr. MORRIS. But you were on the scene and you witnessed that?


Mr. HAZAFI. Yes, I have seen it.

Mr. MORRIS. And may photograph No. 6 go into the record?

Senator JOHNSTON. Photograph No. 6 will become a part of the record.

(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 416" and is reproduced below:)

EXHIBIT NO. 416



Workers and students burn books and plates from the Soviet library and book-store Horizont in Kossuth Lajos Square. We rejoice to see the hated Communist and Russian books go up in flames!

Mr. MORRIS. Next, No. 7; you did not take this photograph?

Mr. HAZAFI. No; but a friend of mine took it. It was made, I think he mentioned, in Dumbovar. And it is the first edition of the free press.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the first edition of the free press?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How long was this free press printed?

Mr. HAZAFI. Only, I think, 2 or 3 days.

Mr. MORRIS. And what is it called?

Mr. HAZAFI. Truth, Igazshaz.

Mr. MORRIS. Igazshaz is the Hungarian for the English word "truth?"

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And these people are dancing with joy; is that it?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes; they jumped up from a truck.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, may that No. 7 go into the record?

Senator JOHNSTON. No. 7 shall become a part of the record.

(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 417" and is reproduced below:)

EXHIBIT No. 417



The first issue of the new Hungarian free press reaches a village outside Budapest. Peasants eagerly grab copies of Igazság (Truth) as they are thrown from a truck.

Mr. HAZAFI. No. 8 shows a freedom fighter on the street, Rakosi Street. There was shooting, and people on the opposite side and here, too, were hidden behind trees and other places. The shooting was going on in the district of the Rakosi Hospital.

Mr. MORRIS. That is Rakosi Street, and Rakosi Hospital?

Mr. HAZAFI. Rakosi Street and Rakosi Hospital.

Mr. MORRIS. And did you take that particular picture?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, may this go into the record as photograph No. 8?

Senator JOHNSTON. It will become a part of the record.

(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 418" and is reproduced on p. 3219.)

EXHIBIT No. 418



A freedom fighter with an automatic rifle captured from the Soviets stands guard on Rakosi Street as the battle between patriots and Soviet tanks continues in the direction of the Rakosi Hospital. On Ulloj Road a children's hospital was fired on by Soviet tanks.

Mr. MORRIS. Photograph No. 9.

Mr. HAZAFI. Photograph No. 9 shows a dead freedom fighter, with the Hungarian flag covering him, with the inscription: "You didn't die for nothing."

Mr. MORRIS. You translated it before as: "You died for our freedom?"

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes, "You died for our freedom."

Mr. MORRIS. Is that what it says: "You died for our freedom"?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And the Hungarian national flag is there?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And the flowers are strewn alongside of the body?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You took that picture?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. May that photograph go into the record as photograph No. 9?

Senator JOHNSTON. Photograph No. 9 will become a part of the record.

(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 419" and is reproduced below:)

EXHIBIT No. 419



A Hungarian freedom fighter in death is covered with the Hungarian national flag and an inscription which says, "You died for our freedom."

Mr. MORRIS. And photograph No. 10.

Mr. HAZAFI. Another freedom fighter, dead freedom fighter, lying covered with flowers. I didn't make it myself, it was made by a friend of mine.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is the man on the lower left who is in the uniform?

Mr. HAZAFI. He is, I think, a railway man.

Mr. MORRIS. And he is legless?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. May this go into the record?

Senator JOHNSTON. It will become a part of the record.

(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 420" and is reproduced on p. 3223.)

EXHIBIT No. 420



Bodies of freedom fighters which lie on a Budapest sidewalk are covered with flowers. A legless veteran—a victim of World War II—is among the mourners.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, will you continue for us in the future your narrative, just as you have told us today?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, in addition to that, there are certain questions we would like to ask you.

Were you designated by the fighting forces back in Hungary to come and tell this story to the United States and to the United Nations?

Mr. HAZAFI. No, I myself, I had the idea myself to come to the free world to show what happened in Hungary, and to ask help from the free nations for my people.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you plan to go to the United Nations with your story?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes; if it is possible, I shall tell it to the United Nations, before the United Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you fraternize with any of the Russian soldiers, did you mix with and talk with at any time any of the Russian soldiers?:

Mr. HAZAFI. During my—

Mr. MORRIS. At any time.

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes; I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what was their attitude toward the Hungarian people, for the most part? Did they like the Hungarian people, were they well disposed toward them?

Mr. HAZAFI. They showed us they were delighted, but everybody knew it wasn't true.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any experiences whatever as to Russian forces joining with you in this demonstration, this uprising?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did any of the Russian officers or men at all participate with you?

Mr. HAZAFI. On the second or third day it happened that Russian tanks, a few Russian tanks, joined with the revolutionary youths, and they let the people put out Hungarian-national flags on the tanks. Everybody had the feeling that the Russians in this town and the second time would help the people against the hated secret policemen.

Mr. MORRIS. The feeling was that the Russian soldiers and the Russian officers would help you against the secret police?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes. And perhaps it was so, because I thought that these soldiers were Ukrainians, and later I heard that the Russians had changed their troops, and their troops were Mongolian troops.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, the first troops who seemed to be well disposed and whom the people thought would possibly join with them, they were replaced, they being Ukrainians for the most part, they were replaced by Mongolians?

Mr. HAZAFI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And when did that change take place?

Mr. HAZAFI. During the first 6 days.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any dealing with the AVH either before or after this uprising?

Mr. HAZAFI. Not myself; no.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you witness any of the torture chambers?

Mr. HAZAFI. No; I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you used the expression "AVO." Is that any different from AVH?

Mr. HAZAFI. The AVH is Allamvedelmi Hatosag, national security authorities, and the AVO is the national security section.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I would suggest, then, in view of the fact that this man has been pressured, he worked very late last night with us on the pictures—we have, as I say, two or three hundred of these things.

I think, Senator, with a little more time we can have a subsequent hearing in which we will complete the narrative and make available the rest of the pictures.

Senator JOHNSTON. Speaking for the subcommittee, I wish to thank you for coming here and giving us this information.

I personally think it clearly shows that the people of your country are not satisfied with the conditions there, and, if given an opportunity, they will throw off the yoke of communism in your country. These pictures show that you are willing to give your lives for that.

I think that it will be well that you do it as soon as possible, in order to save your country. I can say that myself.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, the next session of the committee will be at 10:30 tomorrow, when we will hear Lt. Gen. John W. O'Daniel, who was formerly the commanding officer of the Hawaiian Islands.

His testimony will be in connection with the subcommittee's forthcoming inquiry on communism in the Hawaiian Islands. That will be tomorrow morning at 10:30.

We will work further with this witness and develop further the narrative and the photographs.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p. m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a. m., Friday, November 16, 1956.)

INDEX

NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.

A

	Page
Agriculture, Ministry of (Hungary)-----	3211
American Hungarian Federation-----	3195, 3196
Andrassy Avenue (Budapest)-----	3186
Austria-----	3190
Austrian Minister of Interior-----	3190
AVH—Allamvedelmi Hatóság (Authority for the Protection of the State)-----	3188, 3188, 3192, 3193, 3198, 3199, 3223-3225
AVH headquarters-----	3188, 3189, 3192
AVO (national security section)-----	3204, 3211, 3225

B

Bekescsaba, Hungary-----	3199
Bem (Polish general in the 1848 revolution)-----	3202
Bem monument-statue-----	3205
Bem Square-----	3202-3204
Blue Book against Rajk-----	3201
Boldizsár, Ivan-----	3200
Border patrol-----	3185
Boston, Mass-----	3182
Budapest-----	3183, 3184
3186, 3188-3190, 3193, 3195-3199, 3203, 3209, 3210, 3214, 3217, 3223	

C

Cambridge, Mass-----	3182
Central Committee-----	3200
Communist/s-----	3181,
3183, 3189, 3191, 3192, 3197-3201, 3204, 3205, 3207, 3208, 3213	
Communist Party-----	3197-9199, 3208
Communist Youth Organization (DISZ)-----	3183, 3189, 3200
Czechoslovakia-----	3191

D

Danube River-----	3202
Debreen, Hungary-----	3199
Déri(y), Tibor-----	3200, 3207
DISZ (Communist Youth Organization)-----	3183, 3189, 3200
Dozsa Gyorgy Street-----	3208, 3209
Dunabovar, Hungary-----	3216
Dunapentele, Hungary-----	3197

E

Exhibit No. 411—Photograph of students gathered at Bem Statue in Budapest-----	3203
Exhibit No. 412—Photograph of Peter Veres in the midst of demonstrating students at Bem Square-----	3206
Exhibit No. 413—Photograph of students and workers gathered around demolished statue of Stalin in Budapest-----	3210
Exhibit No. 414—Photograph of captured tank flying Hungarian national flag-----	3212

	Page
Exhibit No. 415—Photograph of sign chalked on window in Rakosi Square during early days of freedom rebellion	3214
Exhibit No. 416—Photograph of burning books from Horizont (Horizon) Book Store, Kossuth Lajos Square	3216
Exhibit No. 417—Photograph of distribution of first issue of Hungarian free press (Igaszag)	3217
Exhibit No. 418—Photograph of freedom fighter standing guard with captured Soviet automatic rifle	3219
Exhibit No. 419—Photograph of a dead freedom fighter covered with Hungarian national flag	3221
Exhibit No. 420—Photograph of a dead freedom fighter covered with flowers	3223
F	
Farkas, Mihaly	3187
Fekete, Sándor	3200, 3204
Fehér, Judith Máriássy Klára	3200
Foreign Ministry of Hungary	3202, 3203
G	
Gero, Erno (Ernest)	3187, 3207
Gomulka government	3202
Gomulka, Wladislaw	3201
Györ (often called Rab), Hungary	3185, 3188, 3189
H	
Hammarskjold, Dag	3191
Hapsburg monarchy	3202
Hay, Gyula	3200
Hazafi, Árpád:	
Testimony of	3196-3225
Interpreter and sponsor, John Joseph Ronto of the American Hungarian Federation	3196
Hétföi Hirlap (Monday News)	3200
Horizont (Horizon) Book Store	3215
Horváth, Márton	3200
Hungarian Communist Party (MDP)	3192, 3197
Hungarian Communists	3191, 3208
Hungarian free press (Igaszshaz)	3217
Hungarian freedom fighters	3181, 3211, 3219-3223
Hungarian Government	3188, 3198
Hungarian military forces	3185
Hungarian national hymn	3205
Hungarian nationals	3187
Hungarian radio	3183
Hungarian-Soviet Friendship House	3215
Hungarian students	3183, 3184, 3193
Hungarian workers	3184, 3193
Hungarian writers	3205, 3207
Hungarians	3190, 3192, 3197, 3205, 3213, 3219, 3220, 3223
Hungary	3181, 3182, 3186-3189, 3191-3193, 3195-3199, 3201, 3202, 3204, 3205, 3208, 3213, 3223
I	
Igazshaz (Truth), Hungarian free press	3217
Interior, Austrian Minister of	3190
Interior Ministry	3204
Internal Affairs, Minister of (Hungary)	3204
International Rescue Committee	3182
Irodalmi Ujság (Literary Gazette)	3200
Iron Curtain	3198
J	
Johnston, Hon. Olin D.	3181, 3195

K

	Page
Kadar government	3187, 3189
Kerepesi-ut cemetery	3200
Kethly, Anna	3189-3191
Kossuth coat of arms	3205
Kossuth Lajos Square	3207, 3211, 3215, 3216
Kremlin	3200
Kucka, Peter	3204

L

Laszlo, Istvan:	
Testimony of	3182-3193
Interpreter, Marian Low	3182
Losonczy, Géza	3200
Low, Marian	3182-3193

M

Magyar (native and/or native language)	3195, 3207
Mandel, Benjamin	3181, 3195
McManus, Robert	3181, 3195
MDP (Hungarian Communist Party)	3197
Miskolc, Hungary	3199
Mongolian divisions	3191, 3224
Morris, Robert	3181, 3195
Moscovite Communist	3200
Moscow	3199

N

Nagy government	3189
Nagy, Imre	3186, 3199, 3204, 3207, 3208
National Square	3209
National Theater (Budapest)	3209
New York	3189, 3190
Nógrádi, Sándor	3200
Nyiregyhaza, Hungary	3199

P

Parliament House	3202, 3203, 3207, 3208, 3211, 3212
Petőfi Kör (a Hungarian youth debating group)	3183, 3200
Petőfi monument	3204, 3205
Photographs (see exhibits Nos. 411-420)	3203-3223
Piros, Laszlo (minister of Internal Affairs)	3204
Poland	3201, 3202
Polish	3202

R

Radio Free Europe Committee	3186, 3187
Rajk, László	3200, 3201
Rakosi (17th century Hungarian freedom fighter)	3213
Rakosi government	3187, 3199, 3201, 3204
Rakosi Hospital	3218
Rákosi, Mátyás	3200
Rakosi Street (Budapest)	3210, 3218
Rakosi Square	3213, 3214
Red Cross units	3190
Ring Street (Budapest)	3210
Ronto, John Joseph, American Hungarian Federation	3196
Rusher, William A	3181, 3195
Russia	3187
Russian/s	3187, 3189, 3191, 3193, 3199, 3201, 3202, 3204, 3211
Russian forces	3185, 3192, 3211, 3223
Russian military military forces occupying Hungary	3186

S

	Page
Security police (AVH)-----	3183, 3187, 3188, 3192, 3193, 3223-3325
Security police crematory-----	3188
Sinkovitz, Imre-----	3205
Sopron County, Hungary-----	3182, 3184
Sourwine, J. G-----	3181
Soviet -----	3186, 3188-3191, 3193, 3199, 3203, 3208, 3215
Soviet bloc-----	3191
Soviet memorial statue-----	3185
Soviet Party Congress, 20th-----	3200
Soviet Union-----	3187, 3191, 3198
Stalin-----	3200, 3201, 3207, 3208
Stalin monument-----	3208-3210
Stalin Square-----	3210
Szabad Nép-----	3200
Szelig, Imre-----	3190
Sztalinyaros (Stalin City, formerly Dunapentele)-----	3197

T

Tardos, Tibor-----	3201
Technological University-----	3204
Torture chambers-----	3188
Torture instruments-----	3188

U

Ukrainians-----	3224
United Nations-----	3189-3192, 3212, 3223
United Polish Workers Party-----	3201

V

Vas, Zoltán-----	3198, 3200
Veres, Peter-----	3204, 3205
Vienna -----	3189, 3193

W

Washington, D. C.-----	3181, 3195, 3196
West -----	3188
World War II-----	3190
World War II Government (Hungary)-----	3191

Y

Youth groups-----	3183
-------------------	------

O

DEPOSITORY

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE
UNITED STATES

DECEMBER 18 AND 19, 1956

PART 47

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1957

Boston Public Library,
Superintendent of Documents

JUL 25 1957

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr., Missouri
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
PRICE DANIEL, Texas
JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, Wyoming
MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia

ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota
WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
HERMAN WELKER, Idaho
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr., Missouri
PRICE DANIEL, Texas

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
HERMAN WELKER, Idaho
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland

ROBERT MORRIS, *Chief Counsel*
J. G. SOURWINE, *Associate Counsel*
WILLIAM A. RUSHER, *Associate Counsel*
BENJAMIN MANDEL, *Director of Research*

CONTENTS

Testimony of—	Page.
Bachki, Bela-----	3239
Bubos, Lexi (assumed name)-----	3300
Joseph, Max (assumed name)-----	3228
Kovacs, Istvan (assumed name)-----	3232
Ruff, Lajos-----	3243

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL
SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY
LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:10 a. m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Olin D. Johnston presiding.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; and William A. Rusher, administrative counsel.

Senator JOHNSTON. I am going to ask the interpreter to raise his hand to be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear that you will truly interpret to the witness the questions directed to him, and will truly interpret the answers given by the witness, to the best of your ability, and that you understand the language that he is speaking and can at all times interpret it? Will you do that to the best of your ability?

Mr. HADIK. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the reporter?

Mr. HADIK. My name is Laszlo, L-a-s-z-l-o, Hadik, H-a-d-i-k. The address is 4200 Cathedral Avenue NW.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you, as Senator Johnston administers the oath to the witness—and, Senator, may I say that the reason the witness today is appearing with this surgical mask and cap is that he has relatives who are still in Hungary, and his appearance here today would subject them to reprisals, in his opinion, and we are going to respect his wish to be anonymous, and therefore present him in this way, Senator, and also under an assumed name, for the record. He has given us his identity in executive session.

Senator JOHNSTON. I want the witness to feel free to answer the questions, and we are going to try not to ask him questions which will identify or embarrass him or his family.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, the subject of this morning's hearings, coming under the topic of tactics of world communism, is information and evidence we have received of efforts on the part of the Soviet Union to deport Hungarians from their own land, and Hungarians have been the object of mass deportation.

Now, we have arranged to have four witnesses here this morning, Senator. There has been a great delay in air traffic, and I am able to present only two of them here at this time, Senator, this witness and the one following, and it will be on the subject of mass deportations.

Senator JOHNSTON. Let the witness stand and be sworn, also.

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you give before this sub-committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. JOSEPH. I do.

TESTIMONY OF MAX JOSEPH (A FICTITIOUS NAME SUPPLIED BY THE WITNESS), THROUGH AN INTERPRETER, LASZLO HADIK, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us, without revealing your identity, approximately your age, and how long you have been in the United States?

Mr. JOSEPH. I am 20 years old. I would like to stay in America.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you been in the United States?

Mr. JOSEPH. Since the 10th.

Mr. MORRIS. That is December 10?

Mr. JOSEPH. Since December 10.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you born in Hungary?

Mr. JOSEPH. In Debrecen, in Hungary.

Mr. MORRIS. And you resided in Hungary all your life?

Mr. JOSEPH. Yes; I lived in Hungary.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you participate in the uprising in Hungary—October and November uprising?

Mr. JOSEPH. Yes; I did take part.

Mr. MORRIS. Again without identifying yourself, without revealing your identity, will you tell us generally what your role was in the uprising?

Mr. JOSEPH. I was in the armed resistance. I was myself fighting in Budapest.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything that you can tell us about whether or not the Soviet Union is now deporting Hungarians, either to the Soviet Union or outside of Hungary in general?

Mr. JOSEPH. The evidence I have concerns a written letter received by me with approximately 50 names signed to it, in which they were saying, "Help us. We are being deported."

Mr. MORRIS. You say you received a letter from 50 persons who wrote to you, and this letter said, "Help us. We are being deported"?

Mr. JOSEPH. This document was brought to the student association by a railroad worker.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you recognize the names of any of the persons signing that letter?

Mr. JOSEPH. I recognized approximately six such names of students who had been together with me in the students' dormitory.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you do when you received the letter?

Mr. JOSEPH. The students then decided to go to the homes of these people whose names I recognized, and there they found out that every single one of them had not been heard of for 5 days.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you persist in your efforts to find these people?

Mr. JOSEPH. Of the 6, we established without doubt that the 5 were not home for more than a week. And we spent the week searching for them.

Mr. MORRIS. What about the sixth?

Mr. JOSEPH. We didn't have time to track down the sixth, because he lived far out of town.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know anything more about what happened to this particular group of 50 people who sent the letter?

Mr. JOSEPH. I do not know anything definite.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any other evidence—

Senator JOHNSTON. When were you last in a position so that you could find out anything about them?

Mr. JOSEPH. This was on October 27 or 28, and the document was mailed from approximately the vicinity of Miskolc in northern Hungary, M-i-s-k-o-l-c.

Mr. MORRIS. How far is that from Budapest?

Mr. JOSEPH. Approximately 200 to 220 kilometers. It is very near the border.

Mr. MORRIS. Near what border?

Mr. JOSEPH. Near the Russian frontier.

Mr. MORRIS. So, in other words, if this thing was signed by students whom you knew as residents of Budapest, and it was mailed near the Soviet border, 200 kilometers from Budapest, the presumption you are engaging in is that they were en route to the Soviet border?

Mr. JOSEPH. There was no reason for the students to be in the vicinity that they were. The letter was delivered by a railroad worker, and the text of the letter said, "We are being deported to Russia. Please help us in any way you can."

Mr. MORRIS. Where is this letter now?

Mr. JOSEPH. This letter is, as far as I know, in possession of the students association still in Budapest.

At the same time, they copied this letter in many copies, and posted it as far, as wide, as they could in town.

Mr. MORRIS. Are any copies outside of Hungary now?

Mr. JOSEPH. No; as far as I know.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any other evidence of the fact that the Soviet Union is deporting fellow Hungarians?

Mr. JOSEPH. The only other thing I know is that a colleague of mine who was a classmate of these six deported is now here in New York, and the address can be found out. I have not got it.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he the gentleman who was supposed to be down here with you this morning?

Mr. JOSEPH. No, it isn't. We couldn't find him in town, because I only got the notice late at night that I was to come here.

Mr. MORRIS. So you will assist us in making this man whom you mention now, available for testimony here?

Mr. JOSEPH. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. There was another incident that you told us about in the office a little while ago, which indicated to you that the Soviets were actively deporting Hungarians.

Mr. JOSEPH. I talked to refugees in Austria, other refugees, who had already been rounded up from the streets, put into vans, and only at the last minute before being shipped out of Budapest could they escape.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything more you can tell us on this particular subject?

Mr. JOSEPH. These students, these people had also been rounded up in Budapest, and the only other evidence that I can think of is having

talked to a number of people who had rushed to them asking for help, because a member of their family or their husband had been grabbed by the Russians under some pretext or other.

Mr. MORRIS. You had encountered people who had rushed to them for assistance because these people had contended that their relatives had been deported?

Mr. JOSEPH. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us about that?

Mr. JOSEPH. One case is of a young couple. He was a driver, and he went down out of the apartment to bring something home, and the police, the Russians, arrested him on the street under the pretext of his papers not being in order, and of taking him down to the station, so to speak, to fix up his papers.

His wife had known that this was, in Budapest, the equivalent of being taken away without—and never being returned. That excuse apparently had been used before.

Another story that I saw was approximately 160—

Mr. MORRIS. You saw?

Mr. JOSEPH. Yes; I saw—approximately 160 to 200 people assembled at the railroad station, the west station. Of course, I don't know for what reason, but they were assembled in the railroad station, and they were herded in to wait—

Mr. MORRIS. What?

Mr. JOSEPH. They were herded in all together, and guarded.

Mr. MORRIS. By the Soviets?

Mr. JOSEPH. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And these 160 to 200 people were Hungarians?

Mr. JOSEPH. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you recognize any of them or did you know who any of these people were?

Mr. JOSEPH. I recognized a number of students from the medical faculty of the university.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what happened to them?

Mr. JOSEPH. No; I don't know what happened to them, because they were not close enough friends. I knew them, but they were not close enough friends for me to be particularly interested in their fate, and because circumstances and other activities carried me away from there.

Mr. MORRIS. Now when you beheld them, were they closely herded together, or did they occupy a broad area?

Mr. JOSEPH. They were collected in one waiting room, and armed guards were keeping them in there.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any other evidence that you encountered that would indicate that Hungarians were being forcibly expelled from Hungary?

Mr. JOSEPH. I can't remember any.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you witness any Russian defections from the Soviet Army?

Mr. JOSEPH. I personally never saw any, but I had constantly heard stories of that happening.

Mr. MORRIS. I don't know, Senator, whether, regarding things he didn't see with his own eyes, whether you would want to have what he did here in the record.

Senator JOHNSTON. I think it would be well to put that in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what you did there?

Mr. JOSEPH. I have one story of paratroopers having been dropped in the vicinity of Szekesfehervar, S-z-e-k-e-s-f-e-h-e-r-v-a-r—that is about 60 kilometers southeast of Budapest—of the paratroopers having been dropped there, and as they were landing they didn't know where they were. They didn't know they were in Hungary. As soon as they found out that they had been in Hungary, they threw their uniforms off.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you believe that story to be accurate, and if so, why?

Mr. JOSEPH. I believe it to be true, because I heard it from more than one unrelated source, and because one of the people who told it to me is a friend of mine, and I believe that that person would tell the truth.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the friend of yours see it?

Mr. JOSEPH. I can't answer that exactly.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any other information that you feel you have which you should give this subcommittee which is now taking into consideration the tactics of world communism?

Mr. JOSEPH. One very important fact that I would like to mention is that the Russian soldiers did not know that they were fighting in Hungary when they were brought in. It was a well-known fact in Hungary that the Russians were looking for the Suez Canal. Some of them believed themselves to be in Western Germany, and they all were convinced they were fighting against Fascists.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything more you want to tell us about that?

Mr. JOSEPH. This happened, these Russian soldiers who believed that they were in Western Germany or were looking for the Suez Canal, were those who had arrived in Hungary subsequent to the revolt; and it is also, was also a well-known fact in Hungary that the Russian soldiers who had been on Hungarian soil before did not wish to fight against the Hungarians, and for this reason the newly arrived troops would encircle them in some way or keep them close to their barracks.

Mr. MORRIS. Encircle the occupying troops?

Mr. JOSEPH. The occupying troops.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that?

Mr. JOSEPH. This is a story which is current in Hungary, all people know of it, and the only proof I have got of it is having talked to a Russian soldier.

Mr. MORRIS. You spoke to a Russian soldier?

Mr. JOSEPH. I spoke to a Russian soldier, who told me they had been sent to fight against Fascists, but when they had found out it was against the Hungarian people they were fighting, they decided that they were not going to carry out their orders. And this soldier, though he didn't fight on the Hungarian side, he allowed the students to take his tank.

Mr. MORRIS. Were there many such examples as that?

Mr. JOSEPH. I have heard of many, and I have personally seen 3 or 4 such examples of Russians handing over their tanks.

Mr. MORRIS. You have seen it with your own eyes?

Mr. JOSEPH. Yes. Yes; with my own eyes.

Mr. MORRIS. This other episode, a Russian soldier told you personally that he had allowed—

Mr. JOSEPH. Yes; I personally talked to the Russian soldier.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I think that about covers the subject. Because of the shortness of time this morning, because of the late planes, we have not been able to have an extended session with this particular witness, or even with the subsequent one, but I suggest that maybe if he stands by and maybe if he stays in the back of the hearing room here, Mr. Bachki is back there, and he might talk with him further; and if there is any more information he has, we can bring him back.

Senator JOHNSTON. I think it would be well.

One other thing before you go. Mr. Interpreter, would you give him a pseudonym that would serve to identify him?

Mr. JOSEPH. I have chosen Max Joseph.

Senator JOHNSTON. Thank you very much.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, the situation I described prior to the testimony of the last witness prevails as to this next witness. He, too, has relatives in Hungary, and he has asked us to conceal his identity for fear of reprisals against his relatives; and, Senator, inasmuch as it is a most understandable request, and he has identified himself to us in executive session, we do know the people with whom he is staying here in the United States, and he, too, will testify on that same general subject as the preceding witness, Senator, we are going to respect his wish.

Senator JOHNSTON. Will the interpreter please stand and take the oath?

Do you solemnly swear that you will truly interpret to the witness the questions directed to him, and will truly interpret the answers given by the witness, to the best of your ability, and that you also understand the language that he speaks, so help you God?

Mr. HADIK. I do.

Senator JOHNSTON. Let the witness be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KOVACS. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you a pseudonym that can be used for the purpose of this testimony today?

Mr. KOVACS. Stephen, or I-s-t-v-a-n, Kovacs, K-o-v-a-c-s.

TESTIMONY OF ISTVAN KOVACS (A FICTITIOUS NAME SUPPLIED BY THE WITNESS), THROUGH AN INTERPRETER, LASZLO HADIK

Mr. MORRIS. When did you come to the United States?

Mr. KOVACS. Four days ago.

Mr. MORRIS. Today is December 18. That was December 14.

Were you born in Hungary?

Mr. KOVACS. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How old are you?

Mr. KOVACS. I am wondering whether I have to give—

Mr. MORRIS. If it tends to identify you, naturally you do not.

If you give your approximate age, that would be satisfactory. Mr. KOVACS. I am under 30 years old. That is all I would care to say.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you participate in the recent uprising in Hungary? Mr. KOVACS. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us, without identifying your precise role, tell us generally what role you had in that particular uprising?

Mr. KOVACS. The revolt had started on the 23d of October, and on the 25th of October was the massacre in front of the Parliament Building at 10 o'clock in the morning, and from that moment on I was a fighting participant in the revolt.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you experience the massacre in front of the Parliament Building on October 25?

Mr. KOVACS. I was present on the Parliament Square when they shot down around four to five hundred people.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about that?

Mr. KOVACS. Around 10:30 on the morning of the 25th, a number of tanks, manned by Hungarian students flying the Hungarian flag, were converging on the Parliament from various directions. The students on these tanks were yelling to the crowds that the Russians had defected to their side, and that there was going to be a large meeting in front of the Parliament.

Mr. MORRIS. May I break in there to ask, do you know that the Russians were defecting to your side?

Mr. KOVACS. This was the first time we had heard that the Russians were defecting. We were very surprised when we heard this.

Mr. MORRIS. As a matter of fact, were the Russians defecting at that time?

Mr. KOVACS. It was not just a rumor, because the very tanks which the Hungarians were riding in had belonged to the Russians, and in many cases Russian drivers were still driving the armored cars which were covered by Hungarian students.

Mr. MORRIS. The Russian drivers were still in the tanks?

Mr. KOVACS. They were still on the armored cars.

Mr. MORRIS. Proceed with the narrative. I am sorry I interrupted you.

Mr. KOVACS. As a result of this, in front of Parliament, approximately, according to my judgment, 5,000 to 10,000 people had assembled. They sang the Hungarian national anthem, and then in rhythmic chants demanded the removal of Gero, G-e-r-o, from the Government.

Mr. MORRIS. He is the Hungarian Communist leader?

Mr. KOVACS. Yes. He was first secretary of the Communist Party at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. His first name is Ernest?

Mr. KOVACS. Ernest.

Mr. MORRIS. Proceed with the narrative.

Mr. KOVACS. On the square at the entrance to the Parliament Building, there were Russian tanks and machineguns, and, on the buildings all around the square, Hungarian secret police, AVH men, were in hiding with machineguns.

They didn't think that this was any danger, first of all because they were so surprised by the fact that some Russians had defected, and

secondly, because they were completely unarmed, and never had a second thought about being shot upon, under the circumstances.

When this crowd assembled, they were allowed to sing the national anthem in peace, because the secret police didn't know their intentions yet. But when they demanded in chants the removal of the first secretary of the Communist Party, then they realized that this was some sort of revolution, and the first machinegun that I know of started shooting from behind the iron bars of one of the entrances to the Parliament Building.

The crowd dispersed in panic, and many stayed there, lying around, some dead, some wounded, and some, also, who were either trampled to death or were pretending that they were already dead so that they wouldn't be shot at.

That is when my activity started, when I returned for three truck-loads of wounded from the square.

Mr. MORRIS. From that time on, you participated in the uprising?

Mr. KOVACS. Yes, then. Until then, of course, I was all for it, but this is the first time that I took active part as a soldier.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you the object of any deportation effort on the part of the Soviets?

Mr. KOVACS. Yes; I was, around November 15 or 16, after the Russians had returned with the new troops.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us what happened.

Mr. KOVACS. Three days before this date, three railroad—

Mr. MORRIS. Three days before November 15?

Mr. KOVACS. Three days before the 15th, 16th, three carloads came in from Eger with antitank weapons hidden under straw, and that came into Budapest; although the fighting was not at its highest then, they were still preparing and ready for more.

Mr. MORRIS. These are Hungarian guns?

Mr. KOVACS. These were, of course, Russian munitions, but they were smuggled into Budapest by Hungarians.

Mr. MORRIS. For use of Hungarians?

Mr. KOVACS. Yes. Two railroad workers notified us of the fact that these weapons had arrived.

There were not many. They were under straw in these vans. We couldn't get to these weapons, although we had heard 3 days before the 15th of their arrival; we couldn't get to it because the west station was so heavily guarded by the Russians.

On the 15th or 16th, we went to the railroad station, sometime between nightfall, when it got dark, and the curfew, which, according to my memory, is somewhere either 8 or 9 o'clock at night.

The plan was to bring them out of the station into a building somewhere in the vicinity of the railroad station.

Of the 9, 5 approached the railroad cars, 4 staying a little bit behind, but, the minute we arrived as far as the railroad cars, we were surrounded by the Russians. The Russians then arrested all nine of us, plus another Hungarian who didn't belong to our group.

They took us out through a side entrance of the railroad station and put us in a Russian truck whose sides were boarded up. This was the Russian regulation army troop transport.

In front of this truck there was parked a Russian officer's car with more than one aerial, presumably radio aerial, on it. There were very

few people on the street, because the curfew had come, and we spent the night in this truck—the better part of the entire night.

At dawn, about 3 or 4 other such trucks joined our group, which were also full of Hungarians, not all students, but some older men together with them.

With these newly arrived people together, we were taken to the same railroad cars which we had tried to reach the evening before. The straw was still in the railroad vans, but the weapons were no longer there.

Approximately 80 people were gathered by then, and we were locked in these 3 vans, which were coupled together, on a siding which was out of the way.

Mr. MORRIS. You were locked in a van?

Mr. KOVACS. It was the normal red-colored cattle van, and we were locked in.

Mr. MORRIS. How many to a van?

Mr. KOVACS. Approximately 25 in my van, and they were more or less evenly scattered.

Mr. MORRIS. This made for crowded conditions inside the van?

Mr. KOVACS. There was still some more could have fitted in.

Senator JOHNSTON. That is, standing up.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you remain in the van?

Mr. KOVACS. I stayed—I was locked in some time at dawn on the day after I was captured, and I stayed—I was freed about 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the next day, so it was more than 24 hours.

Mr. MORRIS. Before we get to that part of the story, I want to ask you, How big are these vans? Do they compare with our boxcars, railroad boxcars?

Mr. KOVACS. I can't compare it to an American thing, but my estimate is that it is 5 or 6 meters long; that is, 5 or 6 yards long.

Mr. MORRIS. That is considerably smaller than our boxcar.

Senator JOHNSTON. Have you seen the French boxcars? About the same as that?

Mr. KOVACS. Approximately the same as the Austrians. They are considerably small, is all I know.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you remain in this van?

Mr. KOVACS. I made a mistake before. I was locked into the truck on the street outside the railroad station at approximately 8 o'clock at night, and 5 o'clock in the morning I was moved to the cattle van, and on the same day, at about 2 or 3 in the afternoon, I escaped from that.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances about the escape?

Mr. KOVACS. The vans were locked from the outside, but they were poorly guarded, and among the guards was a Hungarian secret-police man, too. We only met the Hungarian guarding us at 5 o'clock when we were transferred from the truck to the cattle van.

Mr. MORRIS. Five in the morning?

Mr. KOVACS. Five in the morning. This Hungarian secret-service man let us all know if we were to be loud or to start yelling we would be shot down, and not to raise our voices for this reason.

In spite of this, we did talk quietly between cars, and I succeeded in communicating to one of the railroadmen who had brought these three vans up from Eger, and he had also been arrested at the same time.

I thought there might be a chance to escape, and so I sort of lagged behind with the group, and that is why I was put in a different car from what my friends were, and also this railroadman. Therefore, they were one car away.

This railroadman talked to me from the other van, and said that he was quite certain we were going to be deported.

By this time it was a well-known fact in Budapest that deportations were going on, and I myself had talked to people who believed that their relatives had been deported.

Mr. MORRIS. Because they had disappeared?

Mr. KOVACS. Because they had disappeared.

Two other gentlemen were in the van, and they had been captured in another part of Budapest already, 24 hours before I was, and they, too, had been kept in a cellar until they were moved to this van.

Senator JOHNSTON. Approximately how far from the place where you were captured?

Mr. KOVACS. These two prisoners didn't say where the cellar was where they were imprisoned, but they were captured on the other side of the Danube in Buda, which is approximately 4 to 5 kilometers away.

We were convinced and are convinced today that unless we had been freed, we would have been deported, although we have no proof of that.

Mr. MORRIS. What other evidence have you or what other experience have you had with circumstances indicating that deportation is going on?

Mr. KOVACS. One of these two railroad men who had brought the arms to Budapest was not arrested, and it is probable that one who had organized our release at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. And the reason I have to believe that we were going to be deported is that this railroadman came and freed me, saying that is what he was freeing me from.

Mr. MORRIS. Freeing you from deportation?

Mr. KOVACS. Deportation.

Mr. MORRIS. To the Soviet Union?

Mr. KOVACS. Our only rumors were that it was Russia, not any other place.

Senator JOHNSTON. How many others were freed?

Mr. KOVACS. All three vans were freed by the railroadmen.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of any other instances or of any other evidence which would indicate that the Soviet Union is deporting Hungarians?

Senator JOHNSTON. Just to get the record clear, where were the guards when you were freed?

Mr. KOVACS. The things happened so fast, we didn't stop to investigate how it had happened, but we have a suspicion that the guard or two guards who were left there while the others had gone to lunch, were bribed by some sort of alcohol, bribed with some drink.

Mr. MORRIS. The fact of the matter is that you knew the doors were opened and everyone got out; is that right?

Mr. KOVACS. Yes. Even a couple of seconds before the doors opened, I had heard Hungarian voices saying, "Escape as soon as you can, because the Russians are on their way back."

Senator JOHNSTON. Do you know of any Russian soldiers that had been punished in any way for helping or aiding and assisting in the revolt?

Mr. KOVACS. At the massacre on Parliament Square, the Russians who were driving the armored cars on which the Hungarians were riding, were also shot on the spot.

Mr. MORRIS. The Russians were shot on the spot?

Mr. KOVACS. The Russians were shot on the spot because they were driving the armored cars on which the Hungarians were riding.

One thing which was missed, the railroadman who was locked up with me in the train or in the next van, had come from Eger, the town of Eger, which is on the Russian border, and he based his idea that they were going to be deported on the fact that he had seen such vans going through.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, this man who was in the car with you yourself, had seen vans going across the border?

Mr. KOVACS. He asserted with complete certainty that he had seen such vans going through his town in the direction of Russia.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us more about that. How many vans?

Mr. KOVACS. We were concerned with quite different things from finding out, and therefore the conversation never came to a number, how many.

Mr. MORRIS. But were they the same kind of cattle vans that we are discussing?

Mr. KOVACS. According to the rumors, there must have been a number of such train units leaving Hungary, and they were all, as far I know, cattle vans. There was no passenger transport.

Mr. MORRIS. Did this man, the railroadman in the car with you, know that they contained Hungarians?

Mr. KOVACS. He was quite certain of the fact that Hungarians were in these vans that he was reporting about.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any other evidence or information which indicated that deportation was going on? I think you mentioned that in executive session.

Mr. KOVACS. It was a commonly discussed topic that a certain number of vans had left Hungary along the Russian border, from which Hungarian yells and screams were heard, yells for help.

Mr. MORRIS. At the border?

Mr. KOVACS. Yes, near the border.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you notice any defections on the part of Russian troops?

Mr. KOVACS. Apart from the tanks which joined them at the Parliament house, I have heard directly from workers in the Csepel factory that they had a number of Russians fighting alongside with them.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything more you can tell us about that subject?

Mr. KOVACS. As a personal opinion of mine and my compatriots, everywhere in the west, including Austria and here, the organization and the might of the Russian troops is vastly overestimated; we were in no sense as awed by the strength of the Russians when we were meeting them in the field.

We don't consider the Russian soldiers personally very effective, and if we had had antitank weapons, the fight would probably still be going on today.

Their organization is bad, too, because I know from experience where I was fighting, that for many hours, for lack of organization, the Russians were fighting each other, shooting at each other, by accident.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us about that?

Mr. KOVACS. This square is called Moricz, M-o-r-i-c-z, Zsigmond, Z-s-i-g-m-o-n-d, and that was one of the centers of the revolt. The freedom fighters had captured the square, and the Russian armor had surrounded them.

When the freedom fighters had become weak, then they decided to retreat, and they sifted out through the buildings, one by one. And we know for a fact that 2 or 3 hours later the Russians were still shooting, although the Hungarians were not there, presumably thinking the Hungarians were still encircled. This was at night.

I have talked to a number of eyewitnesses who saw the Russians hand over their armor, including tanks, for food, a couple of kilograms of bread, for instance, because they were so badly supplied.

One of the reasons we didn't consider them very serious and good soldiers was because, with a bottle of brandy we could achieve almost anything with the Russian soldiers.

I have a very good and reliable friend who was asked by the Russians where the Suez Canal is inside Hungary.

We heard of a number of incidents from eyewitnesses, of those Hungarians who could speak Russian and talk to the Russian soldiers, and tell them what the situation was, whom they were fighting against; and in practically every one of those cases, the Russians refused to continue to carry out their orders.

Upon escaping from Hungary, I got the impression that the Russian soldiers were also very afraid, because particularly at night when it was dark, they never separated; they always stayed in large groups, and almost always within the shadow of their tank.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything else that you feel you can tell this Senate Internal Security Subcommittee about the general subject of Soviet tactics and Soviet world communism?

Mr. KOVACS. Apparently, when the new Russian contingents arrived they, in almost every case, replaced the ones who were there; and as far as I know, they either completely relieved the old ones, shipping them home, or just sent them to another area where they were unknown and where they didn't, they couldn't communicate, where they didn't communicate with the people.

Mr. MORRIS. Were they Far Eastern troops or Mongolian troops that replaced the old troops?

Mr. KOVACS. In the last few days, they were Mongolian troops.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean by "in the last few days"?

Mr. KOVACS. Approximately between November 10 and 15, just before I left.

Mr. MORRIS. The Mongolian troops were replacing the occupying troops?

Mr. KOVACS. That is when we for the first time saw a larger number of these Mongolian faces.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

Mr. Joseph, I wonder if I could ask you the same question back there. Were the troops that came in—I understand, Mr. Bachki, you

sent up word after you talked to him back there that the troops that replaced the occupation troops were Far Eastern troops.

Is that true, Mr. Joseph?

Mr. BACHKI. He told me just a little while ago new troops were brought in from as far as 6,500 miles, and some Russians with whom they could speak claim the reason for that being that anyone staying in a country like Hungary cannot be trusted by the Russian command.

He also claims that whatever the Kadar radio, the official Hungarian radio, broadcasts about workers going back to their factories is true only insofar as these workers go in there to pick up their food cards. But whenever they hear, the Hungarians hear, the broadcast that 70 or 80 percent are working in a certain factory, they just smile.

Mr. MORRIS. Well now, Mr. Bachki, you will swear, will you not, inasmuch as we have been taking this testimony, sworn testimony, of the interpreter, I wonder, just so that our record will be perfect, Mr. Bachki, will you be sworn to testify that the answers Mr. Joseph gave you were the ones you just gave us?

Mr. BACHKI. Yes.

Senator JOHNSTON. Do you solemnly swear that you will truly interpret to the witness the questions directed to him, and will truly interpret the answers given by the witness, to the best of your ability, so help you God?

Mr. BACHKI. I do.

TESTIMONY OF BELA BACHKI, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address, Mr. Bachki?

Mr. BACHKI. B-e-l-a, B-a-c-h-k-i, Bela Bachki, 527 Mills Building, Washington, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bachki, the answers that you gave us were the answers given to you by Mr. Joseph, which was the assumed name of the man sitting back there?

Mr. BACHKI. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. They were the answers given to you in response to the question I put to you?

Mr. BACHKI. Yes, sir.

TESTIMONY OF ISTVAN KOVACS—Resumed

Mr. KOVACS. One other matter I want to tell you is that communism doesn't exist in Hungary any more, and apparently there are no more than a few thousand people on whom the Russians can in any sense rely inside Hungary.

Senator JOHNSTON. What has caused that change?

Mr. KOVACS. The Communist regime, from the very beginning, from Gero's first regime all the way to Kadar, had made so many mistakes and had been caught in so many falsehoods that even the most convinced Communist was no longer taking him seriously. And whereas a Titoist or Gomulka type of communism would have slightly more adherents than the Russian type, that doesn't amount to a serious number, either.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions.

I want to thank the witnesses, these two witnesses this morning, Senator, who came with relatively short notice. I mean we had asked that they come down here, but by the time the notice was brought to them, we found we had to rush them to be brought here, Senator. And with the bad weather that prevailed overnight, as I say, we have only 2 of the 4 people we expected to have here this morning.

Senator JOHNSTON. The committee wishes to thank you for coming here, both of you, and testifying today and giving us the information that you have concerning the situation in Hungary.

I have here also a letter written to the editor of the Washington Post of today, which I ask be printed in the record at this time, in that it is from Mr. W. C. Wentworth, a member of Parliament of Australia.

Mr. MORRIS. He is a well-known member of the Australian Parliament. He has a proposal here with respect to the Hungarian situation.

Senator JOHNSTON. In this article there is set forth a suggestion that I think would be well worth putting into the record, and calling it also to the attention of our representatives in the United Nations.

(The article referred to was marked "Exhibit No. —," and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT 406

[Washington Post, December 18, 1956]

MARCH INTO HUNGARY

It is intolerable that the Secretary General of the United Nations, acting upon the instructions of the General Assembly, should be refused access to Hungary and thus prevented from seeing what is happening there and reporting the facts to the world.

The time has surely come when the General Assembly itself has both the right and the duty to convene in Budapest and to rebuke by its physical presence those who deny life and liberty to their fellow men.

Therefore, let the delegates to the United Nations Assembly gather unarmed on the Hungarian frontier and march peacefully across it, giving thereby a moral lead to the world in deeds as well as in words. If they should be subjected to obstruction, indignity or murder, then at least the whole world would know the nature of the threats which face it, and the Hungarian people would know that they do not suffer alone.

The delegates are the accredited representatives of humanity and in the present crisis must be prepared to risk their lives like any soldier on the firing line or any citizen in Budapest streets.

If some of the religious leaders of the world would walk across the frontier together with the Assembly they would be acting in conformity with the traditions which they guard. Since nobody should suggest such a venture unless he himself is prepared to share in it, I would add that I would be willing to accept appointment as Australian delegate to the United Nations for this purpose.

W. C. WENTWORTH,
Member of Parliament.

CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA.

Senator JOHNSTON. I want to also say this: I am asking that the transcript of this hearing, and further hearings on this subject, be transmitted to the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge. This evidence bearing on Soviet tactics is not only of interest to Congress, but should be known to our delegate to the United Nations, and for that reason I am asking that it be transcribed and sent on to him.

Mr. MORRIS. That will be done, Senator, as soon as we get the transcript back.

Senator, I might add that since the hearing has commenced, Mr. Lajos Ruff, whom Mr. William A. Rusher of our staff interviewed in Vienna last week for the subcommittee, arrived in the country this morning, and is available for testimony.

I suggest, Senator, we have an executive session with him this afternoon, so that he may be prepared to testify tomorrow morning. He was in the midst of a 15-year sentence, had served 3½ years of a 15-year sentence, when the uprising commenced in October.

I have no more witnesses prepared to testify now, Senator. I want to thank the interpreter, who came down here at great personal sacrifice, and who was very helpful to us today, sir.

Senator JOHNSTON. The committee is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to call.)

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL
SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY
LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11 a. m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Olin D. Johnston presiding.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator JOHNSTON. The committee will come to order.

You will please call the name of the first witness.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, the hearing this morning is a continuation of what we commenced yesterday. In other words, these witnesses can give firsthand testimony of the Soviet organization's effort to deport Hungarians on a mass scale from Hungary to the Soviet Union. The two witnesses today are both qualified to give testimony on that particular score.

The first witness this morning is Mr. Ruff, who has told us that he will testify without a mask. He has not expressed the fear that the other has of reprisals against his relatives in Hungary.

Senator JOHNSTON. I believe the interpreter has already been sworn.

Mr. MORRIS. He was sworn yesterday.

Mr. HADIK. My name is Laszlo Hadik.

Will you identify yourself for the record this morning?

Mr. MORRIS. And you were sworn yesterday?

Mr. HADIK. I was sworn yesterday.

Senator JOHNSTON. The witness will raise his right hand.

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you will give before the subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. RUFF. I do.

TESTIMONY OF LAJOS RUFF (AS INTERPRETED BY LASZLO HADIK)

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name to the reporter.

Mr. RUFF. Lajos Ruff.

Mr. MORRIS. And that is your true identity; is it not?

Mr. RUFF. That is my true identity.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, before getting into the concrete details of the particular subject for which the witness was called, the witness has a very interesting background, which I think would be of great

interest to the subcommittee in connection with this general subject of the tactics of world communism.

Mr. William Rusher, of our staff here, went to Vienna, and while there encountered Mr. Ruff, and has spent many hours with him, and I think Mr. Rusher is qualified to bring out the underlying background facts which I think are rather essential at this time, Senator. So if Mr. Rusher may take over—

Senator JOHNSTON. Mr. Rusher will take over.

Mr. RUSHER. Mr. Ruff, what is your age?

Mr. RUFF. Twenty-five and a half.

Mr. RUSHER. You were engaged at one time in resistance activities against the Communist government of Hungary, were you not?

Mr. RUFF. Yes.

Mr. RUSHER. Will you tell us, in a general way, the kind of activities that you engaged in, and what years they were, what time?

Mr. RUFF. I took part from 1951 on. This took the form of preparing the leaflets, in the 1953 election, against Rakosi at that time. In 1952 and 1953, for the May 1 demonstrations, we also prepared leaflets, and I also gave certain information to a Western correspondent friend of mine.

Mr. RUSHER. In the course of these activities, ultimately you and the people you were working with were apprehended by Hungarian Communist authorities; is that correct?

Mr. RUFF. Yes.

Mr. RUSHER. Can you tell us in a general way how you came to be apprehended by them?

Mr. RUFF. After I had become suspicious, a secret policeman had gotten me acquainted with a secret police captain, the AVH, and then he arrested me.

Mr. RUSHER. You say when you became suspicious; you mean, after they had become suspicious of you?

Mr. RUFF. Yes; after they had become suspicious of me.

Mr. RUSHER. And how did the Hungarian Communist police find out about your activities?

Mr. RUFF. Without suspecting it, I became a personal friend of Mr. Bela Roezaboeldyi. I didn't suspect that he was a member of the AVH, and I probably mentioned things to him which caused my arrest.

Mr. RUSHER. In other words, this AVH agent won your friendship and eventually betrayed you; is that what you mean?

Mr. RUFF. Yes.

Mr. RUSHER. When were you arrested?

Mr. RUFF. On August 10, 1953.

Mr. RUSHER. Will you tell us where you were taken and what happened to you, in the first period after your arrest?

Mr. RUFF. They took me to the secret police headquarters in the Fo Utca, and that is known as the special matters investigation department of the ministry of the interior.

Mr. RUSHER. Is that the AVH police?

Mr. RUFF. That was the AVH police, known under the pseudonym of special investigations department of the department of interior.

Mr. RUSHER. And what happened there?

Mr. RUFF. There, for approximately 6 to 8 weeks, closer to 8, they tried to get information out of me with common methods of torture,

and were particularly interested in whom I had given information to.

Mr. RUSHER. What sort of torture, that you call common?

Mr. RUFF. They burnt my hand—

Mr. RUSHER. Is that the scar you showed us on your hand yesterday?

Mr. RUFF. That is the scar.

Mr. RUSHER. Would you hold it up, please; just hold up your hand?

Mr. MORRIS. Let Senator Johnston see it.

Mr. RUFF. They knocked my teeth out.

Mr. MORRIS. How many teeth did you lose?

Mr. RUFF. Two on the left side.

They also burnt my feet. For 5 days I stood in a cell 60 centimeters by 60 centimeters, without food or water, or being let out.

For 2½ days I was in a room up to my waist in water, cold water.

Senator JOHNSTON. Sixty centimeters would be something in the neighborhood of 2 feet, wouldn't it?

The INTERPRETER. Two feet by two feet.

Mr. MORRIS. And how many days were you in the room of those dimensions?

Mr. RUFF. Five and a half days.

Mr. MORRIS. Go ahead.

Mr. RUSHER. These are the methods that you call common; is that right?

Mr. RUFF. That is what I call common methods of getting information.

Mr. RUSHER. So, is this what happened to you during this first period of 6 to 8 weeks after your arrest?

Mr. RUFF. This happened for the period of 6 to 8 weeks, and in the meantime, of course, they always took me out of the cell to ask me questions and grill me. One of the hearings lasted 36 hours without stop.

Mr. RUSHER. How did they come to knock out your teeth?

Mr. RUFF. After I had refused to answer 1 question, 1 of my inquisitors threw an iron ashtray at me, which I couldn't duck.

Mr. RUSHER. What happened after this period of 6 to 8 weeks, what came next?

Senator JOHNSTON. Now, then, to show something concrete, I think you should get up and show that hand.

Mr. MORRIS. Let Senator Johnston see the actual scar on your hand.

(The witness arises and comes around the table to meet Senator Johnston.)

Mr. RUSHER. I think you were about to tell us what happened in the second period, after the stage of 6 to 8 weeks of customary methods of obtaining information. What happened next?

Mr. RUFF. Then I was taken into special investigation, psychological investigation room, which we nicknamed the "bewitched room," in which they applied special psychological methods to us.

Mr. RUSHER. How long did that last?

Mr. RUFF. Also 6 weeks.

Mr. RUSHER. Will you tell us something about this room?

Mr. RUFF. One lived in this room day and night without getting out, and there was complete darkness outside the 1 ventilation—no light came in through the 1 ventilation hole in the wall. For this purpose there were special films designed which were shown to us

inside that room. There were lamps whose shades had holes in them and were continuously revolving on the ceiling.

They gave us constantly shots of scopolamine and mescaline.

Mr. RUSHER. I think, Senator, scopolamine is known in this country as a drug that weakens the will and weakens a person's power to resist.

Go ahead, please.

The INTERPRETER. Mr. Ruff would like to comment here that he has agreed to write an article about this, and therefore he would like to answer only questions which the committee puts to him.

Mr. RUSHER. All right. We have understood that, and we will take further information in this regard in executive session.

Mr. MORRIS. Unless the Senator wishes to the contrary.

Senator JOHNSTON. Proceed, and I will pass on it as the questions are asked.

Mr. RUSHER. All right, then.

Will you tell us, Mr. Ruff, how long this lasted? You said 6 weeks?

Mr. RUFF. Six weeks.

Mr. RUSHER. And this was in the "bewitched room" in which you lived during that entire period; is that right?

Mr. RUFF. I was in this room day and night, and a doctor of Russian descent, called Laszlo Nemeth—he was a Hungarian who was a Russian citizen—took care of me, and as far as I know, this is the only—he is the only expert of this method in Hungary.

Mr. RUSHER. He is an expert in these methods of psychologically inducing a person to reveal information; is that correct?

Mr. RUFF. In these psychological methods.

He came in every day and spoke to me for hours on end in a very friendly way.

Mr. RUSHER. Was he a Hungarian?

Mr. RUFF. He was probably of Hungarian descent, because he spoke very good Hungarian. He told me that they brought people into this room only in various special cases, because this method could only be used on a very intellectual sort of people.

He also told me that Cardinal Mindszenty had been in this room.

Mr. RUSHER. The "bewitched room?"

Mr. RUFF. The "bewitched room."

They told me that by perfectly ordinary methods they could also find out what I had done, but they were not only interested in what I had done but also in how I was thinking.

Mr. RUSHER. Where did you go at the end of that 6 weeks in the "bewitched room"?

Mr. RUFF. At the end of these 6 weeks I pretended to be insane, I broke things and made noise, and then they thought—thinking that I was insane, they transferred me to the insane asylum of the AVH, the secret police.

Mr. MORRIS. Before you go on, was that Laszlo Nemeth?

Mr. RUFF. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And I understood you to say he was a medical doctor?

Mr. RUFF. He is probably a psychiatrist.

Mr. RUSHER. So you then feigned insanity, and were sent ultimately to the mental hospital of the AVH; is that correct?

Mr. RUFF. It was their insane asylum.

Mr. RUSHER. And how long were you there?

Mr. RUFF. Approximately 7 weeks.

Mr. RUSHER. Seven weeks. Before the trial?

Mr. RUFF. Before the trial.

I met 5 people there who had all been in the "bewitched room," and all of them were schizophrenic.

Mr. RUSHER. As a result of their experiences?

Mr. RUFF. As a result of that.

Mr. MORRIS. They were not pretending?

Mr. RUFF. They were not pretending. They had been there for a number of years.

Mr. RUSHER. And there were others like yourself who, however, had pretended?

Mr. RUFF. As far as I know; no.

Mr. RUSHER. Now, then, were you left relatively alone in the mental hospital, or were further tortures inflicted?

Mr. RUFF. There were times when I was just plain locked up together with normal criminal-type people, who were mentally ill, and sometimes they had special little tortures. They gave us electric current shocks, shock treatment. They wrapped us in wet blankets, and when the wet blankets had dried, the skin was usually so dried out that it split and cracked.

The head of this insane asylum was a Mr. Istvan Nemeth.

Mr. RUSHER. But not the same man?

Mr. RUFF. Not the same man.

Mr. RUSHER. Now, from this mental hospital or prison, you were taken, as I understand it, to trial; is that correct?

Mr. RUFF. They took us back to the special section of the Internal Ministry of the Interior at Fo Utca.

Mr. RUSHER. Will you tell us the circumstances of your trial, how long it lasted, and what you had in the way of defense counsel?

Mr. RUFF. In 1954, January 18, is when it approximately started.

Mr. RUSHER. How long did the trial last?

Mr. RUFF. Three-quarters of an hour, approximately.

Mr. RUSHER. Did you have defense counsel?

Mr. RUFF. I had defense counsel in the form of a man appointed by the Defense Ministry, and I had no chance to talk to him or even meet him beforehand.

Mr. RUSHER. Do you know whether or not he was himself a Communist?

Mr. RUFF. He had a large party insignia on his lapel.

Mr. RUSHER. Did he make any serious effort to defend you?

Mr. RUFF. He did absolutely nothing, and spoke only 3 or 4 minutes in all.

Two members of the judges' bench were in secret police uniform.

Mr. RUSHER. They were members of the secret police?

Mr. RUFF. They were members of the secret police.

Mr. RUSHER. And I take it then, that under those circumstances, you were found guilty; is that correct?

Mr. RUFF. Yes.

Mr. RUSHER. What were the charges of which you were found guilty?

Mr. RUFF. I was condemned for 15 years for having organized against—having plotted against the People's Republic, for the downfall of the People's Republic, and for having disseminated leaflets.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with an election campaign, or generally?

Mr. RUFF. Elections, and with May Day demonstrations.

Mr. RUSHER. Now, after your sentence to a term of 15 years were you then taken to prison, to begin serving it?

Mr. RUFF. They took me the very next day to the collecting prison, so-called, in Kobanya.

Mr. RUSHER. And how long were you there?

Mr. RUFF. I was there until November 1, 1956, when in connection with the revolt, I was freed.

Mr. RUSHER. Now, was Cardinal Mindszenty in that same prison while you were there?

Mr. RUFF. He was in the same prison until 1955 when, in connection with the Geneva conferences, he was taken away.

Mr. RUSHER. Did you have occasion to see him and, if so, would you tell us about those occasions, or occasion?

Mr. RUFF. Since they still considered me slightly insane, and thought that I wouldn't have the memory to say anything, they chose me for domestic work in the prison. As such, I was transferred to the hospital of this collecting prison, where, in a special wing, they were guarding Cardinal Mindszenty. And in this connection, I was detailed to clean out his cell every single day.

Mr. RUSHER. And how long did this go on?

Mr. RUFF. Approximately 3 months I was doing this.

Mr. RUSHER. And what caused you to stop?

Mr. RUFF. On each of these occasions, Cardinal Mindszenty was standing in a dark suit, in the corner, and in one instance he dropped his handkerchief. I picked it up and handed it to him, and he fairly softly said, "Thank you, my boy." From that point on, they immediately took me away, they didn't let me finish my work.

Mr. RUSHER. Did they see this particular incident?

Mr. RUFF. There was always a guard in the cell, as well.

Mr. RUSHER. So what did they do; they immediately stopped having you clean the cardinal's cell?

Mr. RUFF. They immediately stopped having me clean the cardinal's cell, took me out, stripped me and searched me, and I was never allowed to return.

Mr. RUSHER. And never saw the cardinal again?

Mr. RUFF. I never saw him after that.

Mr. RUSHER. Now, then, you served, you say, in that prison until you had served 3½ of your 15-year sentence, and you were released by the revolutionaries on November 1, 1956? Is that correct?

Mr. RUFF. On November 1; that is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. And they released all the prisoners; is that correct?

Mr. RUFF. Only the political prisoners. This was done by forming five committees, on one of which I took part, and we investigated the prisoners to see whether they really were political prisoners or just common criminals, and the common criminals were not released.

Mr. RUSHER. What did you do after your release from prison on November 1 of this year?

Mr. RUFF. I had a friend among the committee which freed us, he was a writer, and he immediately asked me to join in their work, and told me to go up the next day, as a reporter, to the house of former Premier Rakosi.

Mr. RUSHER. Former Premier of Hungary; is that correct?

Mr. RUFF. Prime Minister, as well as head of the Communist Party.

Mr. RUSHER. Where was Rakosi at this time?

Mr. RUFF. As far as I know, Rakosi was in the Soviet Union at the time, because when Gero came to power during the night, they quickly whisked Rakosi away from his home.

Mr. RUSHER. Did you find anything of interest in Rakosi's home?

Mr. RUFF. Yes; I did. I found the most personal documents of Rakosi.

Mr. RUSHER. Do you by any chance have those?

Mr. RUFF. I have them, yes.

Mr. RUSHER. Could you show them to us, please. Will you just describe them briefly, one by one, so that we will know what they are?

Mr. RUFF. This is the identity card of Rakosi in the so-called Hungarian Workers Party, which is the equivalent of the Hungarian Politburo.

Mr. RUSHER. This is the party card in the politburo?


Mr. RUFF. This is the party card, with the picture and signature.

Mr. RUSHER. Not just Rakosi's card.

Will you pass this up to the Senator?

(The card described above was marked "Exhibit No. 406-A" and is reproduced below:)

EXHIBIT No. 406-A




Mr. RUSHER. What else do you have?

Mr. RUFF. This is his membership card to the Hungarian National Assembly, with the signature of the President of that Assembly.

(The card described above was marked "Exhibit No. 407" and is reproduced below:)

EXHIBIT No. 407




Mr. RUSHER. What others do you have?

Mr. RUFF. There are two identity card booklets for his wife, identifying that she is a member of the Communist Party. It is Feodora Rakosi.

(Pages from the identity booklets of Rakosi's wife were marked "Exhibit No. 408" (under her married name) and "Exhibit No. 408-A" (under her Russian name) and are reproduced below:)

EXHIBIT NO. 408



1949	America Activities	Activities Bilateral	1949 - 1950			
1949						
Bilateral						
Activities						
America						
1949	April		1949 - 1950			
1950	May					
1950	June					

1950	America Activities	Activities Bilateral	1950 - 1951			
1950						
Bilateral						
Activities						
America						
1950	April		1950 - 1951			
1951	May					
1951	June					

EXHIBIT No. 408-A

1945

Hó	Kereset	Bélyeg kelte
Január		
Február		
Március		
Április	15,-	✓
Május	15,-	✓
Június	15,-	✓

MÁGYAR KOMMUNISTA PÁRT

TAGSÁGI KÖNYV

Sorszám 725594
 Név János László Ferenc
 Születési év 1903

A pártba való belépés kelle



A tagsági könyv a Magyar Kommunista Párt tömbértékéből
 vezet neve

1946

Hö	Kennet	Billeg kelta
Juni	15.000,00	FIZETET
July	2.000.000	FIZETET
August	1.000.000	FIZETET
September	1.000.000	FIZETET
October	1.000.000	FIZETET
November	1.000.000	FIZETET
December	1.000.000	FIZETET

1946


Hö	Kennet	Billeg kelta
July	15.	FIZETET
August	15.	FIZETET
September	3.000.000	FIZETET
October	2.000.000	FIZETET
November	3.000	FIZETET
December	3.000.000	FIZETET

1947

Hó	Kereset	Bolygók kelté
Janus		
Február		
Március		
Április		
Május		
Június		
Július		
Augusztus		
Szeptember		
Október		
November		
December		

1946

Hó	Kereset	Bolygók kelté
Janus		
Február		
Március		
Április		
Május		
Június		
Július		
Augusztus		
Szeptember		
Október		
November		
December		



Mr. RUSHER. And I see you have one more there. Will you tell us what that is?

Mr. RUFF. This is a booklet of telephone numbers, marked "Strictly confidential," or "Top secret," and it is marked "No. 1," as being No. 1 of a limited amount of these booklets issued to the heads of the secret police.

Mr. RUSHER. What telephone numbers are in that book?

Mr. MORRIS. Doesn't the first page give a further description of what that is?

What does the cover say, first of all?

Mr. RUFF. The cover says, the most important telephone numbers, No. 1, on top, it says, "Top secret, Budapest, 1955, the month of May."

Mr. MORRIS. And is there anything on the title page or elsewhere which indicates which particular telephone numbers these are?

Mr. RUFF. It says, important information. It says, the first number is, in case of mistake in the ministerial switchboard, in case of mistakes at K station, secret section; and then it goes on and gives a list of most often used telephone numbers.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything that identifies these as Communist Party functionaries' telephone numbers?

Mr. RUFF. No. 1 under these most often used numbers, the political party members, state. Minister of Interior, airport, and the sectional party leaders, as well as the vacation area of the party on Lake Balaton.

Mr. MORRIS. Vacation area, did you say?

Mr. RUFF. Of the party members.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, those are the vacation telephone numbers?

Mr. RUFF. The vacation telephone numbers.

Mr. RUSHIER. Let me ask Mr. Ruff these questions.

This list of telephone numbers in these books, you have had a chance to study it; is that correct?

Mr. RUFF. Yes.

Mr. RUSHIER. Whose telephone numbers are these, generally speaking?

Mr. RUFF. These are the numbers of, what you might say, the aristocracy of the Communist Party. They are the members of the Hungarian secret police, the AVH, as well as political organizations.

Mr. MORRIS. How many pages are there in that book?

Mr. RUFF. There are 68 pages.

Mr. MORRIS. And approximately how many names to a page?

Mr. RUFF. Well, more or less, I would say 6 or 7 names to the page—more—9 names to the page, approximately.

Mr. MORRIS. So you have between 500 and 1,000 important Hungarian Communist officials?

Mr. RUFF. With office and home telephone numbers.


Mr. RUSHIER. Senator, I think, in view of the significance of this and possibly other documents, we will ask to have them put in the record at this point, if you will agree.

Senator JOHNSTON. They shall become a part of the record.

(NOTE.—The leather covers could not be reproduced in readable form.)

(The document referred to above was marked "Exhibit No. 409"
and is reproduced below:)

EXHIBIT NO. 409



— ♀ —			
Név	Munkahely	Lakás	
APRÓ ANTAL	378 10-60 114-296	— 11-61 158-262	A
ACS LAJOS	275 11-97 128-025	— 12-61 155-865	B C
BATA ISTVÁN	225 12-22 124-044	289 12-78 125-495	D E F
GERÉ ERNŐ	350 10-44 110-480	217 11-59 158-085	G H I J
HEGEDÜS ANDRÁS	244 10-00 —	— 12-99 155-025	K L
HIDAS ISTVÁN	385 13-93 114-635	— 14-42 359-362	M N O
KOVÁCS ISTVÁN	256 10-98 142-031	— 13-92 164-056	P R S
MATOLCSI JÁNOS	201 12-48 110-664	— 14-02 165-206	T U V Z

— 2 —

N & V	Munkahály	Lakás	
MÉHIS JÓZSEF	274 14—54 225—047	— 14—74 146—220	
PIROS LÁSZLÓ	252 12—37 123—123	— 10—15 159—062	
RAJOSI MÁTYÁS	258 — —	243 10—14 159—289	
SZALAI BÉLA	227 10—90 151—257	— 11—63 350—512	
VIG. BÉLA	314 10—35 110—478	— 13—12 350—509	

— 3 —

N & V	Munkahály	Lakás	
AJTAI MIKLÓS		239 10—03 358—783	— — 358—140
ALTONÁRÉ IVAN		376 11—74 125—515	— 10—26 364—165
ANDICS ERZSEBET		364 10—33 123—394	— — 364—106
ANTUS ISTVÁN		238 12—30 110—461	— — 158—236
ANDROPOV V. SZ.		276 226—826	— —
APRÓ ANTAL		378 10—00 114—296	— 11—61 158—262
AZOVCEV V. SZ.		346 224—987	— 424—367
ACS PÉTER		336 31—20 183—409	— — 364—388

— 4 —

H & V.	Munkahelyi Lajos
ACS LAJOS	275 11--67 12--51 128--325 155--365

— 5 —

H & V.	Munkahelyi Lukás
BAGOS ZOLTAN	10--52 134--580 361--443

EACZONI JENO	31--67 312--167 365--281
--------------	--------------------------------

EACSVANY JANOS	32--90 204--865 229--829
----------------	--------------------------------

FLAMAYAI JANOS	32--65 324--590 469--760
----------------	--------------------------------

VARCS SANDOR	11--57 150--641 164--974
--------------	--------------------------------

BARTOS ANTAL	272 12--82 113--976
--------------	---------------------------

BARTOS ISTVAN	236 10--99 313--120
---------------	---------------------------

BARTA ISTVAN	225 12--22 124--044
--------------	---------------------------

— 5 —

— 6 —

— 7 —

— 8 —

— 9 —

— 10 —

— 5 —

— 8 —

Név	Munkahely	Lakás	Név	Munkahely	Lakás
BM. PARTBIZOTTSAG	33—27 180—583	—	BM. PARTBIZOTTSAG	33—27 180—583	—
DM. INTER KOZPONT	273 34—98	—	DM. INTER KOZPONT	273 34—98	—
	122—067	—		122—067	—
BUDAPESTI TANACS		D			
Egészszégyei Osztály	33—04	E			
Oroszai Iroda	33—04	E			
EM. TITKARSAG	30—04 188—777	G	EM. TITKARSAG	30—04 188—777	H
		I			J
BM. MEGYEI FOSZTALYOK			BM. MEGYEI FOSZTALYOK		
(Vidéki H. Vonal)			(Vidéki H. Vonal)		
Baranyamegye	20—73	K	Baranyamegye	20—73	K
Békés megye	20—03	M	Békés megye	20—03	M
Borsodmegye	21—53	N	Borsodmegye	21—53	N
Csongrádmegye	21—53	P	Csongrádmegye	21—53	P
Felvidék	20—13	R	Felvidék	20—13	R
Győr-Sopron megye	20—23	S	Győr-Sopron megye	20—23	S
Hajdú-Bihar megye	20—83	T	Hajdú-Bihar megye	20—83	T
		V			V
		Z			Z

— 10 —

M é v	Kunkahely	Lakás	N & V	Munkahely	Lakás
Hévesmegye	21—83	—	BALATONALIGAI ÜDÖLŐ		
Komárommegye	21—35	—	PÁKOSI MÁTYÁS	22—51	—
Nógrádmegye	21—13	—	GERGÉR ENDÉ	22—52	—
Pestmegye	14—66	—	MÉMIS JÓZSEF	22—54	—
Sz. M. Mezői Fű. Vezetője	24—19	—	Telefonkörpont	22—55	—
	343—967	151—512	Ol villa	22—56	D
Somonymegye	22—13	—	HÍDAS ISTVÁN	23—51	E
Szabolcsmegye	21—23	—	HEGEDÜS ANDRÁS	23—52	F
Szatmármegye	20—43	—	KOVÁTH MÁRTON	23—53	G
Tolnamegye	20—63	—	KRISTOF ISTVÁN	23—54	H
Vasmegye	20—33	—	Közponyi épület	23—55	I
Veszprémegye	20—93	—	Telefon körpont	23—56	J
Zalamegye	21—03	—	Zalatornárcsi Ödülös	20—95	K
Békéscsabai MT. Osztály	23—71	—			L
		—			M
		—			N
		—			O
		—			P
		—			Q
		—			R
		—			S
		—			T
		—			U
		—			V
		—			W
		—			X
		—			Y
		—			Z
		—			26

— 12 —

Név	Munkahely	Lakás
-----	-----------	-------

Név	Munkahely	Lakás	Név	Munkahely	Lakás
CSANADI GYÖRGY	309	—	CSANADI GYÖRGY	309	—
	11—44	—		11—44	—
	228—666	159—411		228—666	159—411
CSESTAK IMRÉ (Szabad Ifjúság)	12—35	—	CSESTAK IMRÉ (Szabad Ifjúság)	12—35	—
	343—422	348—761		343—422	348—761
CSERGÓ JÁNOS	394	—	CSERGÓ JÁNOS	394	—
	14—60	14—20		14—60	14—20
	112—636	158—433		112—636	158—433
CSEVENICA FERENCÉ	14—93	—	CSEVENICA FERENCÉ	14—93	—
	120—544	353—146		120—544	353—146
CSIKESZ JÓZSENFÉ	13—90	—	CSIKESZ JÓZSENFÉ	13—90	—
	341—152	458—728		341—152	458—728
CZAKÓ KALMÁR	370	—	CZAKÓ KALMÁR	370	—
	19—18	11—16		19—18	11—16
	181—482	155—463		181—482	155—463
CZOTTNER SÁNDOR	228	—	CZOTTNER SÁNDOR	228	—
	11—85	—		11—85	—
	120—953	—		120—953	—
	124—939	230—300		124—939	230—300
			P	P	—
			R	R	—
			S	S	—
			T	T	—
			U	U	—
			V	V	—
			Z	Z	—

— 13 —

卷之六

卷之三

Sankatayev Lekcii

卷之三

DARABOS IVAN	212 14-52 128-523	— — 497-703	D E F
DARVAS JOZSEF	211 10-56 313-397	— 10-75 164-727	G H I
DEGICS MARE	360 11-30 284-351	— — 288-299	J K L
DOMOKOS ISTVAN	285 12-54 329-415	— 11-91 150-241	M N O
FICAK SANDOR	20-97	—	P
FUGELCS MINTAS OR.	195-905	121-285	R
GALAI ISTVAN	11-95 113-426	— 166-590	S
GORSKI ISTVAN	547 12-88 315-944	222 — 165-268	T
DORI ISTVAN TSC. Tandor	271	—	U
DOMOKOS JOZSEF	323 10-57 161-415	— — 158-670	V

— 16 —

Név	Munkahely	Lakás	Név	Munkahely	Lakás
DÓGÉI IMRÉ	13-35 311-396	— 150-826	EGRÉI GYULA	297 14-39 120-OSA	— 14-57 165-209
DROPPA GUSZTÁV	37-55 111-667 126-986	— — 259-616	ERŐEI FERENC	224 14-84 125-354	— 12-16 428-196
ERDEY GRUZ TÍZSI	392	—	ERDEY GRUZ TÍZSI	14-20 310-597	— 355-452
EGYÉNI	—	—	EGYÉNI	12-87	—
ERDŐS JÁNOSKÉ	30-19	—	ERDŐS JÁNOSKÉ	110-295	I J
ERÖS LÁSZLÓ	31-80	—	ERÖS LÁSZLÓ	120-120 120-073	K L
Építő, Fa és építőanyagipari Szakszerv. Elmökség	13-56 421-755	—	Építő, Fa és építőanyagipari Szakszerv. Elmökség	— 421-755	M N O P R S T U V Z

— 17 —

卷之三

Winkley - Lanes

Munkabehy - Lakes

SARMAS LASZLO 313 —
— 91—98 —
142—640 364—012

FENYVESI JÓZSEF DR. 10-70 —
158-035 620-714

FOLDI LASZLO 31-87 255-513 204-844

FOLDVÁRI LÁSZLÓ 321 12-10

PRRESS ISTVÁN

卷之三

Futura szóráját 312-323

THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

-20-

- 21 -

N & V	Munkácsely	Lakás	N & V	Munkácsely	Lakás
GÁBOR MÁTYÁS	590	—	GÁBOR MÁTYÁS	41-06	—
	126-834	343-615		—	—
GÁSPÁR SÁNDOR	374	—	GÁSPÁR SÁNDOR	14-64	—
	325-347	162-466		—	—
GERŐ ERNŐ	350	217	GERŐ ERNŐ	40-44	71-39
	110-690	158-986		—	—
GERŐ ERNŐ Tilkáság	246	—	GERŐ ERNŐ Tilkáság	13-11	—
	129-579	—		—	—
GÖTZ JÁNOS	12-14	—	GÖTZ JÁNOS	12-14	—
	137-324	125-820		—	—
GYÖRÉ JÓZSEF	223	—	GYÖRÉ JÓZSEF	10-55	12-61
	185-229	355-304		—	—
					Y
					R
					S
					V
					Z

— 22 —

— 23 —

N & V	Munkahely	Lakás	N & V	Munkahely	Lakás
HALASZ JÁNOS			HALASZ JÓZSEF	362 12-04 261-505	— — 159-045
DR. HANGOR MARIUSZ Külvárosi Kórház	223 10-77 350-141	— — 311-362			
HÁZAI JÉNŐ	14-29 115-635	— 204-396			
HARTAI LÁSZLÓ	34-61 361-153	— 151-982			
HAVAS ERNŐ	206 32-33 111-400	— — 164-509		K E M	
HÁZI ÁRPÁD	281 11-58 341-749	— 12-40 151-243		N O P	
HÁZI SÁNDOR	13-28 128-044	— 459-576		R S	
HÁY LÁSZLÓ	249 12-75 128-573	— — 350-193		T G V R	

— 24 —

— 25 —

Név	Műszaki	Lakás	Név	Műszaki	Lakás
HEGEDŐS ANDRÁS	244 10-90 125-025	— 12-99 125-277	HORVÁTH JÁNOS	337 12-43 165-273	— — 123-277
Hegedűs András Titkársága	219 13-44 110-464	— — —	HORVÁTH MÁRTON	257 14-54 224-293	— 14-79 364-338
HEGYI GYULA	311 13-05 123-960	— — 458-711			
HERCZEG FERENC	235 13-14 181-636	— — 164-610			
HEVESI GYULA	10-21 211-781	— 152-482			
HIDAS FERENC	13-26 180-663	— 202-655			
HIDAS ISTVÁN	365 13-93 114-635	— 14-42 359-362			
HOLLAI IMRE	13-73 122-330	— 164-552			
HOLLÓS ERVIN	13-17 139-889	— 457-116			
			K E M N O P R S T U V Z		

— 26 —

N & V	Munkahely	Lakás	N & V	Munkahely	Lakás
			NICE JENG	228 11—71 115—299	— — 346—351
			SCSENKO	234 13—16 189—259	355 — 364—180

— 27 —

JANZA KAROLY	310 11—31 314—728	— — 350—561	JAMRICH MIHALY	11—78 312—965	11—78 204—885
JANOSI FERENC	210 12—30 313—193	— — 165—286	JOBORO MAGDA	397 12—03 121—588 123—872	— — — 151—292
					O P R S T U V Z

— 28 —

— 29 —

Név	Munkahely	Lakás	Név	Munkahely	Lakás
KATONA ANTAL	269 12-00 423-300	382 12-11 205-411	KASSAI FERENC	282 10-65	— — Dorog
					315-925 103
KANA LŐRÍK	340 10-25	— —	KARPATI JÓZSEF	245 34-69 150-469	— — 458-330 350-118
KELETI FERENC	395 13-51 110-870	— — 164-492	KELÉN BELA	12-83 180-436	N — P
KENYERES JULIA	33-37 350-530	— — 354-785	KEREK GÁBOR	304 12-26 187-906	T G V

Name		Residence		Activities	
KALLAI GYULA	331 12-89 128-875	Lakos — 355-344	— — —	HODOCZIAH ZOLTAN 363 11-49 120-344	Sturkabaly Lajos — — 351-513
KILIAN JOZSEF	263 31-32 125-830	— — 342-365	— — —	KOSSA ISTVAN 372 19-85 120-936	— — 155-382
KINCSES ISTVAN	373 10-39 312-184	— — 100-469	— — —	KOLOZS RICHARD 318 14-25 383-478	— — 184-363
KISS ARPAD	367 14-40 123-501	— — 363-320	— — —	KUVACS MARIAN 305 33-95 146-624	— — 120-345
KISS GYULA	14-25 113-260	— 426-900	—	KOVACS IRRE (Balatonlellevarai Irre)	10-51 121-531 204-658
KISS KAROLY	254 15-71	361 —	—	KOVACS ISTVAN (Budapest PB) 256 10-98 142-331	— 12-92 164-956
KOCSIS LAJOS	258 10-94 121-475	— — 123-201	— — —	KOVACS IMRE (FM) 11-95 220-560	— — 486-559
KOMOR IMRE	1204 223-451	— 466-505	— —	KOMORNIK ZOLTAN 10-12 115-500	— 262-089
KONYA ALBERT	—	—	—	KONYA ALBERT 10-70 120-648	— 150-222

— 32 —

— 33 —

Név	Munkahely	Lakás	Név	Munkahely	Lakás
KOBOL JÓZSEF	236 14-43 120-362	— — 165-265	Hüvtölgyi Kórház	331 10-72 345 13-21	— — —
KÖKENY MIHÁLY	215 10-05 121-141	— — 154-654	HERŐLETI PARTSZÍVÖTSÉGÖK:		
			I. ker.	11-39	
			II. ker.	12-39	
			III. ker.	13-39	
			IV. ker.	14-39	
			V. ker.	10-46	
			VI. ker.	11-46	
			VII. ker.	12-46	
			VIII. ker.	13-46	
			IX. ker.	14-46	
			X. ker.	10-38	
			XI. ker.	11-38	
			XII. ker.	12-38	
			XIII. ker.	13-38	
			XIV. ker.	12-38	
			XV. ker.	14-38	
			XVI. ker.	10-49	
			XVII. ker.	11-49	
			XVIII. ker.	12-49	
			XIX. ker.	13-49	
			XX. ker.	14-49	
			XXI. ker.	15-32	
			XXII. ker.	11-32	
				12-32	

卷之三

卷之三

Név	Munkahely	Lakás
LAKATOS ÉVA	284 11-33 311-790	— — 427-759
LOSCHAKOV	277	—
LÓRINCZ INRE	11-89 111-260	— 165-292
LÓRINCZ JÓZSEF	352 14-19 126-512	— — 468-599
LUX LASZLÓ	12-08 112-237	— 155-944

M o v	Soviet Activity	Loktev	K e v	Munkácsy László
HAGYARI ANDRÁS	Political Secretariat	263 14-23 122-485	Political Secretariat	263 14-23 150-684
	Capitalist Society	34-37 151-462 159-676		
		32-54 355-798		
MATOLCSI JÁNOS		201 12-66 110-664		13-92 165-295
MATUSEK IVÁDAR		11-36 120-363		169-355
MARCZIS ANTAL		34-51 111-697		364-420
MARTON JÁNOS		307 13-61 121-520		350-390

Név Munkahely Lakás

MEGYEI PART
VEGREHAJTOSÍTOTT SÁGOK:

Név	Munkahely	Lakás	Munkahely Lakás
Baranyamegye			26-71
Bacsmegye			20-01
Békásmegye			20-51
Borsodmegye			21-71
Csongrádmegye			22-01
Felvidékmegye			20-11
Győr-Sopronmegye			20-21
Havasalmegye			21-61
Hajdú-Bihar megye			20-61
Komárommegye			21-31
Nogradmegye			21-11
Pestmegye			12-37
Somogymegye			22-11
Szabolcs-Szatmár megye			21-21
Szolnokmegye			20-41
Tehamergye			20-61
Vasmegye			20-31
Veszprém megye			20-01
Zalamegye			21-01

P R S T C V N

Line 41

H E V
Hungary
Hungarian Lands

H E V
Hungary
Hungarian Lands

RENTS JÓZSEF

389
12-60
121-109

—
14-74
146-220

KÉZI IMRÉ

346-07
341-152

331-732

SIMHALYFI ERNŐ

210
1270
313-195

382
166-596

MOLNÁR ERIN

216
10-41

—
14-76

328-728
429-534

MOLNÁR SÁNDOR

219
13-44

—
10-60

—
311-344

123-352

MÓD ALADÁR

15-32
343-540

—
158-846

MÓD ALADÁR

32-60
155-209

—
153-246

MÓR ANDRÁS

260
12-47

—
120-891

—
468-202

—
V

P
R
S
T
U
V

Név	Munkahely	Lakás	Név	Munkahely	Lakás
Mentőszolgálat	14-72	—	NAGY JOZSEPHÉ	343	—
	125-225	—		13-94	—
		—		311-332	355-366
MOHSZ	14-36	—	NEZZAL FERENC	332	—
Elnök	34-36	—		10-23	—
Elnökhelyettes (első)	32-37	—		187-636	457-345
Budapesti elnök	33-71	—	NON SVORGY	331	—
Elnökhelyettes		—		12-60	—
		—		129-675	259-712
NOGRADI SANDOR	207	—			—
		—		10-24	10-84
		—		120-820	151-466
NYIKOLAJENKO	267	—			—
Hépstadion (Buzsákihely)	200	—			—
	14-07	—			—

— 44 —

Név	Munkahely	Lakás
-----	-----------	-------

Név	Munkahely	Lakás
-----	-----------	-------

OLT KAROLY

Név	Munkahely	Lakás
-----	-----------	-------

OLYAN MIRLÓS

Név	Munkahely	Lakás
-----	-----------	-------

OROSZ Nándor

Név	Munkahely	Lakás
-----	-----------	-------

ORUJAN MIRLÓS

Név	Munkahely	Lakás
-----	-----------	-------

OROSZ Nándor

Név	Munkahely	Lakás
-----	-----------	-------

OROSZ Nándor

Név	Munkahely	Lakás
-----	-----------	-------

OROSZ Nándor

Név	Munkahely	Lakás
-----	-----------	-------

P	R	S	T	V
---	---	---	---	---

— 46 —

— 47 —

H á v	Munkahely	Lakás	N á v	Munkahely	Lakás
PAPP ISTVÁN			292	—	
			10—16	—	
			121—663	356—380	
PARRAGI GYORGY	30—15	—			
	223—663	126—386			
PENYIGEI DÉNES	328	—			
	13—60	—			
	125—525	268—302			
PESTA LÁSZLÓ DR.	344	—			
	14—36	—			
	187—636	187—301			
PETHŐHÁZI SÁNDOR	12—05	—			
	315—930	269—400			
PECsei JÁNOS	354	—			
	14—57	—			
	189—212	458—319			
PÉTER GYORGY	319	—			
	13—60	—			
	358—774	158—299			
PIROS LÁSZLÓ	252	—			
	12—37	10—15			
	123—123	159—362			
POGACSÁS ANTAL	216	—			
	14—40	—			
	333—140	159—255			

P R T U V Z

— 48 —

Név	Munkahely	Lakás	Név	Munkahely	Lakás
POGÁCSAS GYÖRGY	379 12—41 127—721	— — 165—226	RATHÓ ANNA	33—45 122—444	13—58 344—546
POLICZER MIHLOS DR.	40—76 158—035	14—52 164—093	RÁKOSI MÁTYÁS	265 — —	243 10—14 159—289
PONGRÁCZ KÁLMÁN	259 12—36 186—037	— — 257—457	RÁKOSI MÁTYÁS TITKÁRSÁGA	270 12—34 111—261	— — —
POLONYI SZOCS LAJOS	250 13—57 180—279	— — 258—366	RÉTI LÁSZLÓ	30—47 115—094	— 350—902
POROS TÁMAS	34—34 121—399	— 365—109	REVAI JÓZSEF	254 14—41 111—400	280 13—45 158—691
POCZÉ TIBOR	377 12—66	— 11—73	REVÉSZ GÉZA	366 13—19 124—012	— — 164—071
PRIESZŐL JÓZSEF	318 11—10 222—622	— — 364—144	RIGIANSZKY MIHLOSH	379 34—06 121—562	— — 328—730
Pártkörzepont Ogyelete	338 11—19 313—188	— — —	ROMAN JÓZSEF	232 11—77 112—616	— 33—31 165—275

— 49 —

Név	Munkahely	Lakás	Név	Munkahely	Lakás
RÁKOSI MÁTYÁS	265 — —	243 10—14 159—289	RÉTI LÁSZLÓ	30—47 115—094	350—902
RÉVAI JÓZSEF	254 14—41 111—400	280 13—45 158—691	REVÉSZ GÉZA	366 13—19 124—012	— — 164—071
RIGIANSZKY MIHLOSH	379 34—06 121—562	— — 328—730	ROMAN JÓZSEF	232 11—77 112—616	— 33—31 165—275

T
C
V
Z

— 50 —

— 51 —

N & V	Munkahely	Lakás	N & V	Munkahely	Lakás
RONAI SANDOR	312 14-95 112-227	202 — 164-708	SAGHY VILMOS	320 14-58 120-955	— — 161-246
RUSZNYAK ISTVÁN	242 33-66 128-612	— — 158-254	SANDI OTTO	12-42 123-395	— 354-440
			SANDOR JOZSEF	11-54 127-076	— 493-388
			SATOR JANOS	237 10-48 128-617	— — 167-365
			SEBES GUSZTAV	13-33 126-895	— 142-078
			SEBES ISTVAN	266 12-27 311-778	— — 358-398
			SEBES SANDOR	356 12-20 385-343	— — 496-945
			SIBESTEN JANOS	360 11-91 311-516	T C V Z

— 52 —

— 53 —

Név	Munkahely	Lakás	Név	Munkahely	Lakás
SEAFLEX GYULA	320 11—87 111—097	— — 256—565	SÁJTÓ: Szabad Nép	317 14—91	— —
SIKÉR ENDRE	302 34—63 350—569	— — 164—861	Szabad Nép Gyorsíró	10—90	—
SIMONOVITS ISTVÁN	34—59 315—945	— 120—318	Szabad Szék. Szoba	13—91	—
SIMÓ TIBOR	14—88 311—321	— 257—296	Szabad Ifjúság	33—14	—
SIMON LAJOS	371 14—61	— —	Szabad Föld	14—72	—
SISKÓ VINCE	313—329	202—685	Szikra Könyvkiadó	34—91	—
SOLT LAJOS	316 11—95 111—611	— — —	Esti Budapest	12—79	—
SÓLTESTZ KAROLY	386 13—59 325—764	— — 268—420	Népszava	12—76	—
	246 13—14 129—679	— — 159—070	Népszava Szék. Szoba	12—81	—
			Magyar Nemzet	32—50	—
			Tartós Béke	33—50	—
					T C V Z

— 55 —

— 56 —

— 57 —

— 58 —

— 59 —

— 60 —

Munkahely	Lakás	N & V	Munkahely	Lakás
SZABÓ PÁL		274 12-73 126-252	— — 366-337	
SZABÓ GÖRGELY		396 10-62 129-592	— — 154-856	
SZABÓ ISTVÁN		322 12-21 121-539	— — 164-076	
SZABÓ JÁNOS		360 11-38 120-025	— — 220-018	
SZAKÁLI JÓZSEF		213 14-48 —	— 11-70 150-626	
SZALAI BÉLA		227 10-90 151-257	— 11-63 350-512	
SZALVA JÓZSEF		209 12-90 —	— — 124-012	359-006
SZATHMÁRI ISTVÁN		270 12-34 111-261	— — 113-539	T O V Z

— 56 —

Név	Munkahely	Lakás
SZASZ MARTON	205 12-15 125-926	— — 150-460
SZENDRO SANDOR	30-80 342-173	— 105-351

Név	Munkahely	Lakás	Munkahely Lakás
SZTALIN SZabolcs	—	358	—
SZOT Elnökségi Iroda	31-47 225-013	30-44 429-105	—
SZUJARTO LAJOS	327 11-02 328-712	— 12-03 364-917	
SZUGAI ANDRAS	374 14-14 111-298	— — 159-252	
SZÜCS LAJOS	23-39 313-186	— 151-660	
SZONE GYORGY	261 13-43 311-148	— — 112-248	
SZONE MATIAS	298 11-66 128-020	— — 341-696	
SZUCS LAJOS	12-33 115-259	— —	

TOP SECRET

— 57 —

— 58 —

— 59 —

Név	Munkahely	Lakás	
TASNADI SANDOR	11-83 123-939	— 457-557	
TAUSZ JANOS	208 10-04 185-016	— — 355-520	
TAUSZK GYORGY	326 12-02 120-361	— — 311-492	
TIMAR MATYAS	334 14-03 360-556	— — 154-352	
Titkos Tudakozó	188-030	—	
TOTH KAROLY	348 33-07 325-764	— — 355-288	
TOTTI LAJOS	230 11-22	— 10-73	
Tököl Repülőtér	344-562 144-453	— —	
TOMPE ISTVÁN	264 12-80 127-033	— — —	T G V Z

— 60 —

— 61 —

N & V	Munkahely	Lakás	N & V	Munkahely	Lakás
TRAUTMANN REZSO	220 14—73 310—939	— — 354—935	ÜGYELETIG: Belszolgálati Miniszterium	13—50 313—980	— —
TYLHONOV	288 10—13 123—890	308 — 184—453	Belügyminiszterium	13—04 160—710	— —
			ORH	12—37 123—123 377	— — —
			Budapesti Főosztály	12—66 314—343 251	— — —
			Egészségügyi Miniszterium	31—61 123—456	— —
			Élelmiszeripari Min.	11—77 112—616	— —
			Építésügyi Miniszterium	11—74 125—515	— —
			Földművelésügyi Min.	31—32 125—977	— —
			Honvédelmi Miniszterium	14—84 125—851	— —
				230 225 13—34 124—025	— — — —

— 63 —

— 62 —

Név	Munkahely	Lakás	Név	Munkahely	Lakás
Igazságügyi Miniszterium	30—56 122—431 121—829	— — —	Szentbányaeszti Mű.	11—85 115—409	— —
Hőhő és Gépgyári Min.	14—50 123—580	— —	Város és Községgazdálk. M.	11—83 124—453	— —
Könyvípari Miniszterium	154—413	—	Vegyipari és Energiaügyi M.	11—85 115—400	— —
Rozs. és Postaiügyi Min.	283 10—10 229—029	— — —			
Riúdgyminiiszterium	350—100	—			
Kultúrpolitikai Min.	31—72 313—777	— —			
Népművelési Miniszterium	10—66 312—882	— —			
Minisztertanács	260 12—47 129—801	— — —			
Oktatásiügyi Miniszterium	34—73 123—122 129—074	— — —			
Pénzügyminiszterium	10—50 180—224	— —			

— 64 —

N & V

N & V	Munkahely	Lakás
-------	-----------	-------

N & V			Munkahely	Lakás
-------	--	--	-----------	-------

N & V			Munkahely	Lakás
VALERCSAK JANOS	294	—	Marikahely	Lakás
	14-21	31-36		
	164-236	155-635		

N & V			Munkahely	Lakás
VARGA JANOS	349	—		
	10-64	—		
	115-014	165-091		

N & V			Munkahely	Lakás
VARGA SANDOR	287	—		
	30-77	—		
	125-843	202-819		

N & V			Munkahely	Lakás
VARGA ANDRAS	337	—		
	10-27	—		
	115-676	165-076		

N & V			Munkahely	Lakás
VASS ZOLTAN	351	—		
	11-18	12-32		
	128-710	160-662		
	272 mell.	—		

N & V			Munkahely	Lakás
VALYI PETER	248	—		
	10-35	—		
	381-506	163-376		

N & V			Munkahely	Lakás
VERE KELA	314	—		
	19-35	13-42		
	110-476	350-999		

— 66 —

N & V	Munkácsy	Lakás
VOROS JANOS	232 34-49 112-080	— — 451-778

N & V	Munkácsy	Lakás
ZALAI JULIA	— 34-40 355-133	— 160-396
ZSOFINYEC MIHALY	— 12-85 424-391	13-50 150-202

— 67 —

— 67 —

— 68 —

Név

Munkahely Lakás

Mr. MORRIS. May I have these photostated, and return the original documents back to the witness?

Senator JOHNSTON. Of course, that will be understood, that he can have them back.

Mr. RUSHER. Did you find anything else at Mr. Rakosi's home or villa that would be of interest to the committee?

Mr. RUFF. Rakosi's villa was furnished in the greatest luxury. He had a private theater, not movie but players.

Mr. RUSHER. Was there a barracks nearby?

Mr. RUFF. On the large grounds of the villa there were three buildings occupied by the AVH. Farther down the hill, about three or four hundred yards away—meters away—there was another large building which was in constant ultrashortwave contact with the villa itself.

Mr. RUSHER. Where exactly was the villa? Can you give us an address or description?

Mr. RUFF. It was a former cloister for nuns.

Mr. RUSHER. Where; in Budapest?

Mr. RUFF. It was in the suburbs of Budapest, on Szechenyi Mountain.

Mr. RUSHER. I think you told us yesterday, when we first spoke to you, about a bodyguard barracks—will you tell us about that?

Mr. RUFF. Excuse me. About bodyguards?

Mr. RUSHER. About a barracks for bodyguards.

Mr. RUFF. In the 3 smaller houses on the same property there were approximately 130 bodyguards of the secret service. All of them lived there all the time. And there were approximately 150 more in the other barracks, which were 300 yards away, with radio contact.

Mr. RUSHER. Was there anything in these barracks except the living quarters of the bodyguards?

Mr. RUFF. In the larger of these buildings, which was off the grounds, there were a number of cells, and a small-sized crematorium.

Mr. RUSHER. A small-sized crematorium?

Mr. RUFF. A small-sized crematorium, one person at a time.

Mr. MORRIS. You saw all these things with your own eyes, did you not?

Mr. RUFF. Yes; I did.

Mr. RUSHER. Can you describe the crematorium to us, the small crematorium?

Mr. RUFF. The crematorium was in the basement of the cloister, which adjoined the Rakosi villa, and was probably the former central heating apparatus of the building.

Mr. RUSHER. Do you happen to know who this crematorium was for?

Mr. RUFF. In the second little slot next to the furnace itself we found 12 bodies. These had shown signs of beating, but were obviously waiting to be burned.

Mr. RUSHER. Do you know who these people were or what the particular reason or purpose for this crematorium was?

Mr. RUFF. I don't know who these people were. As far as I know regarding the crematorium, it was to completely erase traces of those special prisoners who had been taken for interrogation in this place.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, they were prisoners?

Mr. RUFF. They were prisoners.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you could tell us, Mr. Ruff, generally, what you have been doing since the time of your release?

Mr. RUFF. The day after my freeing I investigated this Rakosi villa, and already that night the radio was announcing that the Russians were occupying the airport. On the next day I started toward Austria.

Mr. MORRIS. How long were you in Austria?

Mr. RUFF. Until the day before yesterday, from the 3d of November on.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been interviewing escapees during that period?

Mr. RUFF. I talked to a great number of escapees.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you estimate how many?

Mr. RUFF. Several hundred.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Senator Johnston, we have more witnesses here today, and there are more who can testify as to concrete details and evidence about these mass deportations. Now, this witness today is in a particularly good position, because he has talked to many of the

people, not only those who have been deported and come back to Hungary and ultimately made their way on to Austria, but to many others who have firsthand accounts.

So I would like to offer the testimony of Mr. Ruff on this general subject of deportations, and, generally, Russian defections, as an overall basis, his testimony being supported by the two witnesses we had yesterday, the one other witness whom we will hear today, and 4 or 5 more who are now ready to testify as to concrete details.

I wonder, Mr. Ruff, if you can give us an estimate, based on your experience of interviewing refugees and escapees, as to how many people you believe the Soviet Union has deported, how many Hungarians do you believe the Soviet Union has deported?

Mr. RUFF. According to my estimate, about 30,000 people.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us the basis for your estimate?

Mr. RUFF. On the basis of day to day talks with different people, I found out that there were three centers, jumping-off points, for these deportations. One of these was a large baggage area in the basement of the East Station in Budapest. The other one was the same type of area in the basement of the West Station. The third was in the subway station, which is near the South Station of Budapest.

At these various points the railroadmen knew more or less how many had been taken from these collecting points by train.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you talked to these railroadmen?

Mr. RUFF. I talked to 2 or 3 such railroadmen.

Mr. MORRIS. And they have given you estimates?

Mr. RUFF. These gave me part of the estimate, and I also talked to a lady who had already returned from Russian soil; also, to the chief engineer of a machine factory in Miskolc, who was the leader of the Workers Congress in the county of Borsod.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, both this lady and this chief engineer were actually deported to the Soviet Union, and returned?

Mr. RUFF. These had both been on Russian soil, and the engineer was in prison for 3 weeks in a place called Strij.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is that?

Mr. RUFF. This is in the Ukraine. He was released because the county of Borsod is the largest electricity-producing area in Hungary, and the workers had struck so effectively that the Russians thought by releasing him they would pacify the workers.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he was actually deported, but because he was needed back in Hungary he was sent back into the country?

Mr. RUFF. He was brought back because the Kadar regime on December 15, seeing that they made no headway, had announced that it was bringing back the leaders of the old workers councils.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Johnston, we have commenced preliminary arrangements to bring this engineer back. His testimony, in addition to the other testimony, suggests that there is very strong evidence that the deportations, which the Soviet delegation has denied at the United Nations, have taken place. The chief delegate has said that there were no deportations, has flatly denied it.

Mr. Rusher reminds us it was not the chief delegate who made the denial, but the Foreign Minister. And all of this suggests that his denial is completely without foundation. And as I say, we are trying to arrange for this chief engineer, who has been over to the Soviet

Union and is now in Austria, to be brought over to the United States and testify, to complete our record on this subject.

Senator JOHNSTON. I think it is very important that we have him here, and also the witness who has testified today has brought us some information which shows the beastly methods that the Communists use in getting evidence. When I think of that, and I think of our way over here, when the only thing you have to do is say, "I ask that I be given my privileges under the fifth amendment"—over here that is the only thing you have to say, and that is the last of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, is there any other evidence that you can give us, direct or indirect, about the question of Soviet deportations, Mr. Ruff?

Mr. RUFF. I talked to a railroad worker from the railroad station in Miskolc who had seen sealed railroad cars from which young people had slipped pieces of paper out through the cracks. One freedom fighter who had come out to the West told me of having attacked trains in the vicinity of Hatvan, and having freed the deportees from the railroad cars.

Mr. MORRIS. These people actually were on their way to the Soviet Union?

Mr. RUFF. They were on their way.

Senator JOHNSTON. Give the location of this city, too, for their information.

Mr. RUFF. It is approximately 65 kilometers east of Budapest.

Senator JOHNSTON. Now, for the record, too, I think we should insert that a kilometer is about six-tenths of a mile.

Mr. RUFF. Also, railroadmen who were working at the frontier railroad station of Zahony told of having seen a number of bands going through into the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Ruff, could you tell us also about your observations and what you have known, directly or indirectly, about the Russian defections from the Soviet Army?

Mr. RUFF. In the city of Pecs, an entire division of Soviet soldiers went up into the Mecsek Mountains, where to this day the freedom fighters are holding out. The city commander of Miskolc refused to shoot at the demonstrators when they demonstrated in the city, and when he was called to account by his superiors for this he committed suicide by shooting himself in the head.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you estimate the number of troops under his command?

Mr. RUFF. Several thousand men.

I talked to a freedom fighter who spent 3 weeks in the mountains of Borzsony, approximately 13 to 14 thousand partisans are in those mountains; approximately 1,200 of them are Russian soldiers. Those Russians who had been in Hungary for a long time and who were of the white race were so friendly to the Hungarians that, for a loaf of bread, they very often gave their rifles. The Russians had so little confidence in these soldiers who had been in Hungary for a long time and who were of the white race, that from as far as 10,000 miles away they brought new forces who were of the yellow race.

At the airport of Thokol there was an armed conflict between the Russians of the white race and the Russians of the yellow race, who had newly arrived, approximately 80 Russian dead.

That is all I know.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, was there anything in conclusion, Mr. Ruff, that you would like to tell the subcommittee, knowing what our objective is at this particular time, to get evidence about the nature of the Communist organization?

Mr. RUFF. If I may, I would like to tell in a few sentences what I think is the meaning of the Hungarian revolt, and what it means for the future.

Senator JOHNSTON. You may proceed.

Mr. RUFF. The conclusion I draw, and I see, from having talked to them, is drawn by most of the escapees, is that the Hungarian revolution has exploded the myth of Communist dictatorship.

What was the myth? According to the signs, one thought that in Hungary there were a great number of Communists, and that the Soviet orbit is completely unified. The Communist system was to establish this feeling regarding the number of Communists upon a system of fear and hate. On the international plane, some sort of conflict, international conflict or war, had to be used, because otherwise there would have been no object or excuse for the war or peace, the fight for peace.

On the national level, a certain class had to be constantly hated and persecuted. This is what is known as class war, because otherwise the atmosphere of hate and fear cannot be created.

For example, within a firm or factory there was never only 1 leader in the factory, but 3 together. Among these three it was never clarified which one was the supreme one. In fact, neither of these 3 were convinced Communists, but they pretended they were such because they were afraid that the other of the 3 might be one.

It is on this basis of mutual fear that the entire system was built upon a pinpoint, whereby everybody had a feeling that everybody else was a Communist.

In the revolt, in the rebellion, when we were face to face with guns, we realized that the person we had been afraid of as being a Communist turned out to be not a Communist at all, and we saw that in Hungary there were, in effect, no Communists. There was no class war or brother-to-brother war in Hungary before the war.

In 1 day after the revolt had broken out, the entire Hungarian Army and the entire Hungarian police had joined the Hungarian side, except for those who were compromised by having blood on their hands.

As it turned out, those young people whom the Communists had raised and educated turned out to be the greatest enemies of the system. And against the Workers Party, which is in effect the Communist Party, it was the factories and worker areas which presented the greatest resistance.

Actually, the Hungarians only fought against Russians. When they came to close quarters with the Russians in battle they realized that the Russians were weak, they were not unified, and that the Hungarians had no reason to fear them. I think that the only people who are afraid of the Russians are those who are too far away to really know them.

There were 12-year-old children who attacked tanks with bombs, and they were not afraid, and today no one is afraid of the Russians in Hungary.

This Russian myth was built on a monumental and historical bluff, because, as Goebbels said, "If we lie, then we have to make it a very big lie."

It has now been proved that the Russians were no match for the Hungarian problem, and that is why I see a great future for Hungary, because the Hungarians have not only got the strength for armed resistance, as has been shown in the 1948 freedom fight, they succeeded in passively resisting through 18 years—

Mr. MORRIS. From 1948—

Mr. RUFF. I meant—compared to the freedom fight of 1848, where it was passive.

That is why the escapees all voice their expectancy of western support for them, not by arms but through at least such an effective blockade that the Russians should finally realize how alone they are in the world, because the Hungarian nation is at this point completely unified, and as far as I am concerned it is still a completely open question.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell me this, Mr. Ruff: What has happened to the 500 to 1,000 Communists whose names appear in this book that is now in the record?

Mr. RUFF. One cannot say for certain. I know of certain individual cases. But partly, they have been taken to the Soviet Union, partly they are still functioning in Hungary, having been missed in the confusion and turmoil, and partly—some of them have been killed, too.

Mr. MORRIS. So it is your estimate that a few Communists, 500 to 1,000, really in effect ran Hungary?

Mr. RUFF. By all means.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, there will be other interesting aspects of this witness' testimony. I suggest that we have a session this afternoon where Mr. Rusher can make a record with this witness, and at some time we can put that into the public record.

Senator JOHNSTON. That will be agreed to.

Mr. MORRIS. There is so much valuable information, and even evidence that we have, we would like to get it in the record, and I know that your time is short this morning.

Senator JOHNSTON. I notice that you testified that the Russian soldier would do most anything for a little food—is that your statement?

Mr. RUFF. By all means.

Senator JOHNSTON. We had testimony to that effect yesterday. Do you mean to say that Russia does not feed her soldiers?

Mr. RUFF. Those Russian units which had been in Hungary received practically no supplies from home, and their entire existence was based on what they could collect in Hungary, or from Hungary.

Senator JOHNSTON. I am glad to hear that, for this reason: There has been a great deal of criticism in the United States about our surplus foodstuffs. And reading in the papers, I have also found that there are dire necessities in Russia as far as food is concerned. I have never known any nation to win any war on an empty stomach. And for that reason I believe that our surpluses, though there may be a few million dollars, are far better spent, probably, than some money even on airplanes and things that are important for warfare.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Ruff, will you make yourself available to have a session with us sometime this afternoon?

Mr. RUFF. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I would like to thank this witness; he has come a long way to testify.

Do you expect to go back to Vienna, Mr. Ruff?

Mr. RUFF. If I get a chance to study at some university here, then I would probably stay, would like to stay.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you very much.

Senator JOHNSTON. We certainly thank you for coming and giving this information.

Mr. MORRIS. If you could swear in this next witness for us, I know that he can give us more concrete details about the deportation that we are interested in at this particular time.

Senator, this next witness, again, like the 2 witnesses yesterday, and 2 who appeared earlier, is a man who has relatives in Hungary, and for fear of reprisals against them he has asked that his identity not be established, and that his photograph not appear in the press. Therefore, he has come here with one of those surgical masks that we have been using for this purpose.

Senator JOHNSTON. Will you come around and be sworn, under those conditions. Raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you give to this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BUBOS. I do.

TESTIMONY OF LEXI BUBOS (A FICTITIOUS NAME SUPPLIED BY THE WITNESS), THROUGH AN INTERPRETER, LASZLO HADIK, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. You have come here this morning from Ohio, have you not?

Mr. BUBOS. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And how long have you been in the United States?

Mr. BUBOS. A week and a half.

Mr. MORRIS. You had joined the freedom fighters, had you not, in the recent rebellion against the Soviet occupation in Hungary?

Mr. BUBOS. Yes. I took part, armed part, in the rebellion.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you could tell us from your own experience and from the experience that you may have gleaned from your associations, what evidence that you know of that the Soviet Union has been deporting Hungarians to the Soviet Union.

Mr. BUBOS. I took part in a successful armed attempt to free two carloads of youths at the east station in Budapest.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about that?

Mr. BUBOS. We found out that, at the east station, there were these carloads of Hungarians locked up, and that Russian soldiers were guarding these cars. Thereupon a 30-man contingent of ours, armed with submachine guns and hand grenades, surrounded these railroad cars. And after a short battle, we had killed the Russians and freed the youths.

Mr. MORRIS. How many youths were freed?

Mr. BUBOS. Approximately eight to nine hundred were involved.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, they were on their way to the Soviet Union?

Mr. BUBOS. They were, as far as I know, directed towards Russia, because on the railroad cars the ticket of the destination had already been glued on the side.

Mr. MORRIS. And what was that ticket on the side?

Mr. BUBOS. The ticket had said that they were destined to cross the border at Zahony.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the border between Hungary and the Soviet Union?

Mr. BUBOS. And the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say they numbered eight to nine hundred?

Mr. BUBOS. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you personally participated in freeing the 800?

Mr. BUBOS. I didn't take personal part, because I was detailed somewhere else, but I did talk to those people who had done it.

Senator JOHNSTON. It is a rule of the railroad that you have to have stamped on the boxcars when they cross over from Hungary into Soviet Russia; isn't that true?

Mr. BUBOS. Each railroad car has got a certain space prearranged for its destination, where its destination is marked, and this was such a piece of paper glued on there.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, will you tell us any other experience you may have had on that subject?

Mr. BUBOS. I talked to railroadmen who had personally sabotaged such attempts to take Hungarians out of the country. They did this by blowing up the switches in the railroad yard, and by then freeing those who were locked in the cars. For this purpose they were not—they didn't have any confidence in the Russians who had been in Hungary before, they used the ones which they had recently brought to Hungary.

The Russians who were collecting these Hungarians would whistle at the Hungarian, and if the Hungarian didn't immediately stop, then they would just shoot him on the spot.

That is approximately all I know on the deportation.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, can you tell us what you know about Russian defections from the Soviet army?

Mr. BUBOS. I was at the revolutionary youth headquarters in Buda, which is the western half of Budapest, and we got the direct report of the incident which happened in the town of Györ.

Mr. MORRIS. What was that incident?

Mr. BUBOS. The incident of the two to three thousand Russians having joined the Hungarians in town.

Senator JOHNSTON. That is just at the suburbs, is it, about 5 or 6 miles?

Mr. BUBOS. No; that is the western half of Budapest, the western half of the river.

Senator JOHNSTON. Three thousand that left from there?

Mr. BUBOS. No. The 3,000 had joined the Hungarians in the town of Györ, and that incident—

Senator JOHNSTON. How far is that from Budapest?

Mr. BUBOS. It is approximately 160 kilometers.

And we, being at the headquarters, received that announcement from Györ.

These Russians had gone to the Hungarian workers councils and said that since the revolution had been successful they were requesting

that they be allowed to settle in that town and to earn their livings in an honest way. The head of the workers council thereupon told them to return to their barracks and to wait, that they would be notified in which way to proceed.

It was in their barracks that they were caught when the newly arrived Russians attacked the city, and they, too, were attacked by these newly arrived Russian troops.

Part of this group immediately took up its arms to fight the newly arrived Russians, and part of them gave themselves up in the confusion. That part which had continued to fight is still with the Hungarians in the mountains around Györ.

The Hungarian city commander had received orders—this Russian commander of the garrison had received orders from the newly arrived Russians to shoot at the railroad factory, and he announced that he would not shoot at Hungarians, and committed suicide.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the same incident that Mr. Ruff testified to earlier?

Mr. BUBOS. I am not certain, but this I know came from Györ, because that is what I was in contact with.

Mr. MORRIS. Maybe you were out of the room when he testified as to that particular incident.

Now, is there anything else on this whole subject of Russian defections and Russians fighting against the Soviet Army?

Mr. BUBOS. The other incident is that of the air force pilots in the town of Kecskemet.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about that?

Excuse me. Before you answer that question, I wonder if you would give us the assumed name that you have agreed to appear under here today.

Mr. BUBOS. The assumed name is Lexi Bubos.

Mr. MORRIS. That is for the purpose of identifying him and distinguishing him from other witnesses, Senator.

Proceed.

Mr. BUBOS. This incident took place after the Hungarian Air Force had given the Russians an ultimatum that if they did not retreat, or if they moved forward, they would immediately be bombed, and his incident took place—this ultimatum could never be carried out, because they were betrayed by the Russian wife of the Hungarian commander, who had gotten wind of it.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say they betrayed the whole movement?

Mr. BUBOS. Before then, the Russians who had surrounded the air-field had not shot at the Hungarians, but when this betrayal took place then the newly arrived Russians did.

And on the second day of the revolt, on the corner of Korut and Rakosi, the Russians, after we had succeeded in talking to them, got out of their armored cars and told us to take them and go on our way.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, the Russian soldiers just turned their armored cars over to your freedom fighters?

Mr. BUBOS. There were some who stayed in their armored cars, or tanks, but most of them got out and handed them to us.

Senator JOHNSTON. The ones that turned the cars over to you, were they the soldiers that had been in Hungary for some time, or were they the new soldiers that came in?

Mr. BUBOS. These were those who had been in Hungary for a time.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, then, there is considerable opposition on the part of elements within the Red army to communism?

Mr. BUBOS. Within those Russians troops, particularly those which had been in Hungary for a time, there is great opposition to the system and the regime, because they had a taste of the western culture, and they had also had a taste of what it was to be free.

Mr. MORRIS. And, in fact, is it not true that there is more opposition being expressed and given to communism right now by the Red army than there is in the rest?

Mr. BUBOS. Particularly in the crack units of the Soviet army.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean, in their best units there is more opposition to communism than in some of the others?

Mr. BUBOS. More concrete opposition than in the rest.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that covers pretty generally the information that we have gone over, now, does it not?

Mr. BUBOS. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you have answered particularly with respect to those two points, have you not, now, the defections and the deportations?

Mr. BUBOS. One other point I would like to mention is an eyewitness account of Russians shooting defenseless Hungarians.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us that?

Mr. BUBOS. The one incident is on Korut Street, I was standing there when a Russian tank slowly moved down the street, one Hungarian had just looked out the window, without having arms or without being belligerent, and the Russian tank immediately shot at the window with its cannon.

The other incident was when the Hungarian demonstrators were taking the Red Star off the technical university, and they were unarmed, and they, too, were fired upon by the secret police—by the Russians.

The third incident is when about 150 Hungarians had lined up at a bakery waiting for bread, and the Russians shot at the whole length of the line with machineguns, so that there were a number of dead and wounded.

Mr. MORRIS. And these three episodes you experienced with your own eyes?

Mr. BUBOS. These I saw with my own eyes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you are giving sworn testimony here today to that?

Mr. BUBOS. Yes, I swear that that is true.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, this whole transcript should be turned over to Ambassador Lodge, should it not?

Senator JOHNSTON. It is understood that all the testimony we have had concerning this situation and that in Austria shall be turned over to the Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, who is now with the United Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I would like to put in the record at this point a news clipping of the story that originated in Geneva yesterday to the effect that the Swiss Government has apprehended a spy ring in Switzerland, and according to the news reports, the man who was at the head of it, Emeric Pehr, was the counselor to the Hungarian Lega-

tion in Berne from 1951 to 1955. So, a Hungarian official was the head of that spy ring in Switzerland, according to this report.

I would like to have this report put in the record at this time, Senator.

Senator JOHNSTON. This shall be put in the record, as a part of the record. I think it is pretty important that we have that.

(The newspaper clipping referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 410" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 410

[New York Times, December 19, 1956]

HUNGARIAN SPIES REPORTED CAUGHT

SWISS CHARGE BAND HEADED BY DIPLOMAT USED REFUGEES TO GET NATO DATA

Special to the New York Times

GENEVA, December 18.—An espionage network headed by Mate Vegh, second secretary of the Hungarian Legation in Bern has been smashed, the Swiss Government announced today.

According to René Dubois, Swiss attorney general, the network was assigned to get information on military preparations in the Atlantic Pact countries neighboring Switzerland, with especial emphasis on Italy.

Mr. Vegh left Switzerland in September. He tried to return yesterday and was expelled, a Government communiqué said.

Two women assistants of Mr. Vegh were arrested, it added. One of them already has been expelled from Switzerland. The other, a Hungarian who gained Swiss nationality through marriage, will be brought to trial in a Federal court in Neuchatel.

The names of the women were not disclosed in the communiqué. However, the Attorney General said later that one of them was an Italian who had acted primarily as a courier for the espionage ring.

The spy network recruited Hungarian refugees in Switzerland as agents by blackmailing them with threats against their families in Hungary, the communiqué added.

According to the attorney general, the spy network was formed several years ago by Emeric Pehr, counselor at the Hungarian legation in Bern from 1951 to 1955.

No details were available today on the number of persons involved in the network. The Swiss communiqué gave only fragmentary information and the Hungarian legation in Bern refused to comment on the case.

Despite Mr. Vegh's cunning efforts, no harm was done to Switzerland's security, the Swiss communiqué said.

The first suggestions that Hungarian agents were operating in Switzerland came from reports by the Swiss Red Cross. These reports said that at least one informer had been found among the Hungarian refugees brought here for temporary asylum from Austria.

Although Swiss counterespionage agents were aware of the spy ring and made arrests secretly, their work was kept secret until today to permit further investigations.

Senator JOHNSTON. Another thing, as you know, Mr. Morris, we have been studying about money coming through from Switzerland, and we can't find out where the billions are coming from, so we will have to watch the situation in Switzerland very closely.

Mr. MORRIS. For your information, we are trying to summarize all our information on that point for our annual report, Senator.

Is there anything else you would like to tell us? I know you want to get back. You have just gotten a job in Ohio, have you not?

Mr. BUBOS. I am draftsman at the factory in Ohio.

Mr. MORRIS. We won't identify you further.

We want to thank you for coming and giving us this valuable evidence. Thank you very much.

Senator JOHNSTON. We certainly thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. At the conclusion, I would like to mention that we are trying to arrange for John Santo, who was an American Communist who was deported to Hungary, we are trying to arrange for his being brought to the country, but we are experiencing difficulties. However, we do know that Mrs. Santo has come into the country, and we are trying to talk to her, to learn more of the facts in trying to solve the particular problem in this case.

I will, Senator, as we indicated earlier, make arrangement to bring the engineer whom Mr. Ruff mentioned in his testimony to the United States at an early time to give amplifying testimony on this subject.

Senator JOHNSTON. Anything else?

Mr. MORRIS. I have nothing more, Senator.

Senator Johnston. The committee is adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

INDEX

NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the names of an individual or an organization in this index.

A

	Page
Austria-----	3229, 3295, 3297, 3303
AVH (Hungarian secret police)-----	3233, 3244, 3246, 3258, 3294

B

Bachki, Bela :	
Testimony of-----	3239-3241
527 Mills Building, Washington, D. C-----	3239
Berne, Switzerland-----	3304
Borzsony Mountains-----	3297
Bubos, Lexi (pseudonym) (testimony of)-----	3300-3305
Buda-----	3236, 3301
Budapest-----	3228, 3230, 3231, 3234, 3236, 3240, 3258, 3294-3297, 3300, 3301

C

Communist(s)-----	3244, 3247, 3297-3299, 3305
Communist Party-----	3233, 3234, 3249, 3251, 3258, 3298
Congress-----	3240

D

Deportation of Hungarians-----	3228-3230, 3236, 3237, 3295-3297, 3301
Dubois, Rene-----	3304

E

Eger-----	3224, 3235, 3237
Exhibit No. 406—Letter to editor of Washington Post, dated December 18, 1956, from W. C. Wentworth-----	3240
Exhibit No. 406-A—Identity card of Rakosi in Hungarian Worker Party-----	3250
Exhibit No. 407—Rakosi's membership card to the Hungarian National Assembly-----	3251
Exhibit No. 408—Pages from identity booklet of Rakosi's wife under married name-----	3252, 3253
Exhibit No. 408-A—Pages from identity booklet of Rakosi's wife under her Russian name-----	3254-3257
Exhibit No. 409—List of between 500 and 1,000 important Hungarian Communist officials-----	3259-3294
Exhibit No. 410—Clipping from New York Times dated December 19, 1956, re Swiss Government apprehension of spy ring headed by Emeric Pehr-----	3304, 3305

F

Far Eastern troops-----	3238, 3239
Fo Utea (special matters investigation Department of Ministry of Interior)-----	3244, 3247

G

General Assembly, U. N-----	3240
Geneva-----	3248, 3303, 3304
Germany, Western-----	3231

	Page
Gero, Ernest, first secretary of Communist Party-----	3233, 3239, 3249
Goebbels-----	3299
Gomulka-----	3239
Gyor-----	3301, 3302

H

Hadik, Laszlo :	
Interpreter for Max Joseph-----	3228
Interpreter for Lajos Ruff-----	3243
Hatvan-----	3297
Hungarian(s)-----	3227-3230, 3233, 3235, 3237, 3243, 3296, 3300, 3301, 3303
Hungarian Air Force-----	3302
Hungarian Army-----	3298
Hungarian Legation-----	3303, 3304
Hungarian National Assembly-----	3251
Hungarian revolt, October 23, 1956-----	3233
Hungarian Workers Party-----	3249
Hungary-----	3227-3229, 3231, 3233, 3237-3240, 3243, 3244, 3249, 3296-3303, 3305

J

Johnston, Senator Olin D-----	3227, 3243
Joseph, Max (pseudonym) :	
Testimony of-----	3228-3232
Entered United States on December 10, 1956-----	3228
Born in Hungary-----	3228
20 years old-----	3228

K

Kadar-----	3239, 3296
Kadar radio-----	3239
Kecskemet-----	3302
Kobanya-----	3248
Korut Street (incident re Russian tank)-----	3303
Kovacs, Istvan (pseudonym) :	
Testimony of-----	3232-3239
Entered United States on December 14, 1956-----	3232
Born in Hungary-----	3232

L

Lake Balaton-----	3258
Letter received by Max Joseph with signatures of deported Hungarians-----	3228, 3229
Lodge, Ambassador Henry Cabot-----	3240, 3303

M

Mandel, Benjamin-----	3243
May Day-----	3248
Mecsek Mountains-----	3297
Mindszenty, Cardinal-----	3246, 3248
Miskolc, Hungary-----	3297
Mongolian troops-----	3238
Moritz, Square Zsigmond-----	3238
Morris, Robert-----	3227, 3243

N

Nemeth, Istvan-----	3247
Nemeth, Dr. Laszlo-----	3246

P

Parliament Building-----	3233, 3234, 3237
Pehr, Emeric-----	3303, 3304
People's Republic-----	3248
Politburo-----	3249

R

	Page
Railroad cars used for deporting	3234, 3235, 3297, 3301
Rakoski, Feodora	3244, 3249, 3251
Villa	3294, 3295
Refugees	3229
Roezaboldyi, Bela	3244
Ruff, Lajos	3240
Testimony of	3243-3300
Rusher, William	3227, 3240, 3243, 3244
Russian(s)	3229-3231, 3233, 3234, 3288, 3295, 3296, 3298, 3299, 3302, 3303
Russian defections	3296, 3297, 3301, 3302
Russian soldier(s)	3231, 3232, 3237, 3297

S

Santo, John	3305
Secretary General of U. N.	3240
Soviet Army	3230, 3302
Soviet Union	3227-3229, 3236, 3243, 3249, 3296, 3297, 3299-3301
Suez Canal	3231, 3238
Swiss Government	3303
Switzerland	3303, 3304
Szechenyi Mountains	3295
Szekesfehervar	3231

U

United Nations	3240, 3296, 3303
Vegh, Mate	3304
Vienna	3241, 3244, 3300

W

Wentworth, W. C., Member of Parliament of Australia	3240
Workers Congress	3296
Workers Party	3298

Z

Zahony	3297, 3301
--------	------------



SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

~~Committee on the Judiciary~~

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE
UNITED STATES

JANUARY 15, 1957

PART 48

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1957

Boston Public Library
Superintendent of Documents

AUG 27 1957

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr., Missouri
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Arkansas
JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, Wyoming
MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina

ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota
WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland
ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Arkansas
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina
MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland
ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska

ROBERT MORRIS, *Chief Counsel*

J. G. SOURWINE, *Associate Counsel*

WILLIAM A. RUSHER, *Associate Counsel*

* BENJAMIN MANDEL, *Director of Research*

C O N T E N T S

	Page
Witnesses:	
Karlor, Sabo	3308
Karoly, Sabad	3316
Kossuth, Frank	3325
Mogar, Imre	3329
Nagy, Imre	3322
Szekely, Janos	3328
Szep, Istban	3331

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

TUESDAY, JANUARY 15, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:45 a. m., in room 457, Senate Office Building; Senator Johnston presiding.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William Rusher, associate counsel, and F. W. Schroeder, chief investigator.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, before beginning today's hearing, I would like to mention that these witnesses today are being called in connection with the hearings that we have been conducting since last October on the nature of world communism as manifested by Hungarian events.

The hearing today will have a bearing, not only on the nature of the Soviet organization, with its manifestations in Hungary, but as you will see, Senator, by the evidence, right here in the United States.

Father Gregory, Father Berzinec Gregory, has come down with the seven Hungarian escapees from Camp Kilmer today. They left there at 5:30 this morning. We are now ready to proceed. Father Gregory will also act as the interpreter for the witnesses today.

Senator JOHNSTON. Glad to have you with us, too, Father.

The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. Father Gregory, will you take the interpreter's oath?

Senator JOHNSTON. Raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear that you will truly interpret to the witness the questions directed to him, and will truly interpret the answers given by the witness, to the best of your ability, so help you God?

Father GREGORY. I do, sir.

Senator JOHNSTON. Now will the witness be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KARLOR. So help me God, I do.

Senator JOHNSTON. Be seated.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, before beginning the hearing today, I would like to have the record show an episode that occurred in connection with our present inquiry.

Chief investigator Frank Schroeder and investigator Edward Duffy spent most of the week at Camp Kilmer.

Prior to going there the subcommittee had had several leads about Communists coming into the United States in connection with some

of the escapees. The subcommittee received information concerning a certain refugee by the name of Gregory Lang, a lawyer by profession, and the subcommittee information was that he was in the Communist Party in the suburban section of Budapest.

Mr. Schroeder and Mr. Duffy called upon camp authorities to produce Mr. Lang. He was brought in to the chaplain's office, and there present was Father Gregory, who is here with us today, to act as an interpreter, and the representatives of the Immigration Service.

When the staff members asked Mr. Lang, through an interpreter, if he had any connection with the Communist Party in Hungary, at first he denied it. Later, when they persisted in their questioning, he admitted that he had been a member of the Communist Party, that he had joined it in 1945 and even worked as a card clerk in the office of the political secret police.

He went on to say that he left the Communist Party sometime in 1948. When he was asked why he did not record this on his application when he went into the country, he said if he had stated it he could not come in.

Mr. Lang has been turned over to the immigration authority and he is being held in custody. Now, we, Senator, cannot presume whether or not he is presently a loyal Communist. His story, I think it is clear from what he said, that if he said he was a Communist he would not have gotten out. Yet, Senator, as we know from our experience with people, we cannot very well just accept the mere say-so that he has left the party, particularly when it was as late as 1948, as Mr. Schroeder has told us.

We think it is a serious case to be studied by the subcommittee.

Senator JOHNSTON. I can only speak personally for myself, but I have been fearful all along when we let them in by the thousands that we were letting in probably some Communists that would come over here and do nothing but spread Communist activities here in America. So we have got to watch that side of it, also.

(The witness was masked.)

Father GREGORY. He has a father and mother still in Hungary, and he is fearful of their lives.

Senator JOHNSTON. All right. Any pictures made of him, he must have the mask on. That is in order to protect his relatives in Hungary, living in the old country.

TESTIMONY OF SABO KARLOR, AS INTERPRETED BY FATHER GREGORY

Mr. MORRIS. And is it your testimony today, is it your statement here under oath, that you have relatives back in Hungary against whom there would be reprisals if you felt your identity became known?

Mr. KARLOR. Yes, sir; my father and mother and my sister would suffer.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, we have a tremendous responsibility in these things. We do not like to present witnesses in this manner; yet, it is so very understandable that we do so. The story this particular witness has to tell, Senator, is extremely important, and I think his testimony is very necessary and we will have to check into it very thoroughly.

I ask, Senator, that we respect his wishes and allow him to testify with the pseudonym and having his face disguised so his picture cannot be shown to the Hungarian secret police.

Senator JOHNSTON. I think, personally, the witness, being from a foreign country, certainly should understand how the law is here, that if they testify under oath and should testify to something that is not true, then they are liable to a prosecution.

Father GREGORY. He understands that, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us the name under which you will testify today, other than your own name, which you have given us and which, Senator, I have on this particular card here?

Mr. KARLOR. I want to testify under my own name.

Mr. MORRIS. Does he understand if he testifies under his own name, this will be a matter of public record?

Father GREGORY. He says if this will go out, behind the Iron Curtain—I said this will be a public record, and therefore, if he wants to assume another name, and he says he does.

Mr. MORRIS. Now what is the name?

Mr. KARLOR. Under the name of Sabo Karlor.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you spell that, please?

Father GREGORY. S-a-b-o K-a-r-l-o-r.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that a first name?

Father GREGORY. The first name is given always, the family name, and then his Christian name is Karlor.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you were employed in the American Legation in Budapest for a number of years, were you not?

Mr. KARLOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You were born in Hungary?

Mr. KARLOR. I was born in Austria.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Without giving a date, because that would tend to identify you, will you tell us generally over a period when you went into Hungary?

Mr. KARLOR. 1911, with my father, I got to Hungary.

Mr. MORRIS. Well now, can you tell us without identifying yourself—can you tell us without identifying yourself—roughly, what you did in the American Legation in Hungary?

(The answer was stricken physically from the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, may I ask that that be expunged from the record? In consideration for the human qualities involved here, I ask the press that they will ignore that particular identifying feature.

Senator JOHNSTON. Under the rule, I will rule that will be stricken from the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Father Gregory, will you ask him—he should think before he answers these questions, because we cannot necessarily guarantee the security of that statement.

Father GREGORY. He understands that, sir.

Senator JOHNSTON. Our trouble is this, we do not know everybody that is sitting in the room here. This is a public hearing, and somebody may be sitting here listening to him in order to make a report to the Communists.

Mr. KARLOR. We must be very careful.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you participated—you were present in Hungary at the time of the start of the October 23 rebellion, were you not?

Mr. KARLOR. Yes, I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, again without identifying yourself, could you tell us what your role was in that particular rebellion?

Father GREGORY. I did not get that, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Without identifying, again without telling us details that will identify himself, could he tell us generally what he did in connection with the October 23 rebellion?

Mr. KARLOR. The American Legation gave us strict orders not to go into the garage as soon as the revolution started. Since we lived far away from the Embassy, the American Legation give us orders not to come into the garage because they were fearful for our lives and they did not want to assume responsibility for us since we were the employees of the Legation.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you do anything, therefore, at all, subsequently in connection with assisting the freedom fight?

Mr. KARLOR. As a fighter I did not participate in the fight. I was well aware that I was employed by the American Embassy, and I stayed away from the fight.

Mr. MORRIS. And when did you come to the United States?

Mr. KARLOR. 1956, September 16 I left—December 16, 1956, I left Hungary; and the 18th of the same month I came into Austria; and the 30th or 31st of December I arrived at Camp Kilmer, United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, in connection with your work at the American Legation, did you get to know the other Hungarian employees of the American Legation there?

Mr. KARLOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you know any of them to be agents of the Hungarian secret police?

Mr. KARLOR. About one, I know positively.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I wish that you would not, at this time, give us his name in the public record, but will you tell us how you positively know that he was an agent of the secret police?

Mr. KARLOR. Because he has told me so.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, are there any others that you have—

Mr. KARLOR. Yes, sir, about whom we had suspicion, there were many more.

Mr. MORRIS. I want to use a device here, Senator, by which we will know. He has given us on this card, he has identified them, but I do not want to put the names in the record until we are able to check further into the story. But I am going to give him a list of the names here that he has given us.

I wonder if Mr. Schroeder will do this?

I have there the four names that you have given Mr. Duffy and Mr. Schroeder. Can you tell us just by number only—1, 2, 3, 4—which was the one you definitely know as the secret agent?

Father GREGORY. You should number them.

Mr. MORRIS. Just by number?

Mr. KARLOR. Number one.

Mr. MORRIS. No. 1 is the man that you definitely know.

Now, how recently, to your knowledge, was he working in the American Embassy in Budapest, American Legation?

Mr. KARLOR. December 16.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he was there when you left?

Mr. KARLOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what about the No. 2 man on that list, what can you tell us about him—again, without mentioning his name?

Mr. KARLOR. No. 2, we had suspicion and reason to believe that he was also connected with the secret police of Hungary.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the reason you believe that?

Mr. KARLOR. Because he worked for so many years at the American Legation, and nothing ever happened to him.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain that?

Mr. KARLOR. We know, because every man that worked for the American Legation was constantly under surveillance by the secret police.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, were you yourself constantly under surveillance by the secret police?

Mr. KARLOR. I was—for the last 2 weeks of my being there, I was. They talked to me; they approached me.

Mr. MORRIS. Why was he not under surveillance for the period of time that he worked there?

Mr. KARLOR. Because I was a very insignificant person, I was just washing cars, and a very minor official.

Mr. MORRIS. Why would the No. 1 man tell you, the person identified as No. 1 tell you, what were the circumstances under which he would actually say he was an agent for the secret police?

Mr. KARLOR. I enjoyed a particular kind of confidence of all people because I did favors, was a very small man there, considered a small man, and when he came around just 2 weeks before I saw that he was in the same state that I was, because I was approached then, and he was nervous and he begged me to help him escape, and he confided to me.

Mr. MORRIS. He confided in you that he was an agent then for the secret police?

Mr. KARLOR. That is right, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say he was then considering the fact that he wanted to break away from his allegiance?

Mr. KARLOR. Yes; we made a decision, and we both escaped, but he was caught on the border.

Mr. MORRIS. He was caught by whom?

Mr. KARLOR. The Russians.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, with respect to the No. 2 man, what other reason have you to believe that he was a secret agent of the AVO's?

Mr. KARLOR. As we discussed many times who is under the suspicion here, who could be, we all always agreed that he, the No. 2 and No. 3—we were awfully fearful from both of them.

Mr. MORRIS. But you have no direct evidence, or you have no evidence whatever, that they are?

Mr. KARLOR. I have no evidence to that effect.

Mr. MORRIS. What about No. 4?

Mr. KARLOR. No. 4 was jailed for passing dollars and Napoleon gold money, selling, and after a short jail sentence No. 2 immediately employed him again because he was his chief. He also, incidentally, was a piano player in a nightclub at the same time that he worked in the American Legation, and it was not a practice of the American Legation, or any other Legation, to hire a man to hold two jobs down.

He was a piano player at night, was employed in nightclubs which were owned by the government, consequently controlled by the secret police, and yet they allowed him to work at the same time that he worked at our Legation.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you have told us, then, have you not, that the housekeeper for two American officers attached to the Embassy was an agent of the secret police?

Mr. KARLOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that?

Mr. KARLOR. If I may, I will elaborate on it.

Mr. MORRIS. Please do.

Mr. KARLOR. This girl was employed by the American Embassy attaché, and a chauffeur, private chauffeur, of an American Embassy attaché told the Embassy attaché that this woman is a spy for the secret police.

An American Embassy attaché told him what to say to the secret police.

Mr. MORRIS. I did not understand that, Father.

Father GREGORY. You have 2 persons involved—3. One is a member of the Embassy staff, an American officer, who hired a girl to work for him. He had also had a chauffeur, and the chauffeur was loyal and told about this girl, his maid, that she was a member of the secret police.

Then the American officer told the chauffeur to tell her whatever he wants her to know. Later on, when they found out that the chauffeur has reported on the maid, the chauffeur was immediately arrested and sentenced to jail for life. First he was imprisoned and sentenced to death, and then they gave him amnesty to life imprisonment. And he suspects that this information came from the maid.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, could you tell us whether this maid is—when did he last see this maid? When did you last see this maid?

Mr. KARLOR. Just before I left; December.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, to your knowledge she was still working there at the time?

Mr. KARLOR. She immediately married to the chief of the garage, who was an Austrian citizen, and then she started to spy on her husband, too. Whatever happened in the Legation, he would talk about it at home, and she immediately would tell the AVO's—secret police.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that?

Mr. KARLOR. Because the No. 1 once tried him out, tried this ring out. The No. 1 tried it out in such a way that this maid was positively a secret police; that he has passed on some information to her and then he heard it in a couple days already from the secret police.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, the No. 1 name on this list—

Mr. KARLOR. No. 1.

Mr. MORRIS (continuing). Confirmed to you, the fact that she was a secret agent?

Mr. KARLOR. Yes; he told me.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the period when he had taken you into his confidence?

Mr. KARLOR. This maid also was employed by another Embassy attaché—she worked for both of them as a maid—and she implicated another chauffeur, and that one was sentenced to life, too. But he

was released 2 years later. After he received a sentence, life sentence, 2 years later he was released.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the significance of that?

Mr. KARLOR. I think that the jails are opened and lots of criminals, such as this one, was let out also by freedom fighters.

Also, there is another man that is not numbered here, nor his name does not appear here. He also received a life sentence, but then they let him out 4 years later and told him to report in January to the court; secret police. And the revolution broke out on the 23d of October, and he did not report; everybody escaped.

Mr. MORRIS. What have these people been doing since they were released?

Mr. KARLOR. Most of them were trying to escape to another country. Quite a few have succeeded. Some of them stayed back, but I do not know what happened to them.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you also have told us about two chauffeurs who were agents of the secret police, have you not?

Mr. KARLOR. These were the chauffeurs upon whose vanity this maid played. She is the one that they were identified with, those two chauffeurs.

Mr. MORRIS. And were the chauffeurs themselves secret police agents?

Mr. KARLOR. Yes, sir; both of them. But they also told the American Legation member, told the Chief, that they were members of the secret police.

Mr. MORRIS. They admitted to the American Legation member that they were secret police?

Mr. KARLOR. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that?

Mr. KARLOR. They told me.

Mr. MORRIS. They told you they had told him?

Mr. KARLOR. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did he say anything about it?

Mr. KARLOR. He said, "That's fine, you stay a member, and I will give you the information that you can pass on to them."

Mr. MORRIS. An American member told him that?

Mr. KARLOR. Both American officials said this, and if you wish, I will tell you their names.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you do not know whether he meant that he wanted to give them misinformation that they should carry back—

Mr. KARLOR. That is exactly what he means.

Mr. MORRIS. That is what he meant. So, in effect, they were really double agents?

Mr. KARLOR. Yes, sir. That is why, then, the maid reported them, that they were double agents, and that is why they got the sentence.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, is there anything else you can tell us about the secret police, gathered from your experience as an employee at the American Legation?

Mr. KARLOR. Yes, sir. They tried to approach me.

Mr. MORRIS. Tried to approach you. All right.

Now, in telling us that story, remember that they know the details of the story, and if you give too many individuating notes about that

story, you will be giving your identity. Bear that in mind when you tell us how they did it.

Mr. KARLOR. I am the instrument of this whole plot, and Your Honor is right that only I know, and they know, that, and then I would be identified. But off the record, I am willing to state—it is horrible.

Mr. MORRIS. May we have that later on today?

Senator JOHNSTON. You may.

Mr. MORRIS. Don't tell us now here publicly, Father.

Mr. KARLOR. As soon as I came to Austria, I told the American officials about it and I asked them also not to divulge because of safety of my family.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, would you tell me this, did you tell anyone in the American Legation about your knowledge at the time, your knowledge of who these various secret police agents were?

Mr. KARLOR. I did not say it.

Mr. MORRIS. Then why did you not tell the American employers about—

Father GREGORY. He mentioned a name.

Mr. KARLOR. I must relate to you gentlemen that I know what Mr. Voegler said when he came out of jail, right in Hungary, that he said the secret police of Hungary told me such amazing secret things that only could come out of the American Legation, only American Legation officials knew about it, and I was afraid to tell them about an approach of the secret police that they made to me in a proposition. He asked me—may I continue a little bit more?

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Mr. KARLOR. Even when I arrived in Vienna, I got myself an interpreter and went to American officials—and I was even afraid of him—to relate this story and until when I came to Camp Kilmer because I was too close to the Soviet Union. But in Camp Kilmer I divulged everything.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think that the United States has a security problem, then, in its Legation?

Mr. KARLOR. Yes. Not only me, but Mr. Voegler confirmed that himself; we have a security problem.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, is there anything else you can tell us about the security aspect of the American Legation, or whether or not you know of any other secret police, Hungarian secret police, who are working there?

Mr. KARLOR. I made, I told a full story at Camp Kilmer—and it must be there before Your Honor—and that is all I wish to state at this time.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, have you told more to the authorities at Camp Kilmer than you have told us this morning, apart from the identity of the people?

Mr. KARLOR. I told in Camp Kilmer, in detail, everything, including names and how they approached me and what they wanted me to do, which I did not relate in here.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I will take up with the immigration authority, since you asked, to find out whether or not this particular congressional committee should have access to this information, since you know, Senator, that we have the responsibility of presenting the facts and recommendations that will bear on any legislation that might

proceed in the present session of Congress with respect to this whole problem, and that the Senate looks to the Internal Subcommittee to supply the facts on these various security aspects. And it would seem proper, Senator, that we should have the rest of this story.

Now, if there is any security involved, we would be able to screen it out, as we have tried to do, and make it available to the Senate and House of Representatives.

Senator JOHNSTON. I am going to ask the staff to look into that and see about the possibility for getting all that. And if we can receive it, I think it will be better for us to have it.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Cardinal Mindszenty?

Mr. KARLOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Does Cardinal Mindszenty know you?

Mr. KARLOR. He saw me only once or twice.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. What were the circumstances?

Mr. KARLOR. I was in a coffeeshop while Cardinal Mindszenty was upstairs, and he called down for a piece of bread. The elevators did not function because the electricity was disconnected, as a result of the revolution. I picked up a piece of bread and took it up, walked up three flights, and took it to the Cardinal's room.

The Cardinal says: "Well, you are not my servant here, how come that you brought this?"

"Well, the elevators are not functioning, I just brought it up for your Eminence, this piece of bread."

"Thank you very much," the Cardinal said, and then he said, "What are these people doing outside?"

"They are all waiting to buy up bread."

He said: "Oh, in that case, take this to them, too."

Then I asked him to give me holy communion, and I was the first one that received holy communion from the Cardinal—after being in jail—in the American Legation.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Father Gregory, you were present, were you not, in connection with that first episode that I mentioned here today, about this man Gregory Lang, a lawyer by profession, when he admitted to our staffmen there that he had been a Hungarian Communist, working as a card clerk in the AVH? You witnessed that?

Father GREGORY. I was present, I translated. As a matter of fact, I asked the question that Mr. Schroeder put to me, and Mr. Duffy—they were both there—and the immigration officer. I asked him specifically, "Have you been a member of the Communist Party, and did you ever work for them," and he said, "I was employed as a minor clerk in police headquarters in my town."

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if I might ask you, sir, if you could tell us what was the significance of the man who was working as a card clerk in the secret police headquarters? Would that be an important personality, securitywise?

I am asking the witness, Father.

Mr. KARLOR. He could not be a good Hungarian.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, I mean, is it an important position securitywise? That is the significance of it. Would the security police allow anyone to be a card clerk unless they were pretty sure that he was—

Mr. KARLOR. If they did not believe him, if he wasn't a trusted employee, they would never let him come into the police headquarters.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, is there anything more you can tell us now about this present scope of inquiry?

Mr. KARLOR. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Johnston, the time element that we calculated was very much off. You have notified us that you have an appointment at a quarter of twelve. I wonder, Senator, if you would swear in the other witnesses that we have and hear as many as you can, say, this afternoon. And if you cannot give us a full hearing, at least we could do that and then we could release that testimony just as soon as we get it printed and make that part of the record.

Senator JOHNSTON. I will be glad to do that.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would ask the other people who have come all the way from Camp Kilmer to come back here at 2:30 this afternoon?

Father GREGORY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 11:35 a. m., the subcommittee stood in recess to reconvene at 2:30 p. m., of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator JOHNSTON. Will you, Father, raise your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear that you will truly interpret to the witness the questions directed to him and will truly interpret the answers given by the witness to the best of your ability, so help you God?

Father GREGORY. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSTON. Raise your right hand and be sworn.

Do you swear that the evidence that you give before the subcommittee to be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KAROLY. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this particular witness is being asked to testify here today in connection with the tactics that he, himself, has experienced at the hands of the AVH, that is, the Hungarian secret Communist police, and this is in connection with the information we are trying to get as to the nature of the Communist organization of the Communist tactics and strategy.

TESTIMONY OF SABAD KAROLY AS INTERPRETED BY FATHER BERZINEC GREGORY

Mr. MORRIS. You have expressed a wish, have you not, to testify under an assumed name?

Mr. KAROLY. Yes, Your Honor, because I have a mother and sister there.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, Mr. Chairman, this man has given us his name, his right name and address, and we have his barracks number at Camp Kilmer with autobiographical information on him, and that is in our files at this time.

Senator JOHNSTON. In that we have this information, we will permit you to testify under this assumed name. That is understood.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you born in Hungary?

Mr. KAROLY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And what is your business or profession?

Mr. KAROLY. I am a construction engineer.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Now, where were you at the time of the uprising against the Hungarian Communist Government?

Mr. KAROLY. I was in Budapest.

Mr. MORRIS. You were not in prison at that time, were you?

Mr. KAROLY. No.

Mr. MORRIS. What were you doing, generally, without identifying yourself?

Mr. KAROLY. My work was highly special, and as soon as I tell them what I did, the Communists will identify me immediately.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. All right.

Now, you have been arrested on many occasions, have you not—

Mr. KAROLY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about your first arrest?

Again now, be careful. If you tell exactly what the cause was, you may be identifying yourself.

(The answer was physically stricken.)

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would expunge that date from the record. Senator, may that date be expunged from the record?

Senator JOHNSTON. It is expunged from the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Because it will identify you.

Senator JOHNSTON. You do not want anything that might identify you, you see, and probably bring harm to your family.

Mr. KAROLY. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. In the late 1940's you were arrested for the first time. Now, generally, without identifying the particular role, tell us what the nature of it was.

Mr. KAROLY. Yes; in the late 1940's I was arrested. Forty-one men swore allegiance to free Hungary, and I took part in this. One of those men was in prison with me, and he was a very dear friend of mine.

They charged the leader, who was a colonel in the Hungarian Royal Army, who was the leader of this society, that he had placed a time bomb in an open window in one of the government buildings, knowing that his own father was working in the office just above; that he wanted to blow up this building, which was not so. But they convicted him, made him sign a confession, and killed him.

Mr. MORRIS. You say some colonel?

Mr. KAROLY. A colonel. I know the name, but—

Mr. MORRIS. What was the connection with this man? He was arrested because he was a friend of his?

Mr. KAROLY. Because they charged him that he was one of the copartners.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what happened to you after they arrested him?

Mr. KAROLY. I was caught on the Austrian border and brought back to the secret police headquarters inside of Hungary, where for 3 weeks, every day, they beat me, the bottom of my feet and my kidneys, to admit that that man—that they were creating a revolution here. For 3 weeks I was beaten constantly, and I know the name of every one that beat me, and his whereabouts.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you released at the end of the 3 weeks?

Father GREGORY. I beg your pardon?

Mr. MORRIS. Were you released at the end of the 3 weeks?

Mr. KAROLY. No, sir. Three weeks later they took me to another camp near Buda.

Mr. MORRIS. And then what happened?

Mr. KAROLY. They took me to this prison. They beat me and tortured me again, but since they had no evidence whatsoever whether I participated or instigated anything like that—they held me, however, for 8 months in that prison.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, were you subjected to any other torture during those 8 months?

Mr. KAROLY. Of this particular prison, the headmaster and torturer was a fellow by the name of Rushak Mate.

We are a very deeply religious people, and Christmas has the same meaning to us, of course, as in America. A lot of families come over to visit prisoners. When he saw them—amongst them was my wife and baby, my little girl—he opened up the faucets, the fire faucet hoses, and sprayed us in the cold winter, the children and women; chased them away from the prison.

Mr. MORRIS. With fire hoses?

Mr. KAROLY. Fire hoses.

Mr. MORRIS. On Christmas?

Mr. KAROLY. On Christmas.

On one occasion my mother came over to see me, and she kissed me and embraced me, and then he saw that. He subjected me to 6 times 6 hours—they call that. They got an iron and tied the right hand to the left foot and the left hand to the right foot, and I had to be like that for 6 times 6, 36 hours, as a punishment for kissing my mother.

Mr. MORRIS. What else happened?

Mr. KAROLY. On another occasion they called us together and they told us that somebody smuggled letters out to the citizens from the prison. On this occasion they would pick up 45, 50 men, and take them up to the tower, the torture tower they called it, which had no windows, and water was constantly dripping on them, and they would chain them in this tower, where always a few men would die—not all of them would come back—as punishment.

But in one batch they would take 45 to 50 men into this tower and make water drip on them, and tie them with the chains to the concrete wall.

I even know the names of those that did not return from that tower.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, would you be willing, if we could convey your story, say to the United Nations, to give us the names of these people in executive session—with the assurance that we would conceal your identity—the names and some of the atrocities that these people have performed? Would you tell us in executive session those names?

Mr. KAROLY. Not only myself, Your Honor, but at Camp Kilmer we had 300 persons, like I am, that were subjected to the same beating and imprisonment. We would all go before the United Nations and testify against the atrocity and brutality of the Soviets.

Senator JOHNSTON. Proceed.

Mr. KAROLY. Just to describe in a little detail the brutality of this man. We were standing, the prisoners, in the prison yard, and this man passed by in his buggy, and the horse broke the centerpiece on the wagon. He got so mad that he had his horse shod, front feet to one shoe, and back, and tortured the horse in front of all of them.

And his wife just said a word to one of the prisoners, and he also put his wife in the same prison.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, how many times, in all, were you subjected to torture like this?

Now, again, may I warn you that if it is a multiple number, do not give the exact number, because that will tend to identify you.

Mr. KAROLY. I was about 3 or 4 times subject to most terrible brutalities.

Mr. MORRIS. How many times?

Mr. KAROLY. 3 or 4.

Mr. MORRIS. And can you tell us more things like this that these people performed——

Mr. KAROLY. After I was released from this prison for 2 months, they got a hold of me again on the same charge, on conspiracy, and they took me to another prison. They tied my hands, our hands—several of us—to the back, and then they put under our arms, in the back, a Sam Browne belt, on which they tied a rope, and they hoisted us up, hanging, until we fainted, and then they dropped us. They poured water, and hoisted us up again until we fainted. For 2 days this torture was going on.

Father GREGORY. I do not think that, as a priest, I would like to have ladies present, because this is—I never heard of anything like that, and I studied all the brutalities, and everything. But I do not think we should, I should, translate this in front of the ladies.

May I translate it to you, Senator?

Senator JOHNSTON. Anything that you have that you think should not be brought out here, when ladies are present, we will be glad for you to submit in executive session. I think that would be better.

Father GREGORY. And ladies won't be present. Fine.

Senator JOHNSTON. There won't be anybody there but the Senator and the staff.

Father GREGORY. I will tell him exactly what I said, that in America we do not let ladies hear anything like that, and that the Senator assures us that we could have an executive session on this subject.

Senator JOHNSTON. How long have these brutalities been going on?

Mr. KAROLY. It was from the beginning until 1953 when Nagy became a Premier, and then it stopped for a while.

Mr. MORRIS. You say "stopped for a while," did it resume again?

Mr. KAROLY. Well, it resumed again because Nagy did not last very long the Premier.

It was not a question that when he came in everything stopped, except that if the Nagy government caught any secret police handling prisoners like that, political prisoners, or any other, he would punish them, too.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did he last?

Mr. KAROLY. 8 months.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the tortures resume in full vigor after those 8 months?

Mr. KAROLY. It just started all over again just like before.

Senator JOHNSTON. Now, the Hungary Secret Police, was that made up of all Hungarians, or were some Soviets in it—some of the Russians?

Mr. KAROLY. The specialists were imported from Soviet Russia.

Mr. MORRIS. The specialists were brought in from the Soviet Union?

Mr. KAROLY. From the Soviet Union; they were all there. On the front they would name people, "Now you are the secret police," but they directed everything.

There was one priest that was also tortured, given a third degree by them, who was also blinded by the klieg light that they threw into his face. He was exceptionally treated and had the privilege to be treated by pure Soviet secret police and torturers.

Senator JOHNSTON. So when they use the name Hungarian secret police, that is in a certain way a misnomer for it was the Russian secret police?

Mr. KAROLY. They were taught, directed, of course—the Hungarian secret police—by Russian secret police. But Communists are the same all over. Once they get that bloodthirsty, they do not care who it is or what nationality. But it is all directed from Moscow, of course.

I spent 4 years in the prisons, various prisons, and out of those 4 years I was tortured for 3 years—slaved; and the only reason that I am alive today is because I am strong, constitutionally, and they were not able to prove one single thing on me.

Mr. MORRIS. So this is a case of Soviet acts of aggression against Hungarian people, is it not?

Mr. KAROLY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean, it may not be important to him. As he said, the Communists are the same all over. But look at the framework, the way we must look at these things. If things are performed by the Soviet leaders, the Soviet secret police, under their supervision, it is the act of a foreign country against the foreign people.

Mr. KAROLY. This is why the revolution broke out, because we were actually occupied, every director, every undertaking, every manufacturing center all over, were Russian Soviets. It was an actual occupation of the country, and that is why we started the revolution.

Mr. MORRIS. Well now, you told us in our staff interview that the particular effective way of forcing information from prisoners was to use strong floodlights, having strong floodlights focused on your eyes. Could you tell us about that here for the public record?

Mr. KAROLY. The lights were so strong that when they threw that in anybody's face, your eyes immediately blacked out and your ears were piercing with terrific pain and you had to tell. And as soon as they threw it on me, I told them I would tell them. Then they took the lights off. I had nothing to tell them because I was completely innocent of anything.

Senator JOHNSTON. What did they do then?

Mr. KAROLY. They locked me up, as other prisoners, for 6 days into a solitary pen, and they gave us a piece of bread baked twice in salt and salted water, that we could dip that into salted water, and eat it only that way, but no fresh water to drink for 6 days.

It wasn't a case for me, that I was strong; I had nothing to tell. But if they told me under those lights that I killed my own mother, who was alive, yet, I would have said "Yes."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest—I mean, with this witness' stories, such as this, we could consume today, tomorrow and the next day putting them in the record.

However, I think since there are other witnesses here, Senator, maybe we should just make known the fact that this man has more to

tell and let the story go on, unless there is something extraordinary that you think you should tell us.

Mr. KAROLY. This time I want to relate—which I have not seen myself, but my buddies who are also in Camp Kilmer saw this—that the Red Army, at Street No. 140, they saw two electrical furnaces, crematoriums, where they used to throw live people and burn them up.

He is now in Camp Kilmer, this man who was captured, during the revolution, this building and place, and saw this.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have the name of the man who actually captured the building and saw this?

Mr. KAROLY. Yes, he was the leader.

Do you want his name now?

Mr. MORRIS. Give it to Mr. Schroeder. We want to give him the same amount of security that you yourself requested.

Senator JOHNSTON. I certainly thank you for coming before the committee, and we want to get other evidence from you in executive session. We have already gotten some other before.

I think that we have completed with you for this present time. Thank you for coming.

Mr. KAROLY. May I relate, Senator, before I leave—I just want to make another statement, that at Temesvar, 35 prisoners were in 1 camp, 35,000, and 18,000 died within 5 months. And I know the cemetery; I had to bury them and I can identify them.

Senator JOHNSTON. Approximately when was that?

Mr. KAROLY. 1944 to late 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, 18,000 out of 35,000 died?

Mr. KAROLY. Yes, 18. And I can identify and make a drawing of every grave, how they are located and everything, and where.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the assumed name you want to use?

Mr. KAROLY. Sabad Karoly. S-a-b-a-d K-a-r-o-l-y

Senator JOHNSTON. Thank you.

I have been asking the other Senators of this subcommittee that the United Nations hear the testimony of all the witnesses from Hungary who have been testifying to details of Soviet aggression against the people and the acts of brutality and savagery. That should provide a basis for some kind of action by the United Nations against the barbarians who perform these deeds.

I renew my request, and request that they be heard as soon as possible.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I think there is one man here who is prepared to testify under his own name, and I think possibly we will take him out of order because of that.

Senator, the testimony of this particular witness is a little bit different from that of the other witnesses that we have heard. I think, in trying to understand the whole picture of the story of Hungary and what it means, the actions the Communists have provoked, we should know something about the spirit of the Hungarians who participated in the uprising. I think by calling this particular witness we can get a pretty good idea of the caliber of the people who performed.

Father GREGORY. May I add, Senator, for clarification, the boy is 14.

Senator JOHNSTON. How old?

Father GREGORY. Fourteen. And he is the product of so-called Communist indoctrination. He is their baby; they taught him how to shoot.

Senator JOHNSTON. I do not think it is necessary to swear you again—

Father GREGORY. No; he is too young for that.

Senator JOHNSTON (continuing). But tell him to raise his right hand.

Do you swear that the evidence that you give before this subcommittee to be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MORRIS. You understand the nature of the oath?

Mr. NAGY. I understand that I have to tell the truth.

Senator JOHNSTON. He understands if he does not tell the truth before this committee, he could be indicted for perjury?

Proceed.

TESTIMONY OF IMRE NAGY, AS INTERPRETED BY FATHER BERZINEC GREGORY

Mr. MORRIS. You have the name Imre Nagy, the same as the former Premier?

Mr. NAGY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you related to him in any way?

Mr. NAGY. No; just relatives in name.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you take part in the October 23d uprising against the Communist leaders of Hungary?

Mr. NAGY. I took part in the whole revolution from October 23 to November 9.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I might say at this time, did you come over to the United States to stay, or is it your intention to return back to Hungary?

Mr. NAGY. I wish to remain in the United States, and I want to become an American officer, in the American Army, and I never want to return.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, would you tell us of your role in the uprising?

Mr. NAGY. On October 23d I came from the store where my father was the manager, a restaurant, and I was going home, 9 o'clock in the evening, and I came to the Square of Budapest where I saw a lot of students, and posters were hung all over with the demands of the students. When I went further in the crowd, there was an automobile turned over, and I jumped on this automobile and we began to shout, "Disappear, damn you Communists, ricochet," and then we started in this automobile and began to shout from the top of the automobile all over Budapest to "Rise Hungarians, and fight the Communists."

When we came back to the square, we climbed up on the building, and we began to tear down the Red stars. I tore one, then I broke about twenty windows. This happened before the headquarters of the Secret Police, AVO's. They came out armed and started to shoot at unarmed people. We jumped them, and we took their guns away from them.

This time we got the guns from the AVO's. We jumped aboard the trucks and we immediately went to Belojamis ammunition dump to get more guns. When we were on our way there, workers from Csepel Works joined us, and we went after the ammunition but they were already armed well.

Then we heard that, on Brody Sandor, radio studio, they call it, that there was shooting and blood being spilled. We immediately joined those people fighting at this Brody Sandor Street.

It was about 12 o'clock when I got there, at night, and guns were being distributed. I got a hold of one, a Russian guitar. It had 70 shots in it.

(The interpreter: It is something like a tommygun. He calls it a Russian guitar—70 bullets.)

I was shooting until about 6 o'clock in the morning, but then I found out that my mother did not see me since night, so I went back because I am the only son. When I arrived home, my father got hold of me and told me, "What am I doing out in the streets, such a young kid," and he ordered me to stay in the house.

I stayed in the house until the next day, and at 4 o'clock I escaped from my house and joined my gang. When I escaped, I joined my gang there, and the shooting was going on, but not as fierce as before and I decided that I should start doing something about it, so I got the gasoline in the bottles and I began to throw at tanks. But then I went back and told my mother and father that I was still fighting. My father got hold of me and beat me up.

The next morning I escaped again and joined my gang again, to fight. When I escaped the second time, I went to Prater Street School, where we assembled again, and heard that there was fierce fighting in the square. Two hundred of us went there to help them out because the AVO's were shooting down people all over the streets.

At this time Russian tanks began to enter the city, and the fire began again from Freedom Fighters. We had a particular job to do. We were hunting down the secret police. But then when we saw so many tanks come in, we got hold of a couple of boys, and the three of us drew the fire of the tanks. I sneaked up on the back and threw a Molotov cocktail at them.

Mr. MORRIS. Each of the times?

Mr. NAGY. Yes, when the tank got on fire, the Soviets would get out of the hut, and the other buddies would pick them off. And we continued this fighting for 3 days without sleeping, without eating—four of us in a gang.

Mr. MORRIS. How many tanks did your particular gang, as you put it, destroy?

Mr. NAGY. We are sure of about 16 to 18; there might have been more.

I would place the other three men, three boys like myself, in the shut-out and burned-out buildings. When we saw the tank coming, they fired at the tank. The tank would open up the fire, and then I sneaked up on the back and threw the bottle, and then repeated the same thing. When they got out of the hut of the tank, they would shoot them down. And they continued this operation right along.

We also captured from secret police nitroglycerine. We had to watch so that the bottle would be tight. They were stored in thermos bottles, and these were a great help to us.

Senator JOHNSTON. I believe you were using the Molotov bomb, which has gasoline, and when you throw it and it strikes something, it explodes. Is that right?

Mr. NAGY. That is right. They call it Molotov cocktail. You throw it, and naturally these wheels, the chain, it sparks and it burns immediately and the whole tank catches on fire.

When the Russian tanks spotted us, our headquarters was at Prater Street School. They threw—they fired mines at us, and they destroyed the building completely, disregarding anything. They were just shooting and tumbling down building after building.

And we escaped to Rakovci Vasaresarnok, where we fought again for two days, constantly firing. They surrounded us, and we were unable to shoot our way out. But when they got tired, 400 of us escaped from the solid steel ring, and we began to shoot our way all the way to Austria.

Going to Austria, we were attacked twice. The first time they attacked us, out of 400 only 17 of us remained alive. The rest were taken prisoners or shot. The second time when they attacked us, only three of us remained alive, and we came to Austria.

Mr. MORRIS. What about your mother and father?

Mr. NAGY. My daddy is in Germany—I was informed that he escaped—and mother is seeking employment now.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is his mother? Is your mother in the United States?

Mr. NAGY. Yes; I met my mother in Eisenstadt.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is that?

Mr. NAGY. In Austria.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is the substance of the story, Senator, as far as we know, that he has told the staff, Mr. Schroeder and Mr. Duffy, up at Camp Kilmer.

Senator JOHNSTON. Is there anything else?

Mr. MORRIS. I suggest the four other witnesses we have today, that we proceed to your office, Senator, and swear them in and get as much of the evidence that we can. We have promised to take them back to Kilmer tonight, and I notice there is a snowstorm setting in and it is a long drive, and I would like them to be able to get back as soon as possible.

Senator JOHNSTON. Then we will adjourn this meeting, and I will go to my office and we will have them come up.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, since this morning I have called the Immigration people and asked them to make available Gregory Lang. He is the person who we discovered is a Communist, in Camp Kilmer, and he is the one, Senator, we presented with the information that he was a Communist. After denying it, he finally admitted he had been and that he worked in the AVH headquarters as a card clerk.

We have asked the Immigration people if they will produce him for testimony here before the subcommittee, and then we can really go into the thing as far as his individual case is concerned.

Senator JOHNSTON. You have not set a date for that, yet?

Mr. MORRIS. No. They will look it up and try to make him available as soon as possible, Senator.

Senator JOHNSTON. The committee will adjourn to my office.

(Whereupon, at 3:35 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned to room 253, Senate Office Building where the hearing was resumed.)

Senator JOHNSTON. Would you step forward and raise your right hand?

Do you swear that the evidence you give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KOSSUTH. I do.

Senator JOHNSTON. Will you swear that the evidence you give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MOGAR. I do.

Senator JOHNSTON. Do you swear that the evidence you give before this subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. SZEP. I do.

Senator JOHNSTON. Do you swear that the evidence you give before this subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. SZEKELY. I do.

Mr. RUSHER. I understand that this witness, like the others that we had today, wants to give the committee, for the record, an assumed name, although the committee does know his real name.

Mr. KOSSUTH. K-o-s-s-u-t-h.

Mr. RUSHER. And the first name, or the Christian name?

Mr. KOSSUTH. Frank.

TESTIMONY OF FRANK KOSSUTH, AS INTERPRETED BY FATHER BERZINEC GREGORY

Mr. RUSHER. Were you a participant in the Hungarian revolution in October and thereafter?

Mr. KOSSUTH. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. Will you tell us, without revealing by details your identity, in a general way, your part in the affair?

Mr. KOSSUTH. The 23d of October I came home from my work, with my wife, and immediately returned to the square where I joined a crowd to shout for the return of Imre Nagy, the Premier, to pronounce the Government.

Mr. RUSHER. To form a government?

Mr. KOSSUTH. Yes, to come out and speak to the people and make a pronouncement that the students demanded.

We were there until morning, with my wife. We could not join the fight, as yet, because we did not have rifles. The next day, with my wife, I returned to the square, saw a lot of dead people all around. And I was going back to work because I did not receive my pay, as yet.

However, I found that the freedom fighters had turned the bus direction the other way, and I could not get back to the factory.

Since I speak very well in Russian, I began to talk to the Russian soldiers, and a Russian major came to me and he says, "Here"—because we want to shoot the Communists—the major said, "Here", he said, "3 tanks, 3 armored cars, give it to him".

Mr. RUSHER. Now, do I understand that the Russian major made an offer of 3 tanks and 3 armored cars and actually gave them to you?

Mr. KOSSUTH. Yes. These armored cars were loaded already with loot that the Russian soldiers had stolen from the stores of Budapest, and he turned everything over to us.

Mr. RUSHER. Did you at any time during the revolution participate in raids on the headquarters of the AVO agents?

Mr. KOSSUTH. Yes, sir. Being myself a leader of the bloc, having all that ammunition at my disposal, I commanded the whole bloc and I captured a party headquarters.

Mr. RUSHER. Communist Party headquarters?

Mr. KOSSUTH. Headquarters.

Mr. RUSHER. Was this also the headquarters of the secret police, or simply of the party?

Mr. KOSSUTH. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. Will you tell us what you found there?

Mr. KOSSUTH. When I captured that—the reason I was able to capture that as soon as possible was because they told us that there were 200 secret police there. However, when I got in there, I only found 7 or 9. I do not know, because it was so swift. And amongst them was a Kirghiz.

As soon as I chased them out, the people right away shot them down.

Mr. RUSHER. I do not understand—a cross-eyed person is this?

Mr. KOSSUTH. Yes, he was actually a Communist from Russia, member of the secret bunch, that were there in this headquarters. He was one of the secret police and—

Mr. RUSHER. And he happened to be cross-eyed?

Mr. KOSSUTH. Not cross-eyed, this (indicating) slant eyes.

Mr. RUSHER. Slant eyed, I see. A Mongol, in other words?

Mr. KOSSUTH. A Mongol.

Mr. RUSHER. And so he was chased out of the headquarters immediately?

Mr. KOSSUTH. They started to run, because they are dressed in civilian clothes already, they are afraid, but people recognized, and as soon as they stepped out the door, they mowed them down.

Mr. RUSHER. And were killed?

Mr. KOSSUTH. They were killed.

Mr. RUSHER. These were Russian agents?

Mr. KOSSUTH. This particular one; the others were Hungarian. He had Hungarian boots and pants, but the blouse was already Hungarian. American reporters also photographed this.

Mr. RUSHER. What did you find in the headquarters besides the people that you have described—this building?

Mr. KOSSUTH. This building has four stories under ground. We were informed that there were 200 people, so we were looking for the rest of them. We were looking for the rest of them, and this building had four stories under ground.

So I was looking for my men because this building was all shut up, and I was still looking, because I knew that there must be some basement. So we started to walk down, and we did not know, we got into confusion, because it had two entrances from the main yard. So when I got down to the second story, I found a beautiful oriental rug down below on the second story down. The whole room was lined with glass, with looking glass, and beautiful oriental rugs.

Mr. RUSHER. Was this an office of some sort?

Mr. KOSSUTH. The whole thing was lined with rugs, thick rugs, so nobody would hear cries or anything in the torture chamber.

Mr. RUSHER. The torture chamber; there was a torture chamber?

Mr. KOSSUTH. Yes.

Mr. RUSHER. Would you tell us about the torture chamber? Would you describe that for us?

Mr. KOSSUTH. When we left this torture room, we went two places, and then in a third we found that there was a machine, that there were knives in it just like in a meat grinder. I looked at it, and I wanted to start it but I could not start it.

Mr. RUSHER. Now, just a minute, let me go back a little bit. You said when you left this torture chamber—that is the room with the oriental rugs?

Mr. KOSSUTH. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. And all the glass?

Mr. KOSSUTH. Yes.

Mr. RUSHER. What was in there besides oriental rugs?

Mr. KOSSUTH. There were chairs—

Mr. RUSHER. What I am trying to get is, why does he call it the torture chamber?

Mr. KOSSUTH. Then there were tables, chairs, and these lights that the other person—the other fellow (a previous witness)—talked about.

Mr. RUSHER. Lights that they would shine on a person?

Mr. KOSSUTH. Yes.

Mr. RUSHER. Off the record.

(There was discussion off the record.)

(Mr. Rusher left the hearing room and Mr. Schroeder resumed the questioning.)

Mr. SCHROEDER. Continue.

Mr. KOSSUTH. And we went into another room, but we could find no more doors there. The building upstairs was burning, so we had to leave.

The next day I returned again to the same place, and people told us that they picked up voices coming down from the second basement, on a microphone they picked it up, the shouting that there are 147 of us here. So they brought some bulldozers there, but they could not pick them up.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Could you elaborate on this machine that was in the room?

Mr. KOSSUTH. It looked like a funnel, this machine. There were knives on it all around, and I looked at it but I did not pay too much attention to it. My friends, my men that were with me, they examined it more closely than I did, and they said that pieces of meat came, a hunk like that, like a pulp—human flesh.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Do you know of any instance where any human being was ground in that machine?

Mr. KOSSUTH. All our people talked about—I did not see a human being in there, but all our people said that they saw where the human beings were disposed of in this machine. Because it had a sewer connected to the Duna River right from this machine, and as the human body would be ground up, it went down into the river.

Mr. SCHROEDER. And this machine was in the secret police headquarters?

Mr. KOSSUTH. This machine was in the secret police headquarters, and also party headquarters, police headquarters and party headquarters.

My men saw it in other places, but I personally did not see it.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Do you know of any other acts of brutality?

Mr. KOSSUTH. Yes; my own brother was subjected to brutality. He was sent for 10½ years to Siberia. Both his ribs were broken, his stomach was kicked into, they pulled his hair out.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Thank you very much.

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

TESTIMONY OF JANOS SZEKELY AS INTERPRETED BY FATHER BERZINEC GREGORY

Mr. SCHROEDER. You are going to use the assumed name of—

Mr. SZEKELY. S-z-e-k-e-l-y, J-a-n-o-s.

Mr. SCHROEDER. What is your age?

Mr. SZEKELY. 24.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Where were you born?

Mr. SZEKELY. In Gering, Czechoslovakia.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Where are you residing now?

Mr. SZEKELY. Newark, N. J.

Mr. SCHROEDER. When did you escape?

Mr. SZEKELY. November 21, 1956.

Mr. SCHROEDER. And you escaped into Austria?

Mr. SZEKELY. Austria.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Were you ever a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. SZEKELY. No, sir; never.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Were you ever asked to join the Communist Party while living in Hungary?

Mr. SZEKELY. Yes, sir; we were even forced, the whole school, to join the Communists Party, but I never did join the Communist Party.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Now, will you relate the events when you saw Soviet troops outside of Budapest.

Mr. SZEKELY. I was at Nyiredhaza Station, inquiring about transportation to Budapest, and at the station, as I went in the station, the train passed through the station; letters and notes being thrown out of the train, and the people were shouting, "What kind of Hungarians are you, that you are letting us be shipped to the Soviet Union?" And this train consisted of 20 cars packed with people.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Hungarian citizens being shipped to Siberia?

Mr. SZEKELY. Hungarian citizens being shipped to Siberia, Soviet Union.

And at this station they changed crews; not Hungarian personnel took the train, but they brought from the Soviet Union the train personnel to take the train over and take it to the Soviet Union.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Was the train heavily guarded by Soviet troops?

Mr. SZEKELY. Yes. In each carload there is a brake, where the brakeman stands in each car, and I saw in each place 2, 3 Soviet soldiers guarding the people.

Mr. SCHROEDER. And these people were calling from the train, "We are Hungarians, do not allow them to send us to Siberia."?

Mr. SZEKELY. "Shame on you, that you are letting other Hungarians be shipped to Siberia."

Mr. SCHROEDER. And Hungarian people there at the scene were helpless?

Mr. SZEKELY. They were completely helpless, they could not even get near them.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Are your relatives still in Hungary?

Mr. SZEKELY. Yes, I have my uncle still in Budapest, my aunt; but I also have in Soviet Union proper my father and mother—not in Hungary, but in Soviet Union.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Do you know of any brutality being administered to any persons?

Mr. SZEKELY. In 1956, October 27, I was in church, in a Roman Catholic church at Nyiredhaza, and Soviet tanks were passing by going to Budapest. And as they were passing by, 2 of them got into an accident, and 2 Red Army soldiers were killed in this incident.

And as people were coming out of church, completely without weapons, the Soviets got so mad that 2 people got killed, 2 of their soldiers, that they opened fire and killed on the spot 18 people before the church.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Approximately what time of day was this?

Mr. SZEKELY. 11:30, noon.

As soon as they started to open fire on the people and killed 18 people, at that time also 2 bombers appeared over the crowd, but they did not throw any bombs.

The Russian soldiers robbed—the only other thing that I saw that was, to my estimation, plain misbehavior of any army—was on November 4, 1956, in the same city, they broke into the post office and they shot the door down with machineguns, walked in there and robbed everything, left and right, of the Government post office.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF IMRE MOGAR AS INTERPRETED BY FATHER BERZINEC GREGORY

Mr. SCHROEDER. What is your name?

Mr. MOGAR. Imre Mogar.

Mr. SCHROEDER. When were you born?

Mr. MOGAR. I would not like to relate that.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Tell him he does not have to answer it.

Mr. MOGAR. I would like to at least take some town, but the town where I was born, they will find out.

Mr. SCHROEDER. I said, when was he born.

Mr. MOGAR. 25th, 6th month, 1934.

Mr. SCHROEDER. You were a soldier in the Hungarian Army?

Mr. MOGAR. I was a soldier under communism in Hungary.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Please relate what happened on the night of October 23.

Mr. MOGAR. The Hungarian Red Army had a dance on the 4th of October, 23d of October, in the afternoon at 4 o'clock.

At eight o'clock, Erno Gero—who was the Premier of Hungary then—we listened to his speech. We were listening to him speaking at 8 o'clock exactly in the evening, and then the speech stopped. Then right away they put some sort of music on the radio.

We were there until 10 o'clock, and then we left. We went back to the barracks at 10 o'clock.

I met my bride, and my bride related to me that the revolution had started for freedom in the city. As soon as I arrived—it was about 11 o'clock in the evening, and after my bride told me about the revolution, we had an alarm. We had an alarm in our barracks. We came out, all appeared in the field and then, after a few minutes, they told us to go back to the barracks.

But at 1 o'clock they had another alarm. At 1 o'clock they selected 25 men, who were the riot squad. They were the ones that were immediately dispatched to the city.

I was one of the riot squad. But in the trucks, as we were riding toward the city, we decided between ourselves that even if the officer gives us the order to fire upon the crowd, we would not do so, but we will shoot the officer.

They locked us up immediately after that in another barracks, and we could not get out of the rooms, except into the yard and go back. We could not get out of the camp.

So they locked up the rest of the soldiers, but on the 24th we escaped from the camp. There were five of us that escaped, and we immediately rushed near the town, and as the young people came, we told them not to go into the city because there were soldiers waiting for them, they would mow them down.

We told them to take another road.

The next day, the other four soldiers went their way, and I also went my way. I joined the rest of the crowd, where they had surrounded the AVO [secret police] headquarters. I was there until Friday noon. I was fighting there until Friday, and Friday evening I wanted to go into Buda, back to my barracks. But I could not get back because the road was closed already. I could not go back to my barracks.

I went and found part of my outfit in the next street and reported to them, and they asked me where I had been, and I told them I was in Budapest.

"What have you been doing?"

"I was shooting down the AVO's".

Mr. SCHROEDER. Did they disturb you?

Mr. MOGAR. Yes, they did.

"Come on in, and I want you to take your rifle and leave your ammunition here."

Then they immediately put me to be on guard duty night and day around the barracks.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Now, please tell the story of seeing 11 carloads of Hungarians being transported to U. S. S. R.

Mr. MOGAR. November 4 the revolution was resumed partly, and we, the soldiers, escaped and divided into parts and joined the freedom fighters. And as I was approaching the railroad station, the political commissar asked me "What are you carrying hand grenades for?"

I said: "I want to fight for freedom and for the truth, and I need these hand grenades"—because there were three of us at that time.

We went immediately to Budapest by railroad station, and we were told that they had begun to load the people up into the trains. And this interested us, and we went in to look around—just to see what was happening.

So then I immediately went over and found six friends like myself and asked them to elect a leader. And they said, "Well, you be our leader."

Then I accepted the leadership and immediately told them to spread to different parts of the train, and we opened up 11 carloads of people—11 cars. We told them—as soon as we opened the doors, they started to jump out—to immediately go up to the hills of Budapest.

And then immediately we blew up every car, and we blew up the railroad tracks all around. We had dynamite, we had hand grenades.

Then I returned home to change my clothes from military to civilian. And the neighbors told me the secret police had been looking for me all over. Then I attached myself immediately to another family from the same village that I am from, and we left for Austria, the 11th of December, Wednesday, and the 16th of December I arrived in Austria.

Mr. SCHROEDER. These people in the 11 cars, railroad cars, they were being deported to Siberia—

Mr. MOGAR. They were just ready to leave for Siberia.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Thank you very much.

TESTIMONY OF ISTBAN SZEP, AS INTERPRETED BY FATHER BERZINEC GREGORY

Mr. SCHROEDER. What name will you use?

Mr. SZEP. I want to be called I-s-t-b-a-n S-z-e-p.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Now, please tell us the story of your court-martial in Vienna.

Mr. SZEP. I was caught in Vienna, and they charged me with being a war criminal. From there they shipped me to Sopron.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Where is Sopron?

Mr. SZEP. Sopron, Hungary.

In Sopron I was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. And they picked us up, 10,000, and placed us in 1 train. 10,000 of us were entrained, between 8,000 and 10,000 were entrained—

Father GREGORY. And this is interesting; I did not hear this before, but I got it during the lunch. You might take this.

The car consisted of 3 floors; this ordinary boxcar was divided into 3. There were people on top, on the bottom.

Mr. SZEP. And that way between 8,000 and 10,000 were shipped all the way up to Lwow. That is already Soviet Union.

We were there for 2 weeks, children, women, old people, young people, and 1 week later they again packed us in the train and shipped us to Kiev and Moscow—they shipped us to Orcut prison camp, located at—we can find it on the map—Novazemla, North Sea.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Well, how many of these people survived out of the 8,000 or 10,000?

Mr. SZEP. Only 800 of us arrived. Only 800 arrived because we saw, as the train was going day and night, that they were throwing people out of the train, dead people.

Mr. SCHROEDER. What type of work did you do when you arrived in the Soviet Union?

Mr. SZEP. I was a miner for 9 years.

Mr. SCHROEDER. In the Soviet slave camps?

Mr. SZEP. Yes, I was a slave laborer in Orcut coal mines. There are 73 mines there and 250,000 people, slave labor, work there. And in the Soviet Union proper, of all the nationalities, there are 30 million people in jails.

Mr. SCHROEDER. You mean labor slave camps?

Mr. SZEP. Labor slave camps.

When in 1949 they demanded that the prisoners be released from Russia, the Soviets could not produce the prisoners because they were dead. So what they did, they got the prisoners that were not sentenced, yet, and made them sign the documents that they had been sentenced to 25 years.

Mr. SCHROEDER. How do you know that there are approximately 30 million—

Mr. SZEP. 30 million.

Mr. SCHROEDER. 30 million in slave labor camps?

Mr. SZEP. Every prisoner in Russia knows that; we know that—we have grapevines. And we know for a fact that there are 250,000 in Orcut behind barbed wire.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Are there any professional men in these prison camps?

Mr. SZEP. A lot of them, especially Germans.

In 1953 we Hungarians received, 1,400 of us, amnesty. As 1,400 of us were given amnesty in 1953, we were going back and around Kiev, in the vicinity, we found somewhere between 200 and 300 prisoners that were imprisoned since the Spanish revolution, and to our amazement we found that they were professional men, such as chemists, scientists, electronics men who took part in all the Soviet atom research.

We were amazed that they could not talk, that they were one after another deaf and dumb. So we had some people that were able to talk with their fingers, as you talk to the deaf and dumb, and we found out that they were all atom research men that were for 20 years in this field, and when they were finished, so they would not be able to say just what they did, they cut their tongues out and punctured their eardrums so they could not hear nor say what they were. And they warned us that even as much as they said, not to tell anybody, because if they found out, if the Soviets would find out that they said and divulged anything—of course, they could not give us their location—that they would kill them.

Mr. SCHROEDER. That story is so horrifying, will you repeat that again, and name the town, and tell about the time that you came across this horrible scene.

Mr. SZEP. They brought us to the central prison camp in Kiev on 10th of May, 1953, and we found these atom research scientists, chemists, in that prison. They opened their mouths and they showed us that they had no tongues.

I have a friend who was with me and who went to Italy, and from Italy he is coming to the United States; he has petitioned the United States Government. He can testify to this.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Will you give the name of your friend to the committee.

Mr. SZEP. Be very careful. I gladly will give you the name. We received the last telegram from them, from Pisa, Italy.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Of the scientists who had their tongues cut out, were most of them Germans?

Mr. SZEP. They were all Spanish and German engineers.

Mr. SCHROEDER. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 5:06 p. m., the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

INDEX

NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the names of an individual or an organization in this index.

A

	Page
American Embassy	3310
American Legation in Budapest	3309-3311, 3313-3315
Austria	3309, 3310, 3314, 3324, 3328, 3331
Austrian border	3317
AVH (Hungarian secret Communist police)	3309, 3310, 3315, 3316, 3319, 3320, 3324
AVO	3312, 3322, 3323, 3325, 3330

B

Belojamic ammunition dump	3322
Boxcar	3331
Brody Sandor radio station	3323
Buda	3318, 3330
Budapest	3308, 3317, 3325, 3328, 3329, 3330

C

Camp Kilmer	3307, 3310, 3314, 3316, 3318, 3321, 3324
Communists	3307, 3309, 3320-3322, 3324, 3325, 3326
Hungarian	3315
Communist Party	3308, 3315, 3326, 3328
Csepel Works (in Hungary)	3322

D

Duffy, Edward	3307, 3308, 3310, 3324
Duna River	3327

G

German engineers	3332
Gero, Erno	3329
Gregory, Father Berzinec:	
Interpreter for—	
Sabo Karlor	3308
Sabad Karoly	3316
Imre Nagy	3322
Frank Kossuth	3325
Janos Szekely	3328
Imre Mogar	3329
Istban Szep	3331

H

Hungarian rebellion, October 23, 1956	3309, 3313, 3322
Hungarian Red Army	3329
Hungarian Royal Army	3317
Hungary	3308-3311, 3314, 3317, 3321, 3322

I

Immigration Service	3308
Iron Curtain	3309
Italy	3332

K

	Page
Karlor, Sabo (pseudonym), testimony of	3308-3316
Arrived in United States, December 31, 1956	3310
Karoly, Sabad (pseudonym), testimony of	3316-3322
Kiev	3331, 3332
Kossuth, Frank (pseudonym), testimony of	3323-3327

L

Labor slave camps	3331, 3332
Lang, Gregory	3308, 3315, 3324
Lwow	3331

M

Maid (attached to American Embassy)	3312, 3313
Mate, Rushak	3318
Mindszenty, Cardinal	3315
Mogar, Imre:	
Testimony of	3329-3331
Soldier in Hungarian Red Army	3329
Morris, Robert	3307
Moscow	3320, 3331

N

Nagy, Imre, testimony of	3322-3325
Nagy, Premier Imre	3319, 3325
Nyiredhaza Station	3328

O

Orcut prison camp	3331
-------------------	------

P

Prater Street School	3323, 3324
----------------------	------------

R

Rakovei Vasaresarnok	3324
Red army	3321, 3329
Rusher, William	3307
Russians	3311, 3319, 3324
Russian secret police	3320

S

Schroeder, F. W	3307, 3308, 3310, 3315, 3321, 3324
Siberia	3327, 3328, 3331
Sopron, Hungary	3331
Soviet troops	3328
Soviet Union	3314, 3319, 3320, 3328, 3331
Spanish engineer	3332
Spanish revolution	3332
Square of Budapest	3322
Szekely, Janos (pseudonym), testimony of	3328-3329
Szep, Istban (pseudonym), testimony of	3331-3332

T

Temesvar	3321
Torture chamber	3326
United Nations	3318, 3321
United States	3307, 3310, 3322
Vienna	3314, 3331
Voegler, Mr.	3314

O

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE
UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 7, 8, AND 19, 1957

PART 49

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1957

**Boston Public Library
Superintendent of Documents**

AUG 27 1957

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee
 OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina
 THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr., Missouri
 JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
 JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, Wyoming
 MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia
 SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina

ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
 WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota
 WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
 ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
 EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
 JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland
 ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina
 JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
 SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina
 MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
 ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
 JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland
 ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska

ROBERT MORRIS, *Chief Counsel*
 J. G. SOURWINE, *Associate Counsel*
 WILLIAM A. RUSHER, *Associate Counsel*
 BENJAMIN MANDEL, *Director of Research*

C O N T E N T S

Witness:

	Page
Fonagy, Dezso	3333
Kiraly, Gen. Bela	3381
Rastvorov, Yuri	3377
Szeradesi, Jeno	3335
Turani Capt. Andras	3353

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:45 a. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building.

Present: Senator Roman L. Hruska, presiding.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel, and William A. Rusher, associate counsel.

Senator HRUSKA. The committee will come to order.

This subcommittee has been trying to learn the true facts about the Hungarian uprising so that we can know the nature of world communism and its manifestations here in this country.

Accordingly, we have asked two witnesses, whom we deem to be quite competent, to testify in that regard. We will first administer the interpreter's oath, inasmuch as I understand the two witnesses cannot express themselves in English.

Will you state your name?

Mr. VON CSEH. My name is Louis Von Cseh.

Senator HRUSKA. Will you stand, please, and raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear that you will truly interpret to the witness the questions directed to him and will truly interpret the answers given by the witness, to the best of your ability, so help you God?

Mr. VON CSEH. I do, so help me God.

Senator HRUSKA. Now, will the witnesses stand. Maybe we can swear the two of them together.

Do you, and each of you, solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. FONAGY. So help me God.

Mr. JENO SZERADASI. So help me God.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Fonagy will be the first witness.

TESTIMONY OF DEZSO FONAGY, THROUGH LOUIS VON CSEH, INTERPRETER

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name to the reporter.

The INTERPRETER. His name is Dezso Fonagy.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, how long have you been in the United States?
The INTERPRETER. Since January 1, 1957.

Mr. MORRIS. And by what means did you arrive in the United States?

The INTERPRETER. By aeroplane.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

When did you leave Hungary?

The INTERPRETER. He says, December 18, 1956.

Mr. MORRIS. December 18, 1956?

The INTERPRETER. December 18, 1956.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you bear with you, do you not, the credentials of the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, will you present those credentials to Senator Hruska, who is presiding here today?

(A document was handed to Senator Hruska.)

The INTERPRETER. He is begging the Senate to not disclose the names, the signatures; everything else but the signatures.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. I will explain that to the Senator.

Senator Hruska, this witness says he will allow, he will be willing, without objection, this go into the record as it is except for the people who are now in Hungary, their names, who are the representatives of the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament, because to give their names would be tantamount to a death sentence, if those names were set out.

He has made a copy of that same paper, which is identical in every respect, except that the names of those actually in Hungary at that time do not appear here.

Senator HRUSKA. The exhibit will be received for the record in its censored form, if we can put it that way, Judge Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, Senator.

Now, you are willing that the representations herein go into the record?

The INTERPRETER. He says yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And the name Csepel Iron Works, and so on?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; all of those can be on it, with the exception of the signatures, which were omitted from that English translation.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, may I please read that into the record at this time?

Senator HRUSKA. Yes; please do.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

AUTHORIZATION

The Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament (functioning underground) hereby appoints Dezso Fonagy, Dezso Pragai, and Doctor Bala Janko, members of the Committee, as its delegates to the United States and to all the member nations of the United Nations, in order to inform them of the creation this day of the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament, as well as of its objectives. We, the Revolutionary Parliament, through our above representatives, wish to call attention to the tragic plight of our beloved Hungarian people at the hands of the hated U. S. S. R. Also, to implore the heads of all freedom-loving nations to lend us their much-needed support in our struggle for freedom and justice.

Our representatives carry our solemn pledge to the Free World that we will not cease fighting until Hungary will be free of ALL its enemies!

Signed:

Revolutionary Workers Council of Greater Budapest: Csepel Iron Works—Mav, Ganz, Eggyesult Izzo, Standard, Kispesti, Lorinci, Ujpesti, Rakospalotai, Kabelgyar, Lampagyár.

Peasants and Farm Workers: Revolutionary Council of Students and Intellectuals of Greater Hungary.

Dated and signed in Budapest, November 22, 1956.

The original copy is on file.

Now, I wonder if you will read and translate the places that are represented on the council.

The INTERPRETER. Csepel Iron Works; Mav, which means the Hungarian Government steel factory; Ganz means Ganz Iron Works, Electrical Works, et cetera; the Egyesult Izzo Lamp Works, incandescent lamp works of Hungary; and there is Standard, evidently an American subsidiary, or something; then the Kispesti, which was a small town which is now connected to Budapest with a separate—which has its own revolutionary council, which is a member of this Parliament; and then there is Lorincei, which was also another town outside of Budapest, which is also connected now to Greater Budapest under 19 districts; Ujpesti, which is another town outside of Budapest; Rakospalotai, which is also another town close by Budapest; and then the Kabelgyar, which is the manufacture of wires, cables, et cetera, electrical cables; then the Lampagyár, which is a factory where they manufacture lamps, et cetera.

Then, the Peasants and Farm Workers of Greater Hungary; then the Revolutionary Council of Students and Intellectuals of Greater Hungary.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, will you tell us the meaning of this authorization?

The INTERPRETER. Would you—he wants to know if you gentlemen care to ask him to explain the way this Parliament was created.

Mr. MORRIS. Precisely; all the circumstances leading up to his authorization to come to the United States to speak for the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament.

The INTERPRETER. I think we have enough to go ahead. Now, we are going to make the chart, he [indicating the witness Szeradasi] was going to, but he was interrupted—he was going to make a chart to show you exactly.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, maybe he can complete that when the next witness is on the stand.

The INTERPRETER. Well, he [indicating] was going to do it.

Mr. MORRIS. Maybe while he is waiting he can make it up.

The INTERPRETER. It is right there. He has been working on it and in maybe 10 minutes he can finish it.

Sir, Mr. Fonagy states that in November, around the middle of November, when the Hungarian freedom fighters, which we were called up to that time, saw that there was no hope of any United Nations help for the cessation of the murder, et cetera, against the Hungarians by the Russians all over the country, they decided that they were going to take the situation in their hands and people were elected in every district throughout Hungary and Greater Budapest and they created this Parliament who would actually take up the fight of the people and the administration of the government.

Mr. MORRIS. You say they did this because they realized the United Nations were not going to carry on—

The INTERPRETER. Its obligations or its function as it was meant to function as the United Nations.

So they elect—each district from their leadership elected five members which were sent up to Budapest in this Revolutionary Parliament, and these people would consist of a total of—(addressing Mr. Fonagy)—how many?

Each one of these sections, like industrial workers, the farm workers, and the peasantry, the university students, the intellectuals of Greater Hungary, sent five members into the Parliament.

The total membership of this Parliament consisted of 20 members, of which he is one.

Mr. MORRIS. You are one of the members of this Revolutionary Parliament?

The INTERPRETER. Yes. He is representing the industrial workers.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, when was this Parliament constituted?

The INTERPRETER. This was between November 18 and November 22.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you function as a member of this Parliament until you left Hungary on December 18, 1956?

The INTERPRETER. Up to November 12 they all were fighting, when they started to organize the Revolutionary Parliament he was very active until the date he left Hungary to represent the Revolutionary Parliament to the West.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you come to the United States in order to stay here or is it your intention to return to Hungary?

The INTERPRETER. He states that if the United Nations would not fulfill its obligations as it was organized to do, or the West will not give any help to the Hungarian cause, then he would sooner that he goes back and fights there than stay here or anywhere in the world—die with the rest of those Hungarians.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, in other words, you are here in a refugee capacity, is that right?

The INTERPRETER. He is not over here as a refugee but he is sent out as a delegate from the Parliament, revolutionary Parliament.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what have you done since you have been in the United States?

The INTERPRETER. Since he came he made several attempts to see Mr. Lodge to take up the Hungarian—present his credentials in the Hungarian cause, but Mr. Lodge was busy and in the meantime he contacted some of the United Nations representatives who were championing the Hungarian cause in the United Nations and spoke to them.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were they?

The INTERPRETER. One was the Cuban representative.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were they, tell us who they were.

The INTERPRETER. Nuñez-Portuondo, Cuban delegate to the United Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. And he is the Cuban delegate to the United Nations?

The INTERPRETER. Yes. (addressing witness) And who else?

Miss Palmer, you have the names of these delegates he has already contacted—the Uruguay delegate?

Miss MARTHA G. PALMER. He contacted, I think, all of the South American countries' permanent representatives on the United Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. Give him the list of them.

Miss PALMER. I don't have the list but I can get it so it will be included in the record.

The INTERPRETER. This is the Uruguay representative, Rodriguez Fabregat. That is the Uruguay representative. And I contacted the Chinese representative, Dr. Yen, and I have spoken only on the

telephone yesterday, but he was very busy and he is requesting we go and see him as soon as he gets back from New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, would it be in order at this time—it will take about 5 or 10 minutes—if I read the exchange of correspondence into the record at this time between Senator Eastland, chairman of the Senate committee and Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge? Senator, it will give the preface to this particular hearing, by way of what this subcommittee has been doing in this particular field and bring the situation up to date.

Senator HRUSKA. That will be in order. Will you please proceed?

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Eastland's letter dated January 17, 1957 is as follows:

DEAR AMBASSADOR LODGE: I am transmitting herewith the transcripts of the sworn testimony of seven Hungarian escapees. This testimony is evidence of the savage acts of aggression on the part of Soviet officials against the Hungarian people. Some of the details are so harrowing and bestial that we could not even put them into the official record. However, those that are in the official record reflect a savagery that is, to put it mildly, inconsistent with the professed purposes of the United Nations.

As you know, we have been transmitting to the Department of State other transcripts such as these, all abundantly reflecting acts and deeds of aggression which are, as of this moment, unpunished and only ineffectually deplored by the United Nations. Senator Olin D. Johnston of South Carolina, who presided at all of these hearings, has repeatedly but unavailingly asked the United Nations to hear this evidence. Added up, it is irrefutable proof of aggression on the part of the Soviet Union against the people of Hungary.

As far as we have been able to observe here in Washington, the only visible reaction on the part of the United Nations has been to dissolve the observation team which it had set up to go into Hungary to learn the facts. It appears that efforts are presently being made to bring this evidence before the forum of the United Nations, but as yet we have seen no tangible results. We would appreciate hearing from you exactly what steps are being taken by the United States to insure that the United Nations will pursue the Hungarian issue.

These transcripts which the subcommittee makes in connection with its primary function of making a record on the nature of the Communist organization for the Senate of the United States, are being sent to you because we feel that, in the hands of the chief delegate to the United Nations, they may be used effectively to bring about a situation where justice will be satisfied and confidence in the work of the United Nations will be restored.

Senator William E. Jenner, a member of the subcommittee, in a letter to the State Department which we asked to be transmitted to you, has observed the great disparity between the reaction of the United Nations in connection with the aggression in the Middle East and its reaction to the Soviet aggression against Hungary. I feel that the fact that the United Nations allows this disparity to stand on the record to be seen by the whole world, goes a long way toward undermining confidence in that world body.

Trusting that these and other transcripts will be of use to you, I am

Very sincerely yours,

JAMES O. EASTLAND,
Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.

On January 26, 1957 Ambassador Lodge replied:

DEAR SENATOR EASTLAND: Thank you for your letter of January 17, enclosing transcripts of the hearings of the Internal Security Subcommittee, dated January 15, on Soviet repression of the Hungarian people.

In my opinion these transcripts represent precisely the type of testimony which will be valuable to the newly established United Nations Special Committee on Hungary, and I shall transmit them to that Committee along with such other relevant transcripts as your subcommittee makes available to the State Department. The United Nations Committee was established by the General Assembly by a resolution adopted January 10, a copy of which I enclose for your information.

Also enclosed is a copy of the Assembly's resolution of December 12, which, by a vote of 55 to 8, condemned Soviet actions in Hungary—the strongest condemnation of the United Nations has ever voted against one of its members.

In your letter you ask me "exactly what steps are being taken by the United States to insure that the United Nations will pursue the Hungarian issue." The establishment of the committee I just mentioned, with representatives from Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia, and Uruguay, is designed to make sure that the Soviet assault on the Hungarian people is not forgotten either by the United Nations or by world opinion. The United States delegation took a leading part in the movement to have this committee established. Fifty-nine nations voted to set up the Committee; and only the Soviet Union and its satellites voted against it.

In the light of the foregoing, it is inaccurate to say, as you said in your letter, that "the only visible reaction on the part of the United Nations has been to dissolve the observation team which it had set up to go into Hungary to learn the facts." The Committee I mentioned was established to replace a group previously appointed by the Secretary General which was dissolved at its own request. The new Committee gives every evidence of taking its job seriously. The United States intends to submit a great deal of information to it, and to facilitate the appearance before it of recent Hungarian refugees now in this country.

I note your reference to Senator Jenner's statement about the "disparity between the United Nations actions in the Hungarian question and in the Middle Eastern question," a view with which you associate yourself. The disparity you refer to is obvious, and derives mainly from the fact that Britain, France, and Israel are civilized nations which responded to the conscience of the world as expressed through the United Nations, whereas the Soviet Union is willing to defy that same expression of world opinion.

However, it must not be supposed that the debates and resolutions in the United Nations have been ineffective. For the first time many Middle Eastern and Asian countries, which had hitherto been uncommitted on differences between the free and the Communist worlds, have voted in the United Nations to condemn the Soviet Union and to set up an investigating committee to publicize Soviet crimes.

Moreover, we have been advised that pressures brought to bear through the United Nations caused the Soviet Union to stop its mass deportations of Hungarian citizens.

In your letter you refer to repeated requests by Senator Johnston to the United Nations to hear the evidence on this question collected by the Internal Security Subcommittee. I have not received any such request, but I am glad to learn that we will have the benefit of this material as part of the United States contribution to the United Nations investigation.

It may well seem that no United Nations action, short of war, would be adequate when measured against the heroic sacrifices of the Hungarian freedom fighters. However, in the long run, they may prove to have struck a mortal blow against the whole Communist system. The United States delegation to the General Assembly, and I, personally, have, I believe, lost no opportunity to see that their sacrifice proves worthwhile. We shall, I am sure, lose no opportunity in the future.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY CABOT LODGE, Jr.

And Senator Eastland acknowledged that on January 31, 1957:

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Thank you for your full letter of January 26.

I have noted with some satisfaction that, since my letter of January 17, the Committee established by the General Assembly through a resolution adopted January 10 has begun to take testimony. It was precisely with a view toward this eventuality that the subcommittee has been transmitting to you on November 19 and to the State Department on December 20 the transcripts of the hearings. Naturally we are delighted that the United Nations is now taking this testimony. I am also gratified to learn of your sanguine expectations with respect to the determination of the United Nations in keeping alive the savagery of the Soviet conquest of Hungary which you deplore.

Thanking you for your response on this very serious issue, I am,

Sincerely yours,

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Chairman.

Now, Mr. Chairman, this witness who, I believe, arrived here on January 1, is the latest representative witness we have been able to speak to on this whole subject.

I wonder if you could tell us, Mr. Fonagy, of any deportations, acts of deportation against Hungarian people that you know of, based on your own experiences in Hungary.

The INTERPRETER. He knows of two deportations in which he participated, in their flight to freedom; in one place by the name of Czegle—actually, the revolutionary Parliament tore up the railroad tracks so they cannot proceed—however, those they could not free.

And then, another city by the name of Godolo, which is a few miles outside Budapest, they actually broke open railroad cars and freed 340 university students which were on their way to be taken to Russia, they freed those.

And, naturally, many trains they could not open up and could not help, but these they actually halted and he took participation, in which they succeeded in freeing, and in others they tore up railroad tracks, but they were in such numbers they wouldn't be able to do it.

Senator HRUSKA. Would the witness be able to estimate the number of trains which were observed but which had gone on their way?

The INTERPRETER. They had their people at the border at Zahony and from where they got reports of—this was just for a short time—they got reports of 5 trains which passed by which they couldn't help, and each train had between 400 to 600 students in them which they could not halt or could not break open. This part is definite that he knows.

However, there are stories about more which he does not care to state, because he has no evidence of it.

Senator HRUSKA. What dates were those 4 or 5 observed?

The INTERPRETER. This was in the last part of November and first part of December of 1956.

Senator HRUSKA. What kind of cars were they, regular passenger cars or were they boxcars?

The INTERPRETER. They were actually wagons that transport horses and cattle; they usually fit 40 people, I think, each wagon.

Yes; he says they have the sign on them, 6 horses or 40 people on each one of those wagons and so each one of these trains must have consisted of 10 to 12 wagons, each train.

Senator HRUSKA. Were there women as well as men?

The INTERPRETER. These were mostly young people, students and 17-year-old people, et cetera.

He says he actually has spoken to several of these young people who escaped from Russia, the ones that were deported that escaped, and he also has spoken to several people who were too young. A few were 15, 16 years old that they released after some pressure was given somewhere, were released back to Hungary.

Senator HRUSKA. Before taking them on board the trains?

The INTERPRETER. No; after they got to Russia, they were released after; 16, 17-year-old boys, he actually spoke to many of those.

Senator HRUSKA. Were any of the escapees those that are refugees in this country, as far as the witness knows?

The INTERPRETER. With his knowledge with the Hungarian National Council, there are several on record and the ones that were released from Russia from the prison, being too young.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know, when these young people are deported and sent to the Soviet Union, do you know where in the Soviet Union or where in the far-flung Soviet Empire these people were forced to work?

The INTERPRETER. He says he has been around those sections, around Vladivostok and the Urals where they have the lead mines and that is where they claim they took them. However, he has not seen it. He was there previous to that.

Mr. MORRIS. He was there previously?

The INTERPRETER. He was there previously, because he was fighting during the war.

And from 1942 to 1944 they were taken into Russia and they were used for fighting these Hungarians.

Mr. MORRIS. You, yourself?

The INTERPRETER. He was there; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us briefly your experiences in the Soviet Union?

The INTERPRETER. He says that was one of the reasons that he, as soon as—the first opportunity he had, he started fighting against Soviet oppression, he had seen Soviet Russia while he was there as a soldier. He says among many things—

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you were a member of the Hungarian Division that fought with the Russians, is that right?

The INTERPRETER. Oh, he was fighting against the Russians.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. And then you were taken prisoner by them?

The INTERPRETER. No; they never took him prisoner.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, tell us about your experiences.

The INTERPRETER. He says this is what his experience was:

Naturally, in the last 15 years, he says, in Hungary they were teaching the blessings of communism, and over there he has seen what the "blessings" is. Outside of Moscow the people were living with pigs and goats and chickens, maybe there were 8 or 9 of them shoved into 1 room, they were living there, cooking there, sleeping there, and they never knew about a bath, et cetera.

And as soon as he had the opportunity of enlightening the Hungarian people of the Soviet—that they really started doing it from 1948 on.

Senator HRSUKA. What was he doing in Russia?

The INTERPRETER. Well, he was fighting the Russians with the Hungarians, he was fighting there, and while fighting he had the opportunity to be in these villages and towns where there is no glitter like in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Fighting with whom?

The INTERPRETER. With the Germans. Hungarians, Italians and Germans were fighting there.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, were you, yourself, a prisoner of the Soviet Union at any time?

The INTERPRETER. He was never a prisoner of the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, were you a prisoner of the Ukrainian Communist Government in the postwar period?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, he was.

He was first taken prisoner by the Ukrainian secret police, which they called AVO, in 1949.

He was imprisoned for 6 days and he escaped. And then they caught him again in 1950 on February 8, also for a few days and he escaped again and kept on—and then in 1951 they caught up with him again and for 7 months he was tortured at the AVO headquarters, which is the Ukrainian secret police, and then he escaped again and then they caught him again in 1953.

In 1953, then, they were—from 1953 until October 31, 1956, he was continuously in confinement.

Senator HRUSKA. Where?

The INTERPRETER. In Hungary.

Senator HRUSKA. Where in Hungary?

The INTERPRETER. In seven different prisons. Among these there were two slave labor camps in the mines, one by the name of Tatabanya—

Mr. MORRIS. This was a slave labor camp in Hungary, now?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, and this is at Tatabanya—I am going to write it down, these slave labor camps in these mines. Tatabanya and Csolmok. These are the two places where he was in forced-labor camps.

Senator HRUSKA. Getting back to those deportation trains, what was the source of his information that these trains went to Vladivostok, to the lead mines?

The INTERPRETER. His information is personal, his years while he was in Russia between 1942 and 1944, all the prisoners which were taken by the Russians were taken to Vladivostok lead mines to work—the Hungarians, Italians or Germans, they all were taken there—and that is his assumption, they took all these other ones there.

Senator HRUSKA. So the information is not based on direct reports?

The INTERPRETER. No. No direct reports, yes—he had direct reports but he was not present so he could not say.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I wonder if you would describe some of the tortures you were subjected to—this was by the Hungarian Communist Government, I am speaking of.

The INTERPRETER. In 1948, when they starting arresting, like Msgr. Varga, who is here now at the Ukrainian National Council, that is when he started into the whole Ukrainian underground revolutionary movement, to work in it.

There were certain tortures there he had been subjected to, but due to the fact of these ladies, it is very hard to explain, see?

(After speaking to witness.)

All right, this is the most ridiculous thing you ever heard, but it can be true, the effects are on him, the evidence, and due to the fact there are ladies here, I don't know how to explain it, unless you gentlemen want me to, the biggest torture.

Mr. MORRIS. Why don't you describe it, if you can, without too many specific details?

The INTERPRETER. For instance, they undressed him and they put him on a table and they had thumbtacks into his skin, and they were beating him to disclose the other members of the council, and—well, I think this is the most terrible thing, and then they tied his hands to his feet and for 75 days they kept him like that—

Mr. MORRIS. Seventy-five days?

The INTERPRETER. Seventy-five days, day and night, they wouldn't release him, tied his hands to his feet and he had to just hop like

that and crawl with these shackles on him continuously, 75 days and 75 nights—and then they knocked his teeth out, kicked his teeth out, cracked his skull and they did many of these—well, indescribable tortures.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, tell me, was this done by the Hungarian secret police or was it done under the supervision of the Soviet overlords?

The INTERPRETER. Everytime when he was tortured like that, like for instance in 1950, between March 15 and 17, he was subjected to very much torture by General Peter Gabor. That was the same man that—

Mr. MORRIS. Spell that name?

The INTERPRETER. General Gabor, G-a-b-o-r—in the company of eight other Hungarian generals and one Soviet general. The Soviet general was directing what to do and how to torture and he was the directing agent of this whole group.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I think that would be of particular interest to the committee, because that would be an act of aggression on the part of the members of the Soviet organization against the Hungarian people and Hungarian Government.

Senator HRUSKA. How was he able to identify the Soviet general?

The INTERPRETER. First, he was in a Russian general's uniform. Second, he spoke and gave the instructions in Russian, and he (indicating Mr. Fonagy) understands Russian.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I wonder if you could identify this paper.

The INTERPRETER. Yes. He has one of these.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Now, what is this? Will you tell us what this paper is?

The INTERPRETER. This is a document which was given to each one of these people, the ones that were in these forced-labor camps, they were given by the Miners Revolutionary Council that released them from prison.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what prison he was released from?

The INTERPRETER. That was Csolmok.

Mr. MORRIS. I see, and this is the actual release that you received from this particular prison camp?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, and on here it states that he has served 5 years, 7 months and 15 days for instigating the overthrow of the Soviet Government, overturn of the Soviet Government, that is what it says here.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Now, when did he serve in that particular prison camp?

The INTERPRETER. He was moved to this labor camp July 1956 and he was at this particular labor camp until October 1956.

Mr. MORRIS. 1956?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

Mr. Chairman, may I offer that particular document for the record?

Now, we have what appears to be—this is the form that is filled out, is it not? (Exhibiting.)

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. May we take your original, which is your actual certificate, is it not, and you will so testify right now, which you just handed to Senator Hruska?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir, he will.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, may we take this original and conform this, which appears to be a copy of the form? This is a copy of the form?

The INTERPRETER. It is not this [indicating], but it is a copy of such form, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I see, and will you conform this with the original and may that go into our record, Senator? Photostats will be just as well.

Senator HRUSKA. The exhibit will be received in the record in photostatic form.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 421 and is reproduced below:)

**Bűntetésvéghajtási Munkahely
CSOLNOK**

parton
munkahely

Feltétel szabadságra bocsátott

Igazolvány

Az igazolvány tulajdonosa: *Földes Dezső*

Törzslapszáma: *757-556*

Személyi adatok:

Születési helye és ideje: *Gyöngyös 1920. IX. 17.*

Anyja neve: *+ Gyöngyösi Katalin*

Foglalkozása: *gy. mér.*

Családi állapota: *házas*

Lakóhelye: *Bp. I. Petőfi S. - u 1.*

Személyleírása:

Magassága: *162* Fogazata: *hármas*

Szeme: *türkiz* Hajszíne: *szürke*

Alla: *széne* Szája: *rondó*

Szemöldöké: *szarva* Arcformája: *hegyes*

Bajusza: *bőr* Orra: *rundes*

Homlokája: *széles* Szakálla: *hortobály*

Különös ismertetőjele:

Fentnevezett: *lakásban / gyerek /*

számú ítéletével

börtönbűntetésből *5* évet *7* hónapot *15* napot kítöltött.

büntette miatt kiszabott

Büntetése hátralévő részére, azaz 19.....évhó
.....napjáig aszámú határozatával feltételes szabadságra bo-
csátotta, ezért őt a mai napon szabadlábra helyeztem.

Megérkezésekor köteles aBp. V. ker. rendőrhatóságnál nyomban jelentkezni.

Jelentkezésekor igazolványát fel kell mutatnia, hogy azon jelentkezé-
sét igazolni lehessen.

Igazolványát köteles gondosan megőrizni és hatósági közeg felszó-
lítására felmutatni.

Feltételes szabadságának ideje alatt köteles az erkölcselen és íszá-
kos életmódtól tartózkodni, igazoltan munkaviszonyba lépni, vagy
jogsabály által nem tiltott egyéb kereső foglalkozást folytatni. Ha
ebben betegsége akadályozza, betegségét hatósági orvosi igazol-
vánnyal kell az ellenőrző rendőri szervnél igazolnia.


Allandó lakóhelyét csak a rendőrhatóság tudomásával hagyhatja el.

Ha allandó lakóhelyét rendes foglalkozásánál fogva kényleben napon-
kérni, vagy rövidebb időközönként elhagyni, ezt is be kell jelentenie.
Feltételes szabadságának letelte után jelentkezzék az illetékes rend-
őri szervnél és igazolványát záradékolás végett mutassa be.

A magaviseleti szabályok megszegése, vagy bűntett elkövetése a fel-
tételes szabadság megszüntetését vonhalja maga után.

Szabaduláskor átvett Forintot és

Személyi igazolványának száma:



Láttamozás, lakóhely megváltoztatására vonatkozó engedély, záradékó-
lás és az illetékes rendőrhatóság, vagy rendőri szerv egyéb feljegy-
zései:

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I wonder if you could tell us what is the out-
look, what is the intention of the Hungarian Revolutionary Parlia-
ment with respect to the future?

The INTERPRETER. When the Parliament was organized November
19, between the 18th and 22d of November 1956, they decided that—
they took up the fight, going underground, and started to direct the
movements of the Hungarian people.

But then they, the people of Hungary, decided that the promised help which was to be given to the revolutionaries was not forthcoming, so they had to take it in their hands.

I just asked him, why did they assume that help was coming from the West, why should they believe that and he answered they believed the United Nations structure is such that they would go to the help of oppressed people.

They thought as soon as the Suez question was settled then the Hungarian question was going to be settled.

Senator HRUSKA. Now, Mr. Interpreter, you used the words "promised help."

The INTERPRETER. That is right.

Senator HRUSKA. Are those the words that the witness used?

The INTERPRETER. He says they believed that the United Nations was set up—it was to defend the oppressed, the small, that is why they assumed.

Senator HRUSKA. So it was not a promise from any individuals or any radio broadcast—

The INTERPRETER. No, he did not say that.

Senator HRUSKA. Or any representatives, it was an assumption?

The INTERPRETER. No, he does not say that.

Senator HRUSKA. I just wanted that point cleared up.

The INTERPRETER. Well, they tried to make contacts with the Kadar government, and in this contact they tried to reason—to come to some conclusion, so that from the revolution something could be saved, some accomplishment that the revolution may have accomplished could be saved.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you say the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament did make contact with the Kadar government in order to save something from the revolutionary activity?

The INTERPRETER. He was one of the representatives to go ahead and try to deal with the Kadar government, to save something of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, tell us what happened.

The INTERPRETER. When it was on the radio, on the Hungarian radio, that the workers, representatives of munkacz—farmers—they had the headquarters of the Ukrainian iron workers, where the radio said they had the right to—to select of their representatives and they were going to listen to their grievances, and so forth.

Senator HRUSKA. Did they meet, did they actually meet?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, they met.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us what happened.

The INTERPRETER. They gathered together from 28 different big factories and 3 mining sections, representatives, they gathered in one of the big places of these Hungarian iron workers.

And then they told them that this is not a legal place, or a legal body, but there is another one somewhere else where there is a meeting going on.

Senator HRUSKA. Who told them that?

The INTERPRETER. Well, they always had these secret police people around, buy them out—

Mr. MORRIS. Let me see If I understand that. This was a meeting between the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament and representatives of the Kadar regime?

The INTERPRETER. This was where all these representatives were going to select a committee and go up to Kadar, they hadn't gone to Kadar yet.

So, while this meeting was in progress to select the representatives, the ones that were going to go to the Kadar government, the word was passed that a couple of streets down below there was another meeting which was more attended—then, they are always trying to interrupt them, so 150 from that meeting proceeded over here to this other street, and at this other street there were Russian soldiers with machineguns.

So, when they arrived, these Russian soldiers put their machineguns in readiness, while they told them to go ahead, "Have your meeting, we are not going to do anything," and in about half an hour the Kadar government's representatives came and they were apologizing for the Russian soldiers with the guns, and they say, "Look, we are with you, and we are sending them away."

Then the Kadar government representatives sent away the Russian soldiers.

That was the first and the last contact they had with the Kadar government, because while the soldiers were gone away, they left also, and they had to go and went back to the underground.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that the answer to your request of the Kadar government?

The INTERPRETER. No; they were not interested.

Well, their first demand was that the Soviet troops have to leave Budapest because there were no factory workers will go back to work until the Soviets aren't there.

Also, please to remove the tanks and the Soviet troops from Budapest because the workers were afraid to go to work, because on every corner, street corner, were tanks and machineguns and Soviet troops.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, the Kadar government did not listen to your request to have some accommodation between themselves and you?

The INTERPRETER. Instead of that, next day on the Hungarian radio the Kadar government issued a statement, in which statement they stated that 20 factory representatives were together and they had meetings, and they decided that all the workers were going back to work.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, it was a false report of what actually took place, and you know it was false because you were present?

The INTERPRETER. So he says, yes; he was there when this happened, and they were betrayed again—among them they had many of these informers and these secret police people, evidently, and just—the idea was they had met together and the people knew of this committee's meeting, and the only decision they ever brought was that the workers should go back to work, and then they were to get together again after they went to work.

Mr. MORRIS. Now—have you finished?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you will tell us, you as the representative of the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament here in the United States, will you tell us how many people in Hungary you think you speak for?

The INTERPRETER. He says that he testifies, and every Hungarian knows, that the Kadar government hasn't got more than about 1,000

followers in Hungary, and the rest of the 9 million are behind the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament. He himself was one of the organizers who was sent out to the farms to get the peasants, and the peasants are 100 percent behind this Parliamentary government, which is their elected underground leadership.

Mr. MORRIS. So it is your contention here you represent ninety-some—that you are the spokesman of some ninety-some percent of the Hungarian people?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I wonder if you would tell us what you expect to do, what the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament expects to do in the coming days, in view of all of the circumstances which now exist?

The INTERPRETER. He says he is getting very much complaint that the Revolutionary Parliament thinks that he is not doing enough to help the Hungarian cause—

Mr. MORRIS. You hear from that inside Hungary?

The INTERPRETER. No. He is in contact continuously.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

The INTERPRETER. What they want to do, and nothing happens, and it is getting to be a month since he has been away.

And the Revolutionary Parliament actually stated the following: Now, there is a date set, but he doesn't know the date—in the near future—in which, if by then nothing has been done by the United Nations or the West to free Hungary from the Soviet troops, then they are going to start sabotage, blow up everything and put Hungary in a chaos, because the Hungarian people will not give up the fight. They are not going—if they have to—if they are going to be exterminated they are not going to live under the Soviet yoke any longer.

Mr. MORRIS. So, in other words, your testimony is that unless the United Nations or the West, generally, does something to aid the plight of the Hungarian people, that the Hungarians are going to take it on themselves to force some kind of a second uprising in the near future?

The INTERPRETER. Yes. His contention is, and his representation to the Revolutionary Parliament is, that if the United Nations and the West will not help them, then the third phase of the revolution is going to start, in which there is going to be a finish fight; either the extermination of the Hungarian people or the exit of the Soviet oppressors from Hungary.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, was the original revolt—what was the cause of the original October 23 revolt against the Soviet occupation?

The INTERPRETER. In July 1956, through some unknown factors, thousands of political prisoners were freed, and these political prisoners were agitating for the overthrow of the Soviet yoke.

His torture, which was very terrible, is only the story of one man, but everybody knows throughout the world that tens of thousands of Hungarians were imprisoned by the Soviets and tortured, and the situation was such it didn't make any difference to them, if they are killed by torture or fighting for freedom.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, do you know, or have you had any dealings with Cardinal Mindszenty?

I notice a news report that he has been accused of being in contact with religious people in Hungary. There is a protest on the part of

the Communists to Cardinal Mindszenty communicating with religious people in Hungary.

Did you have any experience with him or with that whole situation?

The INTERPRETER. He was in Bacz, and in this prison camp were all the other people who were imprisoned from the Mindszenty case. Mindszenty was not the only person who was imprisoned at that time; there were very many; thousands of people, thousands of people were imprisoned in the Mindszenty case and he was—he studied the situation, and when the revolution came he was among the people who freed Mindszenty.

Mr. MORRIS. You were one of the people who freed Cardinal Mindszenty, were you not?

The INTERPRETER. No, when he got to Budapest, he was there, with him.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. He didn't see Cardinal Mindszenty since that time?

The INTERPRETER. He has seen him until he took refuge into the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. You did see him, then?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you talk to him?

The INTERPRETER. No; he didn't speak to him.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, do you know anything about the circumstances surrounding Cardinal Mindszenty's asylum in the American Legation?

The INTERPRETER. He says since Cardinal Mindszenty took refuge in the American Embassy, it was very difficult to anybody to go because they were surrounded with spies all around and they took pictures of people and anybody that even attempted to speak to anybody who entered the American Legation. They just gathered them in and they disappeared and so for that reason they could never get near him after he took refuge.

Senator HRSUKA. Now, you have testified that if help does not come from the United Nations or from the West that the people of Hungary will arise again and enter into this third phase of the revolution.

How long do you think they will wait before they undertake that third phase?

The INTERPRETER. He says that he has not got the date but it is not—it is not very long; maybe a month, 1 or 2 months—not before spring—and they are waiting for him to come back with the reports.

Senator HRSUKA. Have they fixed a definite date; does he know?

The INTERPRETER. There is no definite date set.

Mr. MORRIS. Well now, have you testified before the United Nations?

The INTERPRETER. Not yet.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you hope to?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, he would like to.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, is there anything else that you feel that this subcommittee should know about the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament, its purposes, its aspirations?

Is there anything else you feel that the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee should have in its public record about you or your personal experiences or the experiences of the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament in general?

The INTERPRETER. He believes that, due to the fact that tomorrow is the eighth anniversary of the imprisonment of Cardinal Mindszenty, the Hungarian people will come, if nothing else but in silent protest, and this silent protest might end up in something, as it happened in October when the students were asking for a silent protest against their oppression.

However, definite knowledge he has none when the date is.

What he wishes to testify in front of the United Nations, however, his experience in this 1 month is very sad and the Parliament, the Revolutionary Parliament, which is sad, that regardless of what resolution is brought by the United Nations, they did not bring actual help or does not ease the suppression of the Hungarian people, so the Hungarian people are going to take it into their hands and fight to the finish.

He says that one of the main wishes of the Hungarian people would be if some help would come through the United Nations or through the Western Powers, and if it doesn't there is only one way, that would be for the Hungarian people to give in to the Russians, which they don't wish to do, and they are not going to do; and the second would mean the complete extermination of the Hungarian people because they are going to fight to the very last.

He said that the two points which the Hungarian people are begging the free world to see are very simple. The only thing that they ask is that the free world and the United Nations see to it that Soviet free Hungary and the Hungarian people should have the freedom to elect their own representative government, which they don't think is too much.

Senator HRUSKA. All right. Any further questions?

Mr. MORRIS. I think not of this witness, Senator.

As you know, Senator, there is present here ready to testify, Mr. Jeno Szeradasi. He was the vice chairman of the original Hungarian National Revolutionary Council until the execution of Chairman Joseph Dudas, and, therefore, it is presumed he is now acting chairman.

Do you know when Mr. Dudas was executed?

The INTERPRETER. He was executed after he left.

Mr. MORRIS. I see; in other words, after December 18 he was executed.

You see, Mr. Chairman, this other witness was vice chairman of that Hungarian National Revolutionary Council and is here ready to testify.

We were also scheduled to have here Gen. Andrew Turani. I understand there was a delay in some of the plans, for which reason General Turani is not here. So, it is your choice, Senator, whether we are going ahead, whether you think we should hold this other witness over until tomorrow.

Senator HRUSKA. Well, the hour is getting late and there are other things the Senators are engaged in and I would suggest that the witness be held over tentatively until tomorrow until we ascertain the wishes of the chairman of the subcommittee.

It is my own reaction after hearing this testimony that it is very important that it be sent in transcript form to Ambassador Lodge and for the attention of the United Nations' Special Committee on Hungary, or for whatever use he wants to make of it.

It is important, it seems to me, not only what the witness has narrated of his own experiences, but also on some of the things which the Western World has long suspected the Russians have done and it is also important for the things which are forecast in the future and the indications thereof, and certainly the United Nations and our Ambassador should be informed of the testimony that has been made available here.

Subject to the approval of the chairman of this subcommittee, that transcript will be forwarded in that fashion.

For the time being, then, and until further order of the chairman, this meeting is adjourned.

Thank you very much for coming here, Mr. Witness.

(Whereupon, at 12:10 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.)

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building.

Present: Senator Roman L. Hruska (acting chairman), presiding.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher, associate counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator HRUSKA. The committee will come to order.

There will be resumed the hearings with reference to the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament. The Internal Security Subcommittee heard yesterday the testimony from one of the representatives of that Parliament. He testified, among other things, that the Hungarian people may rise up again in the near future and complete the third phase of the Hungarian revolution.

The subcommittee is interested in ascertaining the full scope and duration of the Hungarian revolution because no other event in the last 10 years has raised a potential threat to the Soviet Empire as this one has.

This development may have had repercussions, we believe, even on the Communist Party here in the United States. We are trying to determine whether or not events in Hungary may have caused some defections here in this country. For this reason we would like to learn as much as possible about the forthcoming events in Hungary.

It is of considerable interest to the committee that we learned, since yesterday and since the hearings that we had yesterday, that Mr. Fonagy, the witness who testified before us, has been invited by the United Nations Special Committee on this subject to appear before that committee.

Will you ask the witness to verify that?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF DEZSO FONAGY, THROUGH LOUIS VON CSEH, INTERPRETER—Resumed

Senator HRUSKA. Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Fonagy had just a few things he wants to tell us. He asked if he could say a few words before we start the session.

Senator HRUSKA. That would be fine. If he has anything by way

of a supplement to yesterday's statement, we would be pleased to receive it at this time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, let the record show that both the interpreter and the witness now on the stand have been previously sworn.

Now, you told me today that you wanted to say a few words before we began our hearings this morning.

The INTERPRETER. First, he wants to remind the committee that today is the eighth anniversary of the imprisonment of Cardinal Mindszenty.

For the last 10 years the Hungarians were exterminated. It is a very sad situation. The Hungarians wish, in Parliament, that all this killing, et cetera, which has been going on—tens of thousands of people have been imprisoned and the United Nations hasn't moved its fingers to ease this situation.

The Hungarian revolution has not expected any help, like soldiers, et cetera. The only thing, they wanted some moral support that they should have fought off the Russian hordes. The Soviet Union was in such a weak position when this revolution broke out that if a hundred soldiers under the flag of the United Nations would have arrived in Hungary, Hungary would be a free nation, and probably the whole world would be in a better position today.

Instead of that, nothing happened from the West, and that is when the Russians got more momentum and brought in more soldiers and started the extermination of the Hungarian people.

He said the reason he was sent out by the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament was that he took an oath that he was going to come and explain the plight of the Hungarian people, and he is going to return. He is not going to leave the Hungarians behind, like many people have done.

As soon as he determines if any kind of help through the United Nations or the free West is not coming, he is returning.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, tell me this: Will there be any other representatives of the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament coming to this country?

The INTERPRETER. At this moment the only thing he knows is three of them were sent out. One went to Asia, one is all over Europe, and he is the third one.

Mr. MORRIS. Will there be others coming?

The INTERPRETER. If necessary, they will be able to come.

Mr. MORRIS. If you hear from any who are here, or who come here, will you so advise the committee, so that we may hear from them firsthand testimony of conditions that prevailed in Hungary after your departure?

The INTERPRETER. Absolutely he will do so.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you.

Senator, I think we have two other witnesses, and the time is short. Senator, I know there is much more he can tell us, but inasmuch as he will testify before the United Nations, I suggest, Senator, that we discontinue with this witness at this time.

Senator HRSKA. Whom do we have here?

Mr. MORRIS. We have two witnesses, Captain Turani, and then we have Mr. Szeradasi.

Now, in view of the last point that that witness made, I think Captain Turani's testimony would follow directly from the points he just made. So, even though the other man has been waiting here now, I suggest we call Captain Turani.

Senator HRUSKA. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Captain TURANI. So help me God.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ANDRAS TURANI, THROUGH LOUIS VON CSEH, INTERPRETER

Mr. MORRIS. Where are you residing now?

The INTERPRETER. He is residing at Camp Kilmer, N. J.

Mr. MORRIS. And your last name is Turani?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you were born in Hungary?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And you went to the military academy, did you not, the Hungarian Military Academy?

The INTERPRETER. He went to the Hungarian Lutovicum, they call that.

Mr. MORRIS. Spell that, please.

The INTERPRETER. L-u-t-o-v-i-c-u-m. This is equivalent to our West Point.

Mr. MORRIS. And when did you graduate from that institution?

The INTERPRETER. 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. And did you—

The INTERPRETER. It was a trial service when he finished it.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, he graduated in 1942?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your age?

The INTERPRETER. He is going into 43.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you fought with the Hungarian Army against the Soviet Union and against the Allied Forces during the war; did you not?

The INTERPRETER. He fought against the Russians, and also against the Germans.

Mr. MORRIS. During the war, World War II?

The INTERPRETER. World War II; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I wonder if you could tell us what you—you were active in the Smallholders Party, were you not, in the postwar period?

The INTERPRETER. He was, and he was also secretary to Vidovicj, who was the head of the surroundings of Budapest, and he also was what we call a governor of a state.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Turani was the governor of the state?

The INTERPRETER. No; his uncle, Vidovicj, whom he was the secretary to. Turani was the secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you had office in the Smallholders Party, did you not?

The INTERPRETER. He was a member of the Small Land Owners Federation during Monsignor Vargas—when he was in Hungary.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his title?

The INTERPRETER. He was a member of the Small Home Owners Federation, some kind of a functionary.

Mr. MORRIS. He wasn't the secretary of that?

The INTERPRETER. In one department in the suburbs, he was secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. I see; but he was not the secretary of the general party?

The INTERPRETER. Not the general secretary. He was also a member of the representatives without portfolio, under the Pfeifer government.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like for the record to show that there is a statement—some person came down with these three witnesses, who was interested in these witnesses, and has a summarization of the witnesses' testimony. I would like the record to show that only the testimony coming from this witness is associated with this committee today.

Now, would you tell me what you did after you—tell us what was your political activity in the postwar activity?

The INTERPRETER. After he was released from American prison—he was taken American prisoner of war in 1945, and after 5 months he was released—and over the radio it was announced that Hungary was going to have a democratic type of election, and he went home and partook in this election. During this election period he was campaigning under the Small Land Owners aegis for his uncle, Vidovicj's election to the Parliament.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you take part in the October 23 uprising in Hungary?

The INTERPRETER. Yes. He did partake in the uprising of 1956, October 23, actively, and also directly.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what your role in that revolution was?

The INTERPRETER. In the factory where he was working, under illegality—

Mr. MORRIS. Illegally.

The INTERPRETER. Yes. He was employed as a blacksmith, and they took all the small ammunition, whatever there was around, and took them out to the streets to fight with.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you participate in the fighting?

The INTERPRETER. This lasted 3 or 4 days. They were fighting for about 4 days against the Hungarian secret police and against Russians, whatever might be the case.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you hear the testimony of the preceding witness, that there was a certain amount of demoralization and a certain amount of lack of support that the Russians, the Soviet forces themselves, experienced in Hungary?

The INTERPRETER. The Russians, which were the occupation forces of Hungary, they were demoralized completely. Being a military man, he noticed it, and they were more or less on the side of the West.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about that in great detail basing it on your own experience with the Soviet soldiers?

The INTERPRETER. He was living very close by a Russian barracks, and even the Russian hospital, and he had the opportunity to gather

with the Russian soldiers and Russian officers, and when they especially had a little drink, they expressed their hatred for the leadership of Soviet Russia.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us about that.

The INTERPRETER. They all said there is no difference between the leadership of Rakosi, and Khrushchev and Bulganin in Russia. They were hated by the Russian people as much as Rakosi by the Hungarian people. These were the words of Russian soldiers and officers.

Senator HRUSKA. What were their specific complaints?

The INTERPRETER. They had seen it in Hungary, the great difference between the life of the people, and the life of the Russian people in Soviet Russia, and they are tired of the demagogues which were given to them. There is only one person they thought might have been all right, and that is Zhukov, the General Zhukov, whom they claim is probably pro-Western and a friend of President Eisenhower.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, tell me this: Did this hostility manifest itself at all after the uprising began?

The INTERPRETER. Yes. When the uprising started, you could see on those troops, Soviet troops, the hesitancy, and they did not want to cooperate with the orders and they were just in the waiting period.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us what experiences you had with the Russian soldiers after the uprising began.

The INTERPRETER. He experienced that, at the beginning, if they had specific orders, they rather shot over the heads of the people, the populace, the ones that were fighting, and they were very friendly toward the people. This was the first troops which were in Hungary.

Mr. MORRIS. What else can you tell us about that?

Senator HRUSKA. Were they the troops which had been garrisoned there, or were they the first ones who came there from the outside?

The INTERPRETER. He thinks, as far as he could determine, these troops, 80,000 to 100,000 or more, were those troops, the ones that were garrisoned in Hungary, the ones reluctant to shoot at the Hungarians.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know they were reluctant to shoot at the Hungarians?

The INTERPRETER. They had seen the way they behaved, and their behaviors they could see. They were very friendly toward the Hungarians.

Mr. MORRIS. What else did you see?

The INTERPRETER. He has seen those trains which were taking these Hungarian people into deportation.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you see—you told us in the executive session, did you not, that you saw defections, actual defections, on the part of the Soviet soldiers?

The INTERPRETER. He has seen actually Russian officers in civilian clothes. They were waiting to escape.

Mr. MORRIS. And they came and spoke to you, did they not?

The INTERPRETER. Yes. The Hungarian people were hiding those defectors.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us about that, as you did tell us earlier today?

The INTERPRETER. He says that these Russian soldiers, they were afraid that they were going to be liquidated, and therefore they were

expecting to join Hungarian units, or any other units which might come to help, and there is such a possibility that many even escaped into Vienna.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell me this: Did you see any Russian officers, yourself?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you see them in civilian clothes?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about it?

The INTERPRETER. These were officers, not very high ranking officers, who must have thought of something before, because they all obtained civilian clothes and were waiting for something.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you ask Captain Turani if he will tell us exactly what he saw, and just relate to us his own experiences, what he beheld, his own firsthand experiences.

The INTERPRETER. He says this second phase of the Russian occupation troops are in such demoralized condition.

Mr. MORRIS. Is he not going to answer the question?

The INTERPRETER. Which?

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us what he actually experienced when he encountered these Russian officers in civilian clothes.

The INTERPRETER. He has spoken to these officers many times, in a very long period of time, weeks and weeks, daily, due to the fact that he lived close by, and these officers were waiting for something, something might happen—help, or such, some sort of uprising, so they can join any kind of a new movement.

Senator HRUSKA. And did they tell him that?

The INTERPRETER. They told him that, and they continuously kept on telling him that, yes.

Senator HRUSKA. And did they tell him that during the days of the uprising, when they were in civilian clothes, and did any of them join the fighting against their own troops?

The INTERPRETER. He says when the revolution broke out, then they could not contact any more because there was a mobilization among them, and they also had the—the Hungarians had ammunition. However, he has knowledge, personal knowledge, that many, many joined the fighters, many of these Russians.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that?

The INTERPRETER. He personally only knows of one case, this first lieutenant who joined. However, it was told by the rest of the leaders in the revolution that many Russians joined them in the fight.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us about his own experience with the one lieutenant.

The INTERPRETER. The Russians grabbed this one, and the patrols took him away and they have not seen him any more.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, was there anything else you can tell us about this particular phase of the fighting that has to do with the Soviet occupation, and the leader of the Soviet troops in Hungary?

The INTERPRETER. Here is the whole story of the second phase, which is—he was caught outside of Budapest, and he and his uncle, Vidovicj, got hold of a radio station and they were broadcasting for help from the West during this period.

Mr. MORRIS. You were broadcasting?

The INTERPRETER. Yes. He was reading it into the radio with this uncle of his, Vidovicj's, help.

Mr. MORRIS. How long were you doing that?

The INTERPRETER. He did this for five hours continuously, and then the Russians came and occupied that town where this happened.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, is there anything else you can tell the subcommittee about your experiences during this particular period?

The INTERPRETER. You are not interested in what he heard, et cetera; you are interested in what he——?

Mr. MORRIS. What he knows about it. Tell us generally what he has learned, and tell us of his experience.

The INTERPRETER. He knows of a case where the head, which was a general of the Russian occupying forces, was liquidated for the simple reason that he was reluctant to fight against the Freedom Fighters of Hungary.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that general?

The INTERPRETER. This happened in Papai. It is P-a-p-a-i. The name he does not recall, but he was a very high-ranking Soviet officer.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, I have no more questions of this witness, Senator. Do you know something of the deportations that the Soviet Union is carrying on against the Hungarian people?

The INTERPRETER. He himself has spoken to those young kids, 16-year-old young children, who were taken out, the ones who told him that there were tens of thousands of them out in the Ukraine, and some of them were released, under age 15 and 16, and he himself has spoken to many of those children, with heads all shaven off, and they told him there are tens of thousands of them in the Ukraine.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the people you spoke with?

The INTERPRETER. Sixteen-year-old children.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you see them?

The INTERPRETER. They came back to Budapest.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, these are people who had already gone into the Ukraine, and returned to Budapest?

The INTERPRETER. Released, for some unknown reasons.

Mr. MORRIS. And they told you there were tens of thousands of people who had been deported to the Ukraine?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; tens of thousands.

Mr. MORRIS. How many of these young people did you see in Budapest?

The INTERPRETER. Several. In one of the big buildings they introduced these children as they came back. That is where they saw them.

Senator HRUSKA. At a public meeting?

The INTERPRETER. This was a big group of buildings where, at night, the Russian soldiers returned these children, where they lived.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, is there anything more you can tell us about the deportations?

The INTERPRETER. These young children were telling him and all the other people that the older persons and the intellectuals which were taken, they are taking them far inland into Russia. They are not going to release them.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, can you tell us more about that particular subject, deportations?

The INTERPRETER. He has seen wagons getting ready for some more deportees.

Mr. MORRIS. Seen what?

The INTERPRETER. Seen some of these wagons preparing to be taken, and they heard people hollering for help from these wagons, and the Russian soldiers were chasing away the civilians from around that neighborhood.

Senator HRUSKA. When you say "wagons," you mean those railroad cars?

The INTERPRETER. Railroad wagons, railroad cars; yes.

Senator HRUSKA. Were any efforts made to free them or derail the trains?

The INTERPRETER. There were attempts made and, by the time they organized into bigger groups to successfully, probably, free these, they were taken away, and other attempts were made at the borders. Some of them succeeded, some haven't. They just kept on rolling into Soviet Russia.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you believe anything could have been done to encourage defections of the Soviet soldiers?

The INTERPRETER. He says that his experience and his knowledge of the Russians, is this: Under the United Nations flag, if only just a small token force would have appeared, they would never have shot on them, and they would have defected.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, when you made your broadcast to the West on behalf of the Hungarian freedom fighters, what points did you cover in your broadcast?

The INTERPRETER. It is all in here.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you the person who made the famous appeal from the hidden Radio Rakoczi?

The INTERPRETER. Yes. It was called Petofi, not Rakoczi.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about that?

The INTERPRETER. He is going to submit the whole thing. Here is the whole speech, right here, which, if you care to present—

Mr. MORRIS. Sunday, November 4, 1956. Will you tell us specifically which was the broadcast and the appeal you yourself made here?

The INTERPRETER. It is marked here.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

Civilized people of the world, listen and come to our aid, not with declarations, but with force, with soldiers and arms. Do not forget that there is no stopping the wild onslaught of Bolshevism. Your turn will also come, once we perish. Save our souls. Save our souls.

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I recall that that particular broadcast was given quite a bit of currency shortly thereafter.

Are you the person who made that?

The INTERPRETER. He is the one who occupied this radio station. He is the one that read that message.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Senator, that should be in the record.

Senator HRUSKA. It will be incorporated in the record at this point.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 422" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 422

(THE REVOLT IN HUNGARY, PUBLISHED BY THE FREE EUROPE COMMITTEE,
NEW YORK CITY, P. 86)

Civilized people of the world, listen and come to our aid, not with declarations, but with force, with soldiers and arms. Do not forget that there is no stopping the wild onslaught of Bolshevism. Your turn will also come, once we perish. Save our souls. Save our souls.

Peoples of Europe whom we helped for centuries to withstand the barbaric attacks from Asia, listen to the tolling of Hungarian bells warning against disaster . . . Civilized peoples of the world, we implore you to help us in the name of justice, of freedom, of the binding moral principle of active solidarity. Our ship is sinking. Light is failing, the shadows grow darker every hour over the soil of Hungary. Listen to the cry, civilized peoples of the world, and act; extend to us your fraternal hand.

SOS, SOS—may God be with you.

Senator HRUSKA. Now, one other question about these deportations before we leave it.

How were these railroad cars filled? Were they filled—did the soldiers just go out and gather boys and young men of this age and put them in, or did they have some courts, or did they have some way of selecting certain ones that would go into those railroad cars?

The INTERPRETER. He says all these people were just gathered haphazardly. Anybody they could get hold of. And they were handled with chains and everything else, were shoved into these railroad cars, 80 to 90 people. The actual capacity of these cars is about 36 men. There were 80, even, shoved in, all chained, without keeping any record, not knowing who was in it.

Senator HRUSKA. Where did they get them; on the streets or houses?

The INTERPRETER. On the streets, houses, anywhere they could.

Senator HRUSKA. What were their ages?

The INTERPRETER. The ones he has seen specifically, they were young children, some of them from 12 years up to 25.

Senator HRUSKA. Just men?

The INTERPRETER. There were also women of the same ages, between 12 and 15, all mixed up, but not as many as men.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Captain Turani, do you feel that if there had been action on the part of the United Nations, under the terms of the charter, the absence of which you have deplored here today, do you feel that the Soviet Union would be able to move on to aggressions in the Middle East, as they are now threatening?

The INTERPRETER. Any small help that would have come to Hungary, the Soviet Union would not have been able to do anything in the Near East or Middle East. This is a good example of the weakness of the Soviet Union, and the Hungarian revolution is an example, and it could be a barometer to the West how weak the Soviet Union is. The Soviet Union is not as strong as they like to have us believe, but very weak, and the only reason they try to show that they are strong, they try to show us how strong they are, because never has any actual thing happened that they should stop them in their bluffing, which they are actually doing, really.

Mr. MORRIS. And do you feel, therefore, that they could commit aggressions in the Middle East if they had been preoccupied with the Hungarians?

The INTERPRETER. He says he does not believe that the Soviet Union could do anything in Asia if somebody would stand against them; they could never fight anything against the West. He doesn't believe they would.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions.

Senator HRUSKA. If not, we will dismiss this witness, and get into the matter set for the committee by Mr. Szeradasi.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you for your testimony.

Senator HRUSKA. Thank you very much, Captain, for coming before us and giving us your testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Before leaving, Captain Turani, what was the highest military grade that you reached?

The INTERPRETER. He is, of course—he was demoted, but he was, when the war ended, a captain.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

Are you known sometimes as General Turani?

The INTERPRETER. He does not know of any case where he was known as such. He was never a general.

Senator HRUSKA. Let the record show that Mr. Szeradasi has been sworn, and he will proceed to answer the questions that Mr. Morris will give him.

TESTIMONY OF JENO SZERADASI, THROUGH LOUIS VON CSEH, INTERPRETER

Mr. MORRIS. Your name is—your first name is J-e-n-o, and your last name is S-z-e-r-a-d-a-s-i; is that right?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you come to the United States?

The INTERPRETER. December 28, 1956.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you born in Hungary?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year?

The INTERPRETER. 1914.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, will you tell us what your position is with the National Revolutionary Council?

The INTERPRETER. The National Council, vice president; executive vice president, you would say.

Mr. MORRIS. Of the National Revolutionary Council?

The INTERPRETER. Of the National Revolutionary Council.

Mr. MORRIS. What is or was the National Revolutionary Council?

The INTERPRETER. It was an anti-Communist organization, which was defending the revolutionary movement against the Communist government.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, when was it formed?

The INTERPRETER. It was organized October 24, 1956.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the day after the outbreak?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

And who was the head of it?

The INTERPRETER. Dudas. Josef Dudas.

Mr. MORRIS. He was recently executed, was he not?

The INTERPRETER. They hung him.

Mr. MORRIS. You were the executive vice president of that council?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

Now, what is the function of that National Revolutionary Council?

The INTERPRETER. This Revolutionary Council submitted to the Communist government the reason the revolution broke out, and what is the object of their fights.

Mr. MORRIS. You submitted the demands of the Hungarian Revolutionary Council to the Hungarian Government?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

He himself personally, with Dudas and another one, were in the Hungarian Parliament and were negotiating these points which they presented.

Senator HRUSKA. With whom did they meet?

The INTERPRETER. With the Imre Nagy government.

Mr. MORRIS. The Imre Nagy government?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet with Imre Nagy personally?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What demands did you make with the Imre Nagy government?

The INTERPRETER. They submitted 22 points. The first point was that they should create a government which has other factions, representatives, not only the Communist Party.

The second point, to immediately denounce the Warsaw Pact.

Mr. MORRIS. The Warsaw Pact?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

The third point, the immediate withdrawal of the Russian troops from Hungary.

The fourth, as Austria is neutral, Hungary should declare its neutrality.

The fifth, which he emphasizes is very important, that the Hungarian Government should go to the United Nations and tell them it cannot fulfill the obligations of the peace treaty while they are under Soviet domination.

Mr. MORRIS. Unless they are out from under Soviet domination?

The INTERPRETER. That is right. Out from.

The free election is the sixth. The free election should be supervised by the Four Powers. The elections should be supervised by the United States, France, England, and the Soviet Union.

The seventh, the immediate denunciation of all the treaties they have. All treaties which they have, industrial and commercial, with the Soviet Union should be denounced and new treaties be made, international treaties. They should bring it to the attention of the people, the statistics of everything that was taken away from Hungary. And all the laws concerning workers, and so forth, should be rewritten, as is done internationally.

The immediate permission of everybody's free travel to the West.

The United Nations should immediately expel the Hungarian representatives in the United Nations.

Senator HRUSKA. The present representatives?

The INTERPRETER. The present ones, yes.

And there should be representatives sent, the ones sent by the Hungarian people.

Imre accepted this 22-point declaration, and promised next day at 9 o'clock he was going to have an answer for them. Imre Nagy promised this, and also shuffled around his government, which is over here, what he did.

On October 30, Imre Nagy shuffled his government, which then consisted of Bela Kovacs, Smallholder; Zoltan Tildy, Smallholder; and Ferenc Erdei, Peasant Party; and three Communists.

The National Council were not satisfied with this.

Mr. MORRIS. That is, the National Revolutionary Council was not satisfied?

The INTERPRETER. Was not satisfied. They gathered the representatives of the armed revolutionaries, and all the workers' organizations and all the unions, and then the result of this gathering was that Imre Nagy shuffled his government again, and only himself, as a Communist, was retained, and they elected from the other parties, such as Zoltan Tilday, Smallholder; Bela Kovacs, Smallholder; Istvan B. Szabo, Smallholder; Anna Kethly, Social Democrat; Gyula Kelemen, Social Democrat; Jozsef Fischer, Social Democrat; and Istvan Bibo, Petofi Peasant, Peasant Party.

The weakness of the Imre Nagy government was that between October 27 to November 3 they were fumbling around, and this gave the Soviet Union the time to come in with new troops.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you hear the testimony of Mr. Fonagy yesterday, that there was going to be—that the National Revolutionary Parliament is organizing, or the Hungarian people will rise up and complete the third phase of the revolution?

The INTERPRETER. He agrees with everything Fonagy said. However, he goes further. He says the revolution didn't cease. The revolution continues on, although there are no actual fightings. And when and if this third phase of the revolution comes, it is going to be a much bigger—on a bigger scale—and probably better organized than it was before.

The Hungarian people lost everything, so it is going to be a much bigger revolution than the October 23 one.

Senator HRUSKA. When the witness says that the fighting, the revolution is still going on, what specific acts are they doing to carry on that revolution now?

The INTERPRETER. They are working and making all the contacts with all the people who are revolutionists and they are going to be in a better position to lead a revolution than they were in October.

Senator HRUSKA. Can it be said that they are organizing?

The INTERPRETER. Organizing, yes; that is what they are doing.

Senator HRUSKA. Are they doing any sabotage or any slowdown of production?

The INTERPRETER. Yes. He says that they are continuing sabotage and, practically, there is no production in Hungary, even their own statistics show our production went down to 30 percent instead of being 100 percent like it was before the revolution.

Senator HRUSKA. Was the Parliament against all Communists, whether Hungarian or Russian Communists, or did they confine their efforts to just one of those?

The INTERPRETER. He said that it was an anti-Communist organization that fought against all Communists who were under Soviet domination.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that exactly the Senator's question?

Senator HRUSKA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, now, would a form of national Hungarian communism satisfy the Hungarians at this juncture of history?

The INTERPRETER. No, it would not. The Hungarian people are so against even the word "communism" that when they hear that they immediately revolt, be it any form or shape.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened to Mr. Dudas?

The INTERPRETER. They executed him.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you nearby when that happened? When was the execution?

The INTERPRETER. He said, when he returned the second time to Hungary.

Mr. MORRIS. Just a minute. When did you first leave Hungary?

The INTERPRETER. November, the 4th and the 5th, in the night.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you sometime subsequently returned to Hungary?

The INTERPRETER. He returned to Hungary December 4 and December 8 he arrived in Budapest.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. What was the purpose of your trip into Budapest in December?

The INTERPRETER. His main purpose was to destroy all evidence, documents; and also to try to bring other people out into Austria.

Mr. MORRIS. What documents did you try to destroy?

The INTERPRETER. The national council's documents.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words he was going to destroy the documents of the National Revolutionary Council?

The INTERPRETER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Why were you going to do that?

The INTERPRETER. They were in such place that, well, if it was found by the antirevolutionaries or the present form of Government, it would create many—a lot of trouble. A lot of people would be executed whose names were on this document.

Mr. MORRIS. So your purpose in coming back into Budapest was to destroy the records that might embarrass or get into trouble members of the National Revolutionary Party?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. All right. What happened when you went into Budapest?

The INTERPRETER. He says, this time the Russians with Hungarian civilians, who he doesn't know, probably six people, went from house to house and were gathering those people who actually fought in the revolution.

Mr. MORRIS. The Soviet-occupying forces were therefore going around gathering up people who fought in the revolution?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir. He had seen it himself and he was instructed by people that he should not go near any of the Soviet troops because they were gathering those people who fought.

Mr. MORRIS. What else happened? Did you see Dudas?

The INTERPRETER. He has not seen Dudas. He has spoken to his wife and Dudas, through his wife, told him he was not willing to leave Hungary.

Mr. MORRIS. All right. Did you see Dudas when you went there?

The INTERPRETER. No. He did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you did see his wife?

The INTERPRETER. He did see his wife.

Mr. MORRIS. And Dudas conveyed a message through his wife he was not going to leave Hungary?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And did you suggest to Dudas that he leave?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, he said he told him—he told him that he definitely can get out because there are still some people sympathetic at the border with the revolution.

Mr. MORRIS. Then what happened to Dudas ultimately?

The INTERPRETER. They arrested him.

Mr. MORRIS. And he was executed?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; they hung him.

Mr. MORRIS. When was that?

The INTERPRETER. The witness was in Austria when it came to his notice Dudas was hung.

Senator HRUSKA. Did he have a trial?

The INTERPRETER. His only knowledge is what he read in the paper.

Senator HRUSKA. And what was that?

The INTERPRETER. That was, he was under an emergency court, statarium, they call it, in which he was found guilty, and he was executed.

Senator HRUSKA. And the date?

The INTERPRETER. He does not know, but it is easy to find out the date.

Mr. MORRIS. It was late December, was it not?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, it was late in December.

Mr. MORRIS. And when did you come to the United States?

The INTERPRETER. December 28, 1956.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, are you endeavoring to keep alive the National Revolutionary Council, you as the vice chairman?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, do you feel there is going to be continued resistance on the part of your people in Hungary?

The INTERPRETER. He definitely knows, he doesn't think but he knows, that they do.

Mr. MORRIS. And you, yourself, took part in the fighting, did you not?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us generally what you did?

The INTERPRETER. Well, he shot.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you carry out for a long period of time those shooting activities?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Senator HRUSKA. Was it street fighting and did you shoot at Russian soldiers or the secret police or what?

The INTERPRETER. First, they were shooting at the Hungarian secret police and a couple of days later at the Russians and during this fighting several Russian armored cars joined them—two tanks—joined the Hungarian revolutionaries and fought on their side. They helped them to shoot the Hungarian secret police.

Do you want to hear what he has just been telling me?

Senator HRUSKA. If it bears on that question.

The INTERPRETER. Well, it does. And then he said they got into some sort of an armistice with the Russians which they broke on the 28th of October and started shooting.

Senator HRUSKA. Who broke the armistice?

The INTERPRETER. The Russians. At 3:30 in the morning they came with 20 tanks and started shooting the Hungarians. Then he was among them.

Mr. MORRIS. You are an artist by profession; are you not?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you attend the university?

The INTERPRETER. Yes. At the art school.

Mr. MORRIS. And do you hold a degree?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any experience with Soviet defections among the troops in Hungary?

The INTERPRETER. Due to the fact that among themselves they had many Russians fighting—he knows that—and one of the points of the Hungarian Revolutionary Council, they said that any Russian that defects and joins them are going to be Hungarian citizens and going to get complete—how do you say that?

Senator HRUSKA. Amnesty?

The INTERPRETER. Amnesty.

Senator HRUSKA. In other words, that was the declaration of the National Hungarian—

The INTERPRETER. Revolutionary Council.

Mr. MORRIS. That if any Soviet soldiers would join them they would have amnesty.

The INTERPRETER. And become American citizens, if they wished.

Senator HRUSKA. You mean Hungarian?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Senator HRUSKA. How long do you plan to stay in America?

The INTERPRETER. He says that depends mostly on the United States and the other free nations. When and if Hungary becomes a free country and they are going to have free elections, he desires to return then.

Senator HRUSKA. Will he accompany Mr. Fonagy to the United Nations to testify there?

The INTERPRETER. He would like to. However, he has no knowledge at present if he is to be heard.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rusher has a few questions and I don't think they will be long.

Senator HRUSKA. Very well.

Mr. RUSHER. Who gave you this document—would you please tell us briefly what it is?

The INTERPRETER. The Hungarian Optical Workers sent this to—not him but with demands. Do you want me to translate that?

Mr. RUSHER. No, I don't want it translated just yet. Tell me, was this forwarded through the National Revolutionary Council?

The INTERPRETER. The Optical Workers' Council joined the Hungarian National Revolutionary Council and then through the Hungarian National Revolutionary Council they had it transmitted to the Hungarian Government.

Mr. RUSHER. Were there many such sets of demands forwarded through the National Revolutionary Council to the Nagy Government?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, very many of these were submitted to us. Not only the optical workers but all of the peasants and intellectuals and different factories presented their demands.

Mr. RUSHER. But this is typical of the demands?

The INTERPRETER. This is a typical demand. They—

Mr. RUSHER. Now, I notice—go ahead.

The INTERPRETER. The only reason he submitted this is because here you can see that the Hungarian workers or the Hungarian people would not ally themselves with any Marxist ideas, et cetera. He wants to emphasize that fact.

Mr. RUSHER. Would you summarize this for us, just briefly, the substance of the document? I notice there seem to be two demands listed, as I understand it.

The INTERPRETER. The Hungarian Optical Workers, through their duly elected representatives, are putting these demands forward:

We demand that the Soviet Union should immediately start withdrawing their troops from Hungary.

Only after this demand is met can they say that they will start the work in their plant.

We demand from the Hungarian National Government that they should immediately withdraw the present delegates to the United Nations and send out duly elected delegates from the present Hungarian National Government and they should be instructed to instruct the people of the West of the Hungarian people's plight.

The above demands we want to be broadcast through radio so every worker should know all those demands.

Mr. RUSHER. Over the Hungarian radio?

The INTERPRETER. Over their radios; yes.

The Hungarian optical workers are only going to start work if the National Government broadcasts this through radio and some of their demands are met.

Mr. RUSHER. Senator, if you approve I would submit this for the record, with an appropriate and more thoroughly worked out translation as a typical set of demands, demands that were forwarded by the workers in one factory through the Hungarian National Revolutionary Council to the Government, and they are typical, as the witness has said, of the demands by other workers and the peasants, and so on.

Senator HRUSKA. It will be placed in the record with instructions to the staff that appropriate translations will be procured.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 423" and is translated as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 423

To IMRE NAGY, President of the National Council of Ministers, Budapest:

The workers of the Hungarian Optical Works have elected their temporary Workers' Council and have brought the following resolutions:

(1) We demand that the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary be immediately begun, because only in this way do we see the possibility of securing decent working conditions in order to begin work.

(2) We ask the Hungarian National Government that it revoke the powers of the old government's delegate to the United Nations, and that it send a new delegate who would represent the demands of the Hungarian people fighting for its independence. Also that the government give progress reports of the activity of this new delegation to the Hungarian working people.

We ask that the above resolutions be broadcast by the Hungarian radio. The Workers' Council has seen to it that by multiplication this document has been brought to the attention of other factory workers.

According to the expressed wishes of the workers of the Hungarian Optical Works, the Workers' Council is so disposed that the workers will only begin work if the delegation to your Council of Ministers has met with success and when, through the radio, you shall announce this success and ask the workers to return.

THE TEMPORARY WORKERS' COUNCIL OF THE
HUNGARIAN OPTICAL WORKS.

Senator HRUSKA. Mr. Witness, during these times you have described, did you get news of what was happening in Poland?

The INTERPRETER. Due to the fact that there were some of those people with whom the connection was held with the Polish workers—he cannot mention any names. However, for years they have been in contact with the Polish movement.

Senator HRUSKA. Did they receive word about the uprising in Poland that occurred during October?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, they had knowledge.

Senator HRUSKA. How did they get that knowledge? Through newspapers or radio?

The INTERPRETER. No, through courier.

Senator HRUSKA. That is the underground?

The INTERPRETER. That is right.

Senator HRUSKA. What was the thinking of the Hungarian Parliament and members of the Hungarian National Government about that? Your people?

The INTERPRETER. They had submitted this to the Hungarian people as an example of the Polish fight.

Senator HRUSKA. And they did that to encourage the Hungarian people to also arise and take action?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Senator HRUSKA. Did they approve of what happened in Poland?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, they did.

Senator HRUSKA. Of course in Poland they simply changed the form of communism. They did not abolish communism.

The INTERPRETER. That is right.

Senator HRUSKA. And to that extent perhaps the Hungarians were not satisfied. Might not that be true?

The INTERPRETER. That is the same thing to the Hungarian people as the other.

Senator HRUSKA. But they did get some comfort out of the idea that the Russian Communists had been defied and that they were resisted?

The INTERPRETER. The real—the little gain which the Poles probably obtained through the revolution again shows the weakness of the Soviet Union and the Hungarian people therefore got a little more momentum from that fact that they are not so strong and if any help would come from the United Nations or from the West they would probably—it would probably prove what the Hungarian people think of the Soviet Union, that they are not so strong, but without any help they cannot do anything.

Mr. NORRIS. Do you have any connections in the underground in the Soviet Union?

The INTERPRETER. No, sir.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record and possibly ask a question or two of this particular witness about it, a press release and a report issued.

It is a joint FAO mission report, Senator Hruska. The FAO is the Food and Agricultural Organization in the United Nations. It is a specialized agency of the United Nations. At the head is the new Director General, Mr. Sen, an Indian. He was recently elected as Director General of the FAO.

Now, after the United Nations team had been authorized to conduct a fact-finding tour of Hungary and was turned down, a team representing the FAO and the United Nations apparently did get into Hungary and they issued a report and I have that report and press release issued January 23, 1957, and I would like this for the record and point out just a few things.

SENATOR HRUSKA. It will be received in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 424 and 424-A and read as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 424

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

NORTH AMERICAN REGIONAL OFFICE,
Washington, D. C., January 23, 1957.

(The following press story has been received from FAO Rome Headquarters and is reissued from the North American Regional Office for reference purposes.)

SUBSTANTIAL FOOD IMPORTS NEEDED BY HUNGARY, UN/FAO MISSION REPORTS

Rome, January 18—A joint UN/FAO mission reported today that the people of Hungary urgently need "substantial imports" of agricultural supplies and an assurance of regular deliveries from the farms if they are to be assured an adequate food supply between now and the next harvest. The mission's report on the country's food and agricultural needs was made public simultaneously by the Food and Agriculture Organization and the United Nations.

B. R. Sen, Director General of FAO, said the estimates of food and agricultural needs listed in the agricultural chapter of the report had already been submitted to member governments likely to be able to supply at short notice some of the required goods, and that already he had received intimations that part of the requirements, including all of the needed seed supplies, could be found.

The report said that a combination of a bad 1956 crop and the disruption of normal field work during the recent political upheaval have made it essential to raise agricultural production in 1957 to the "highest possible level." Otherwise, it warned, a period of critical shortage would develop in the summer and Hungary would have to prolong its dependence on external sources of supply.

The report was prepared by a joint mission composed of Philippe de Seynes, U. N. Undersecretary in charge of relief for Hungary; Dr. F. T. Wahlen, Director of the Agriculture Division of FAO; Arthur Ewing, Chief of the Steel, Engineering and Housing Section of the U. N. Economic Commission for Europe, and Pierre Sinard, Chief of the FAO/ECE Joint Agriculture Division. It was in Budapest from January 4 to 7. The full report, released at U. N. Headquarters today, deals with the needs of the Hungarian people under the additional categories of industry and transport, housing and economic policy.

Its introduction noted that the mission, undertaken in pursuance of humanitarian resolution of the U. N. General Assembly, was exploratory, and that the findings were based on information made available by the Hungarian authorities and information gathered in recent years on the Hungarian economy by the Secretariats of the U. N. and of FAO. It also drew on a memorandum on relief action prepared earlier by the International Committee of the Red Cross. By agreement with the U. N., the ICRC is the sole agent for channelling supplies and employing funds contributed to the U. N. Relief Fund. The agreement provides in addition for action by the specialized Agencies within their fields of competence. The UN/FAO mission's report supports an ICRC proposal to establish an expanded program of emergency relief towards basic needs for the period January 15 to July 15.

Dr. Wahlen, in a summary submitted to Mr. Sen, pointed out that the most critical factor in the Hungarian economy is shortage of coal and power, and warned that this together with other factors "may lead to inflation, and thus severely affect the prices of food supplies."

Even as the report was being prepared in final form, FAO was approaching certain governments to secure their cooperation in meeting the needs revealed in the report. A preliminary survey made in Geneva and Vienna in late December by Dr. Wahlen and Mr. Sinard indicated that some 15,000 tons of seed would be needed for spring planting. The Director General made available information on the quantities of various types of seeds which would be needed. And when Dr. Wahlen returned from the joint UN/FAO mission Mr. Sen communicated further information on other agricultural needs to governments which might be in position to satisfy them.

"Thus far," Mr. Sen said, "I have every hope that the greater proportion of the immediate food and agricultural needs can be met."

The Agricultural portion of the report emphasized that the estimates of aid needs were aimed primarily at maintaining the agricultural production apparatus, in the interest of ensuring future food supplies.

"Examination on the spot and discussions with the Hungarian authorities" Dr. Whalen's summary said, "have shown that the supply of seeds, feeds, and fertilizers is the most effective way of accomplishing this goal." The Hungarian authorities had agreed that, insofar as aid goods were furnished as donations, FAO "shall exercise a control for their correct distribution along the lines of control exercised by the International Committee of the Red Cross for the distribution of goods supplied by them."

Dr. Wahlen said the food situation at the time of the mission's visit was "not alarming." Basic foods were available and price levels had been largely maintained.

But there were some disturbing indications of what the future might bring. Among them were cited delays at food-distribution points, the slaughter of valuable breeding stock because of feed shortages, the disruption of the output of food-processing plants, the rapid dwindling of reserve stocks to keep abreast of day-to-day demand, the suspension of exports, and the probable effect on prices of the abolition in November of the policy of compulsory deliveries by farmers of their products at fixed prices. On this latter point, the UN/FAO report said:

"Such far-reaching changes in economic behavior may well be accompanied by occasional temporary dislocation in deliveries, and it should be pointed out that even a temporary falling-off in the supply of certain products would inevitably lead to a spectacular rise in prices, consumers' purchasing power being for the moment quite high. Difficulties are being experienced in estimating the probable timing of deliveries from farms, since no comparable situation has existed in recent years which might furnish a basis of estimation."

"Nevertheless, farmers have increasingly come to regard the removal of compulsory deliveries as an essential step in the improvement of rural conditions and to that extent they have now obtained satisfaction. The most recent official declarations contain for the time being no reference to or modifications of the arrangements announced in November, and it appears that from now on it is the play of the forces of supply and demand which will decide the way in which agricultural production will develop."

The report said emergency measures needed to assist the recovery of agricultural production include:

Provision of some 15,000 tons of seeds (spring wheat, spring barley, oats, and seed potatoes) for spring planting to help in offsetting the 30 to 40 percent deficit in autumn sowings.

Provision of about 50,000 tons of chemical fertilizers for use in the spring, to make up for the loss of current production due to fuel shortages and transport difficulties.

To combat a "serious" livestock feed situation, 300,000 tons of coarse grains must be provided between January and March.

The report also estimated food imports needed between now and the next harvest at 400,000 tons of wheat, 20,000 tons of sugar, 10,000 tons of lard and 10,000 tons of tallow. As lower-priority items it listed 1,000 tons of cocoa beans, 1,000 tons of coffee, 100 tons of pepper, 5,000 tons of lemons and 2,000 tons of oranges.

Meat, the report said, was presently in plentiful supply due to the widespread slaughter of stock because of lack of feed. All available refrigeration space was filled to capacity and arrangements have been made to use facilities in neighboring countries. These stocks would in part offset the shortfall in meat production expected during the summer.

EXHIBIT No. 424-A

INTRODUCTION

1. A visit to Budapest from 4 to 7 January was undertaken jointly by the United Nations and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations in pursuance of Resolutions 1004 (ES-11) and 1006 (ES-11) by which the General Assembly inter alia resolved to undertake on a large scale, immediate aid for Hungary, and requested the Secretary-General in consultation with the heads of the appropriate specialized agencies to enquire into the needs of the Hungarian people for relief supplies and to report thereon to the General Assembly.

2. The mission was one of enquiry and not one to negotiate on any matters with the Hungarian authorities. The following report is based on information made available to it by the Hungarian Government in the course of three days' intensive consultations. The information which has been gathered in recent years on the Hungarian economy in the secretariats of the United Nations (particularly the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe) and of the Food and Agriculture Organization considerably facilitated the task of appraising the effects of recent developments. The mission had also with it a memorandum on relief action for Hungary prepared at an earlier date by the International Committee of the Red Cross in cooperation with the Hungarian Red Cross and the Ministry of Supplies.

It was possible for the mission to revise and complete the estimates made in this memorandum in the light of additional and more recent information. The mission, furthermore, consulted the Directors-General of the International Labour Office, the World Health Organization and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations as well as with the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the President of the League of Red Cross Societies.

3. The national economy of Hungary has suffered a severe setback as a result of recent events. The fighting and subsequent unrest resulted in extensive damage to buildings, the destruction and depletion of stocks of food and goods, the loss of skilled labour and the virtual cessation of work in many sectors of the economy. The present situation is conditioned not only by these events but also by a relatively poor harvest in 1956 and by the changes being implemented as a result of the current rethinking of economic objectives.

4. There is at present a lack of fodder necessary to maintain livestock through the winter months, as well as a lack of seed for the spring sowing, and of fertiliser. There is also the prospect of food shortage from May until the next wheat harvest. The short fall in coal production has already brought certain sectors of the economy to a standstill with the result of widespread unemployment. Furthermore, inflationary pressures are mounting due to increased pressure of consumer demand upon depleted supplies.

5. The relief requirements of the Hungarian people can be assessed only in the light of the overall economic conditions at present prevailing and it has therefore been necessary to review these conditions in this report. Moreover, it is clear that steps designed to restore productive capacity will reduce both the duration and the volume of relief needs. The determination, however, of where relief ends and rehabilitation begins, in this situation, is not one where economic considerations are paramount.

6. With regard to relief programmes the International Committee of the Red Cross under the terms of the agreement between the Committee and the United Nations signed on 4 December 1956 is the sole agent for the channelling of supplies and the utilization of funds contributed to the United Nations Relief Fund. The mission had the opportunity to observe at first hand the field operations of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Hungarian Red Cross whose work is widely publicized in Hungary; the administration and distribution of supplies by these bodies are exemplary. A section of this Report refers to the programme of the Committee and to the proposals for expansion for the present ICRC activities through 15 July 1957 after which the Red Cross proposes to discontinue its relief activities inside Hungary.

CHAPTER I. AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SUPPLY

Minimum conditions for recovery

1. An adequate food supply to the population of Hungary between now and the next harvest can only be assured, under present circumstances, given two conditions:

(a) that substantial imports take place urgently, so as to compensate in part for the abnormally low production of 1956;

(b) that the supplies becoming available from agriculture in the coming months will be marketed in a regular and continuous manner.

These two imperatives dictate the whole food supply policy of the government. Any reduction in the volume of imports which is envisaged or any prolonged suspension of deliveries from farms would, without any question, endanger the supply of the large cities and towns and would aggravate a food situation which is already difficult.

2. It is moreover essential that every effort should be made to raise agricultural production in 1957 to the highest possible level, especially crop production. The events of recent months have held back fieldwork, in particular the autumn sowing of cereals. If this lost time cannot be made up, the insufficiency of national supplies would not only prevent Hungary, which in the past has been a traditional exporter of agricultural products, from maintaining its flow of foreign trade during the coming year, but would also prolong its dependence on external sources of supply.

Shortcomings of 1956 domestic supplies

3. The deficit in production in 1956 can be attributed for the most part to the long dry period which was experienced. The production of both bread grains and coarse grains was greatly diminished thereby, and fodder crops and pastures were similarly affected. Furthermore, since the food processing industry was and continues to be interrupted for a long period by the shortage of transport facilities and of coal¹ (especially in the case of sugar beet factories), certain industrial byproducts which normally become available for feeding to livestock have been at least partially lacking. For these reasons the feed supply situation for breeding and fattening livestock is very difficult.

Effects of changed system of marketing

4. Until a few months ago the food supply of the urban centres depended essentially on the compulsory deliveries which farmers were called upon to make, and the purchase price of these quantities was fixed by the State. In the early part of November this system was abolished. Henceforward farmers, whether they operate private farms or whether they belong to a cooperative farm, can dispose freely of part or all of their produce to individual consumers. If sales are not made directly to consumers, the farmers have to deliver their products to the trade organizations which collect and distribute under regulations made by the Ministry of Internal Trade. All those transactions, however, take place at prices freely arrived at, and this applies at all stages of distribution.

5. Such far-reaching changes in economic behaviour may well be accompanied by occasional temporary dislocation in deliveries and it should be pointed out that even a temporary falling off in the supply of certain products would inevitably lead to a spectacular rise in prices,² consumers' purchasing power being for the moment quite high. Difficulties are being experienced in estimating the probable timing of deliveries from farms, since no comparable situation has existed in recent years which might furnish a basis of estimation. Nevertheless, farmers have increasingly come to regard the removal of compulsory deliveries as an essential step in the improvement of rural conditions, and to that extent they have now obtained satisfaction. The most recent official declarations contain for the time being no reference to or modifications of the arrangements announced in November, and it appears that from now on it is the play of the forces of supply and demand which will decide the way in which agricultural production will develop.

¹ In these respects serious difficulties still exist. [Footnotes are those of issuing agency.]

² This has already happened for certain products, such as eggs.

Current food situation in Budapest

6. At the time when the mission was carried out, the food situation in Budapest (and, it seems, in other large cities) was on the whole satisfactory. The basic commodities, bread and milk, were obtainable without rationing, though often only after a period of waiting, due to the reduction in the number of points of sale. Meat was plentiful, this being normally the time of seasonal surplus, aggravated this year by the scarcity of feeds which forces farmers to sell animals; vegetables were arriving from the surrounding districts in sufficient quantities but without much variety to choose from; fruit, consisting almost entirely of apples, was scarce and of poor quality.

The price levels fixed before October have been more or less maintained for the essential foodstuffs, although for other products (notably eggs and paprika) considerably higher prices have been recorded. This satisfactory situation has only been maintained by rapidly drawing upon the stocks. In addition, exports of agricultural products have been totally stopped during the past few months, while a certain quantity of imports have continued to arrive.

Immediate tasks

7. Three main problems arise for the Hungarian food and agricultural services at the present time.

- (a) to make available to farmers without delay the means of production which are needed in preparation for the harvest of 1957, and for the maintenance of livestock;
- (b) to secure the regular delivery of produce from the farms under the new system of free marketing; and
- (c) to make plans for such imports as are indispensable.

These three points are developed more fully below.

(a) *Emergency measures to assist the recovery of agricultural production*(i) *Seeds.—*

8. Up to the present time it has been not possible to complete the programme of autumn sowings.³ If normal weather conditions prevail in the coming months, this delay could be made up by prolonging the period of spring sowing. Early-ripening varieties of wheat, barley, and oats which are not available locally in sufficient quantities would have to be obtained. The requirements for these seeds are stated to be as follows:

	Tons
Spring wheat.....	5,000
Spring barley.....	5,000
Oats.....	2,000

A list of the varieties which are requested has recently been drawn up by the Hungarian agronomic services, which communicated it directly to FAO. That Organisation has already initiated action with a number of its member governments in Western Europe where the desired varieties might be available. It appears that it will be possible to meet the needs expressed in large measure, either in the form of gifts or by means of a barter exchange (e. g. seed barley against an undertaking by Hungary to furnish the equivalent quantity of malting barley after the harvest), or through the normal channels of trade.

Similar provisions have already been made by FAO to secure the supply to Hungary in the near future of 2,500 tons of seed potatoes and 400 tons of hybrid maize seeds.

In the event that gifts are forthcoming, their distribution would be controlled according to a procedure similar to that at present being followed for International Red Cross supplies.

(ii) *Fertilisers.—*

9. Production in 1957 could also be increased if chemical fertilisers were put at the disposal of farmers in relatively large quantities.

Fertiliser consumption has remained low in Hungary in comparison to the more advanced countries of Europe. Production in 1955 amounted to 12,800 tons of pure N and 28,800 tons of P₂O₅. It is difficult to estimate what will be the shortfall in fertiliser production due to the recent and continuing fuel shortage as well as transport and other difficulties, but it is safe to consider that the reduction will correspond to no less than three months' output. The most immediate need, which is for nitrogen fertilisers for use in the spring, is on all available evidence considerable.

³ According to some estimates, the area sown with cereals this winter amounts to only 60 or 70% of the area normally sown.

(iii) *Livestock production.*—

10. The Hungarian feed situation is serious. The harvest of coarse grains, and especially of maize, was about 30 percent below that of the previous year. Fodder crops were also poor.

Production of certain cereals

[Million tons]

	Average 1950-55	1954	1955	1956 (Prelim- inary estimates)
Barley.....	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.6
Oats.....	0.15	0.15	0.2	0.15
Maize.....	2.3	2.5	2.9	2.3
Total.....	3.15	3.25	3.9	3.05

Breeding stock (at breeding stations) and some of the stock for meat production (specialized pig-producing enterprises) are particularly threatened. Their feed supply in the past depended mainly on compulsory deliveries coming from cooperative farms and family farms. These deliveries were stopped shortly after the maize harvest, with the result that no stocks of coarse grains were built up by the livestock enterprises.

11. In order to maintain the numbers of pedigree livestock and to fatten the pigs which the specialized enterprises now have, 150,000 tons of coarse grains (essentially barley and maize) are urgently requested by the authorities. The delivery timetable, they consider, should be as follows:

	Tons
Before the end of January.....	20,000
In February.....	60,000
In March.....	70,000

The needs for the next two or three weeks will be met by a consignment of barley promised by the USSR and now on its way. There have been negotiations with China and 150,000 tons of coarse grains will be provided by that country; it is not expected, however, that delivery will take place before April or May. Should these supplies not be forthcoming within the arranged time, the previously mentioned minimum requirement of 150,000 tons would have to be increased proportionately.

(b) *Encouragement of deliveries from farms*

12. To encourage deliveries from farms, three series of measures have been taken or are envisaged:

(i) as indicated above, steps have been taken to obtain by trade negotiation or other ways, means of production for which the farmers urgently ask.

(ii) concerning domestic production, important changes have been made to the regulations which were previously applied. Farmers are under no obligation as regards their production plans, and they can dispose of their produce in any way they wish. They have obtained the right to dissolve the cooperative farms previously created, if they so desire.⁴ The machine-tractor stations must in the future be at the disposal of all and they must become self-financing independent concerns. During discussions mention was made of the Government's intention to proceed with the sale to private farmers of land belonging to the State or to local communities. The purchase and renting of land is authorised so as to enable family farms to adapt their area to the labour which they have at their disposal.

(iii) finally, the Hungarian supply services are concerned to provide farmers with the various consumer goods which they need. The new priorities allocated to the industries which produce these goods, which are dealt with elsewhere in this report, partly reflect this concern.

⁴ It seems that about 50 percent (or 2,000 in number) of the cooperative farms existing at the end of October have been dissolved. It is reported that some have been reestablished in a modified form.

(c) *Food imports and requirements: forecasts for the coming months*

13. The food requirements to be covered by imports relate both to basic commodities (cereals, sugar, fats) and to products often considered to be less indispensable (coffee, cocoa, oranges, etc.). Moreover, a serious shortage of meat might appear during the summer months if the coarse grains necessary for the maintenance and fattening of the livestock are not forthcoming in good time.

Wheat.—

14. The harvest of 1956 was markedly lower than the average of recent years.

Production of bread grains

	Average 1950-55	Million tons		
		1954	1955	1956 ¹
Wheat.....	2.0	1.7	2.1	1.7-1.8
Rye.....	.6	.5	.55	.5
Total.....	2.6	2.2	2.7	2.2-2.3

¹ Provisional.

Some stocks had been built up before the recent events, through the operation of the programme of compulsory deliveries. However, it has been officially stated that total State procurements of bread grains up to 15 October were 20 percent less than had been planned. The deficit for compulsory deliveries up to that time (based on farm area) was only about 10 percent, but there was a failure to make the planned purchases at free market prices, over and above the compulsory delivered quantities.

15. To maintain sufficient supplies between now and the next harvest, it is officially estimated that more than 400,000 tons of wheat will have to be imported.⁵ After allowing for the 250,000 tons which are expected from USSR as part of the programme of economic aid recently prepared, a need for 150,000 tons would remain. Although it is desired that shipments should begin soon, it would suffice if this quantity were to be delivered in April or May, since the available stocks and the undertakings for delivery from other countries should theoretically cover requirements until the beginning of June.

Sugar.—

16. The sugar beet harvest of 1956 would normally have been sufficient to cover all requirements. However, as work at the sugar factories has been held up, some losses have occurred through a reduction in the sugar content of the roots. It is now necessary for 20,000 tons of sugar to be imported, at the latest during the summer months, if the present consumption levels are to be maintained.

Fats.—

17. Lard plays an important part in Hungarian food supplies. It will be necessary to import 10,000 tons to cover requirements until October. The International Red Cross has already taken steps to ensure a supply of 3,000 tons of fats to Hungary in the near future.

18. Tallow: Normally 10,000 tons are imported annually. For 1957 this quantity is not yet assured and apparently cannot be obtained through the usual trade channels owing to lack of means of payment.

Other commodities.—

19. It would seem desirable to maintain a very limited supply of certain commodities of lower priority, the complete deprivation of which would cause hardship. These are as follows:

	Tons
cocoa beans.....	1,000
coffee.....	1,000
pepper.....	100
lemons.....	5,000
oranges.....	2,000

Some of these commodities, such as oranges, could be reserved for persons with special nutritional needs.

⁵ This estimate takes account of the quantities of wheat and flour recently received from various countries as emergency aid.

Problems of meat supplies

20. Meat is plentiful at present in Budapest and probably throughout the country. Slaughterings have been accelerated, especially of pigs, on account of the insufficient supplies of feedingstuffs. Since storage facilities are not such as to accommodate all the available quantities, arrangements have been made to utilise cold stores in neighbouring countries.

These stocks will in part make up for the shortfall of meat production which will occur during the summer (after the end of May). When that time comes the remainder will have to come from the specialized pig enterprises for which imports of coarse grains are now requested.

Certain traditional exports of Hungarian produce (poultry, for example) will have to continue in order to fulfil trade commitments already made and to pay for the planned imports of basic foods.

CHAPTER III. SUMMARY OF RELIEF REQUIREMENTS

60. From the preceding brief survey the following relief requirements appear to emerge with respect to food supply and agriculture:

(I) Seeds:	Tons
Spring wheat	5, 000
Spring barley	5, 000
Oats	2, 000
(The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is in contact with a number of governments with a view to facilitating arrangements for the provision of seed.)	
(II) Fertilizer:	Tons
Nitrogen	3, 150
P 205	7, 000
(III) Fodder for livestock:	Tons
Barley and maize	300, 000
(The Hungarian authorities reported arrangements are being made to receive 150,000 tons of this amount.)	
(IV) Food Requirements:	Tons
Wheat	400, 000
(The Hungarian authorities report that arrangements are already underway to secure 250,000 tons of this amount.)	
Sugar	20, 000
Lard	10, 000
(The ICRC has arranged to supply some 3,000 tons of this amount.)	
Tallow	10, 000
Other Requirements (lower priority):	Tons
Cocoa beans	1, 000
Coffee	1, 000
Pepper	100
Lemons	5, 000
Oranges	2, 000

61. Since November 1956, the ICRC has been conducting a traditional emergency relief programme, which as indicated in the interim report of the Secretary-General (Document A/3443), is providing minimal relief to four percent of the population.⁶ Through resources available to the ICRC this relief activity can be carried on until the end of April 1957. In order to continue this limited operation until July 15, 1957, the ICRC is requesting additional supplies valued at some dollars 1,500,000.

62. The ICRC has informed the Secretary-General that traditional emergency relief activities along the above lines will be insufficient to provide the necessary aid to the Hungarian population since reserves of basic food supplies are at a dangerously low level. The ICRC accordingly urges the establishment of an expanded programme of emergency relief to cover some of the basic needs in primary commodities such as bread-wheat, coal (for hospitals and social institutions only) and cattle fodder (barley oats, cattle cake, maize) for the period January 15 to July 15. The joint UN/FAO mission wishes to endorse a programme of this kind.

⁶ The items included in this programme are: powdered milk, cod liver oil capsules, fats, meat, fish, cheese, cereals, sugar, flour, soap, clothing, blankets, coal for hospitals, and window glass. Distribution is made through standard parcels, child feeding programs, and direct distribution of clothing and blankets.

63. If an expanded programme of emergency relief is to be established, careful consideration needs to be given to the method of distribution. Items such as bread-wheat and fodder cannot be distributed in large quantities in the same way as the items in the traditional emergency relief programme. Quite apart from the physical impossibility of direct distribution of such items, it is necessary to consider the possible inflationary effect of free distribution of sizable quantities of these items. In view of these considerations the ICRC has prepared a plan which foresees that products such as bread grains would be distributed through the normal economic channels, namely mills and bakeries, and would be sold to the population at the basic trade rate. For coal, it is foreseen that relief coal would be sold to the coal distribution agents in Budapest under an agreement stipulating that this coal would be exclusively used for hospitals and social institutions such as schools, universities, etc. As for cattle fodder, the quantities which would be available under the general relief programme would be sold through certain specified cooperatives to be used in specially designated areas of the country. In each case the products would be sold at the basic world average prices. The resulting funds would be put into a special account of the Hungarian Red Cross and would be used in turn with the agreement of the ICRC for such purposes as administrative costs of the Relief Programme, and ultimately for hospitals, social institutions and related welfare programmes. It is understood that before such a plan could be accepted, discussions both on the principle involved, and on the details would be required.

64. With regard to the coal mentioned in the ICRC proposal the quantity involved is 260,000 tons, and as indicated the supply is intended to fulfill minimum needs for social institutions. The mission was unable to check on this quantity, but in view of the overall deficiency in coal productions it would appear that the amount is reasonable.

65. In addition to the various sources of relief assistance, it is expected that within the framework of the technical committees of the Economic Commission for Europe consideration may be given to certain of the economic problems with which Hungary is faced.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, this apparently shows that the report is based on information made available to them by the Hungarian Government in the course of 3 days' intensive consultation. In other words, they received the information that formed the basis of this report from the present Hungarian Government.

Now, do you think for instance, that the information applied by the present Hungarian Government should be the basis of any report of the United Nations or the FAO?

The INTERPRETER. He says this is similar to the fact that somebody goes to Tibet for 3 days' time and then describes the life of the Dalai Llama in Thibet. It is similar to it. He doesn't think much of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I would like to point out that the whole tenor of this report seems to deplore the uprising in Hungary. It says for instance:

The national economy of Hungary has suffered a severe setback as a result of recent events. The fighting and subsequent unrest resulted in extensive damage to buildings, the destruction and depletion of stocks of food and goods, the loss of skilled labor and the virtual cessation of work in many sectors of the economy. The present situation is conditioned, not only by these events but also by a relatively poor harvest in 1956 and by the changes being implemented as a result of the current rethinking of economic objectives.

That generally, Senator, is the whole tenor of the report and I think it should go into the record because it bears on the testimony we have had today.

Senator HRUSKA. That is very fine and it will be received for that purpose. Is there anything further?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

Senator HRUSKA. If not, thank you very much for coming and giving us your testimony. And thank you, Mr. Interpreter, you have done a very good job.

(The subcommittee adjourned at 12:15 p. m.)

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, D. C.

Interrogation of Yuri Rastvorov was continued in room 319, Senate Office Building, at 4:20 p. m.

Present: Robert Morris, Chief Counsel, William A. Rusher, Associate Counsel, and Mr. Mandel, Research Director.

TESTIMONY OF YURI RASTVOROV (Continued)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rastvorov, the morning press carries a story from Stockholm, Sweden, that the Soviet Government has acknowledged that a kidnaped Swedish diplomat, Raoul Wallenberg, who disappeared 12 years ago, had in fact died in a Moscow prison.

This announcement contradicts the statements of the Soviet Government heretofore expressed, that Mr. Wallenberg had not been in the Soviet Union and was unknown to them.

In fact, the Soviet Union has previously charged that the Swedish Foreign Ministry had used the "Wallenberg case in the most shameless manner for purposes inimical to relations with the Soviet Union."

The official explanation that we now receive is to the effect that a "corrupt" security police official, Viktor S. Abakumov, former Minister for State Security, was to blame for Mr. Wallenberg's fate.

Mr. Rastvorov, did you know Mr. Abakumov?

Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes, I knew him as my boss in the Ministry of State Security in the U. S. S. R.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you know him?

Mr. RASTVOROV. I knew him from the time I entered the service, which was in 1943.

I consider it very important to give certain facts about Abakumov and his background in order that the people of the United States may understand who he really was.

During the second war, Abakumov was appointed the Chief of the Army Counter Intelligence Service. In this post he came to work very closely with Stalin himself, since Stalin was at that time concerned with counterintelligence matters.

Because Abakumov successfully solved a couple of cases involving espionage in the army, his authority in the eyes of Stalin increased considerably.

After the war, in the summer of 1946, when it came time for Stalin and the other leaders to decide on future policy for the state security organization, the then Minister of MGB, General Merkolov—who was later shot with Beria and really was one of the central figures in the so-called Beria plot—made a big political mistake when he insisted that the main aim of the state security organ should be the struggle against internal enemies of the U. S. S. R.

General Abakumov, who also participated in these meetings, expressed a different opinion. He declared that the principal target of the state security organization should be the external enemies, in other words the United States of America, primarily, and its allies.

Stalin supported the opinion of Abakumov and soon after these high level meetings, fired Merkolov for his political blindness and shortsightedness, and appointed Abakumov to Merkolov's post. This happened in spite of all attempts of Beria, who was a friend of Merkolov, to keep Merkolov in the position of Minister of State Security. Merkolov was then named to a small post involving the supervision of Soviet properties abroad, which was at that time called Gusims.

Later in 1948 Merkolov was forgiven by Stalin and was appointed to a little higher post, Minister of State Control, which is a secondarily important ministry in the Soviet state apparatus.

As a consequence of this shuffle, the relationship between Abakumov and Beria became very tense and Beria tried constantly to undermine Abakumov's position. At this time Beria was deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R. and while his main responsibility was for atomic energy affairs, he was also still responsible for all internal security.

I had known Abakumov since 1943 when I entered this organization, in other words, the MGB.

Despite Abakumov's strong start, he did not last long as the head of MGB. In 1951 Abakumov was arrested by order of Stalin at the instigation of Beria, who had prepared the case against Abakumov, collecting compromising material on him.

Mr. MORRIS. May I break in there, Mr. Rastvorov, and ask:

It seems from what you say then, that Abakumov was eliminated because of opposition from Beria?

Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And that he was not executed along with Beria?

Mr. RASTVOROV. No. He was arrested by Beria before Beria himself got into trouble. I estimate it was in 1951—3 years earlier.

He was arrested because of his alleged social crimes, one of which was the charge of unlawful accumulation of several million rubles worth of property in Germany and other personal crimes.

Mr. MORRIS. That was the formal charge against him?

Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Therefore, the Soviet explanation of Mr. Wallenberg's death is to your knowledge false?

Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you finish your story on Abakumov into which I broke?

Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes. After Abakumov's arrest, Beria hired back all the old Merkolov crowd, including Merkolov himself. Abakumov was put in jail in Moscow, in a jail reserved for VIP's; not until 3 years later was he tried. Then the old charges of bad conduct and

decadent private life gave way to a new, obviously ridiculous one; that he was one of the participants in the Beria plot. This, of course, was impossible.

Abakumov's trial was secret. He merely disappeared. Abakumov's case unquestionably parallels those of the six whose sentencing has just been announced.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rastvorov, then the Soviet explanation of the Wallenberg death contains material falsehoods?

Mr. RASTVOROV. The Soviet's explanation of the death of Raoul Wallenberg represents a mistatement of facts from the beginning to the end:

In the first place, when Wallenberg was arrested, General Abakumov was not the Minister of MGB, and the responsibility at that time must have fallen on General Merkolov who was the head of MGB. In connection with this, it should be known that Merkolov and Abakumov were enemies and therefore it would be wrong to assume that Abakumov had reason to cover the crimes of his predecessor.

My experience permits me to say that all acts of MVD insofar as arrests of foreigners are concerned could be accomplished only with the permission of the leaders of the Soviet Government, and particularly with the consent of former minister of Foreign Affairs, V. Molotov. In this connection it would be worth while to mention known to me the following facts: (1) In 1947, the Soviet counterintelligence service recruited an employee of the American Embassy in Moscow—A. Bukar—and this operation was possible only with the approval of the Foreign Office, (2) in 1948, the same counterintelligence service, in order to create an unfavorable opinion among its own people and the people of the free world about spy activities of western diplomats, created an incident involving a British attaché who was arrested presumably taking pictures of military installations in the Moscow area. This more or less small incident, according to my knowledge, was possible also only with the permission of the Foreign Office. These facts clearly indicate the responsibility, not only of the MVD, but directly of the Soviet Government. It is ridiculous to believe that the Soviet Government took 12 years to find records in connection with the case of the Swedish diplomat, Wallenberg. Again, on the basis of my own knowledge, the Soviet Government operates in a very efficient manner when it comes to keeping records on such incidents as that of the Swedish diplomat. It is clear to me that no one else but the Soviet Government was responsible at that particular time for the recruitment and kidnaping of foreigners for the purpose of obtaining intelligence information, for the recruitment of persons to work as spies, and for getting from these persons documents which the Soviet Government needed to provide the means for illegal, subversive activities in democratic countries.

Furthermore, in cases of foreign personnel who fell into the hands of the Soviet Government, if they failed to cooperate or provide the desired information, it was an accepted practice to refuse permission for such persons to return to their country. This was done obviously to keep such persons from revealing the ordeals they suffered at the hands of the Soviet security organ.

The Soviet version of Abakumov's ultimate fate contradicts the time of Abakumov's arrest, trying to show that he was arrested as a supporter of Beria after the execution of Beria. In reality, Abakumov

was arrested in 1951 by Stalin at the instigation of Beria because of his "social" crimes, which was the charge of unlawful accumulation of several million rubles worth of property in Germany, and other personal crimes. Beria prepared the case against Abakumov after collecting the necessary compromising material, and later Beria recalled to his service all the former Merkolov crowd, including Merkolov himself.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 4:35 p. m., the hearing was adjourned, subject to the call of the chairman).

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 o'clock a. m., in room 457 Senate Office Building, Senator Olin D. Johnston presiding.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; and William A. Rusher, associate counsel.

Mr. MORRIS. General, will you stand, please?

Senator JOHNSTON. Will you please raise your right hand and be sworn.

Do you swear that the evidence you give before this subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General KIRALY. I swear.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL BELA KIRALY

Mr. MORRIS. Give your name and address to the reporter.

General KIRALY. Yes. I am General Bela Kiraly. I am a major general in the Free Hungarian Army, and commander in chief of the national guard established during the Hungarian National Democratic Revolution.

Mr. MORRIS. May I just ask you a few questions before you begin.

Senator JOHNSTON. Let me ask you a question.

I notice you speak pretty good English. Where did you go to school?

General KIRALY. I learned English in the prison. I was 4 or 5 years in prison, and I have time enough to learn the English language.

Senator JOHNSTON. Good.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Johnston, this witness is being called today in line with the general purpose of the Internal Security Subcommittee of learning as much as possible about the nature of and the possible duration of the Hungarian uprising, revolution.

The subcommittee has perceived that there has been an effect on the Communist Parties all over the world as a result of the Hungarian revolution, and even on the party in the United States.

Now, we find, Senator, that the two things are almost indistinguishable. In order to really understand the nature of the American

Communist movement, we must know something about the nature and the possible duration of the Hungarian revolution.

In connection with that, we had a Communist Party convention here last week in New York, and we have now been endeavoring to get some of the principals of that convention here to testify.

For instance, there is a subpoena out for Eugene Dennis. We heard of some connections between Mr. Dennis and the American Communist Party and Moscow, and we are trying to have him come here and we will ask him about that particular matter.

But, as I say, as part of this whole inquiry into the nature of world communism, we have General Kiraly here this morning, and we want to get some of his firsthand experiences. I think he is the ranking military man, ranking Hungarian general, are you not, now?

General KIRALY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You are.

Now, I notice in yesterday's press that there was a new chief of staff of the Hungarian Army, General. His name is Ferenc Ugrai. Now, who was Colonel Ugrai?

General KIRALY. I know him very well. For a short time he was one of my students when I was a professor of military science.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he was one of your students?

General KIRALY. One of my students.

He was, at the beginning of this 12-year period in Hungary, a member of the secret police of the army, which you are knowing by the abbreviation of AVH.

Mr. MORRIS. So, you say, then—excuse me—that Colonel Ugrai was the head of the AVH?

General KIRALY. No; he was not head. He was, in that case, a young man. He was a lieutenant, and afterwards captain, and in this rank he was a member of the secret police, and on account of his "merits" he has been appointed in higher ranks. He was sent to Moscow, to military high schools, and returned some years ago.

I was in prison when he returned from there. He became the chief of staff of the highest commander of the artillery of the Hungarian Army, and now, as I read also in the newspapers, he became the chief of staff of the Hungarian Army.

He was a top Communist, of course, and he had a lot of merits on the Communist line previously.

Senator JOHNSTON. Did Russia have anything to do with his promotion?

General KIRALY. Of course. He is a trustee of the Russians. He was for a long time, for at least 4 years, in Moscow, and he was a trustee in Hungary of the Russian Communists, of course.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, it says that the head of the political department is Maj. Gen. Pal Ilku.

General KIRALY. Yes; I know him also perfectly well.

He is, according to his origin, a Ukrainian. He came to Hungary from so-called Carpathians in Russia, which belongs now to Russia.

Previously, during the two World Wars, between the two World Wars, it belonged to Czechoslovakia. From that part he takes his origin, so he is Ukrainian, a very old member of the Communist movement.

Mr. MORRIS. You say a very good member of the Communist movement? Did you say a very good member of the Communist movement?

General KIRALY. From the Communist viewpoint; an old member, I said; yes.

And after World War Second, he was a top man in the youth movement in Hungary, the Communist youth movement in Hungary. In 1948 he was brought into the army in the rank of colonel, and became one of the deputies of the political department's chief.

Then he has been sent to Moscow, for 5 years' education, and during this revolutionary movement, the national democratic revolutionary movement, he was in Moscow and he played a very suspicious role, because when all the officers being in the Soviet Union military schools decided to go home and see what is happening, the Muscovites hold 5 high-ranking officers there in Moscow, and they were in negotiation with the Russian Home Defense Ministry, and only sent back to Hungary on the 2d of November.

One of this group was Pal Ilku, who has been sent on the 2d or 3d of November back to Hungary to play a role, taking the revolution—a part in it. He was one of the first men who supported this Kadar regime on a military basis. He is also a trustee of the Russians.

Mr. MORRIS. A trustee, you say?

General KIRALY. Trustee.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, this is very short. It is just two paragraphs. May I read this Associated Press release?

Senator JOHNSTON. You may read it.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

Budapest, February 17. Hungary's Army, riddled by desertions during the revolt, is to come under tight Communist Party control, the high command announced today.

The new chief of staff is Colonel Ferenc Ugrai. Head of the political department is a major general, Pal Ilku, who was quoted today as saying: "Party organizations in the Army will in future have a voice in operational planning."

Only a few of Hungary's 170,000 Russian-trained and equipped troops are believed to remain under the colors. They are mostly militia, on police duties.

The Communist trade union newspaper, Nepakartat, charged today that nothing like the total aid promised by the United States and the International Red Cross had reached Hungary. It said more aid had come from the satellites.

Now, does this change in command that was announced on the 17th of February in Budapest, does that indicate to you the nature of the control exercised by the Soviets over the Hungarian Army?

General KIRALY. Completely. I was aware of this even when the Kadar regime began its rule over Hungary, that it is only a puppet regime of the Soviet Union.

They will act according to the commands of the Muscovites and to subdue completely, to annihilate completely, the wish of freedom of the Hungarian people.

They will act according to the Stalinist system. I am completely convinced that, if they will be allowed, they will act according to the Stalin systems. It means that the suppression and exploitation of the Hungarian people will grow and grow, without any limit, if the Russians will have complete free hand in the future, in Hungary.

Senator JOHNSTON. So Russians are taking complete control of the military and police in order to subdue the Hungarians; is that right?

General KIRALY. Completely it is so; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this witness has testified before the United Nations Special Committee in New York, and in going over his testimony today we plan, as much as possible, to avoid a repetition

of anything there, because his testimony there will be accessible to us. We want to make our own record on this.

However, there is one thing that the committee has learned, Senator, that these hearings that the Special Committee of the United Nations is holding are now being held only in executive session.

(To the witness.)

Do you know that, that witnesses now being called are not being called in public, the witnesses called by the United Nations Special Committee in New York?

General KIRALY. Yes. The hearings of the witnesses are in a secret session. It is continuously held. Almost every day they hear witnesses, but completely secretly.

Senator JOHNSTON. We are giving to them all the information that we receive concerning the Hungarians?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Senator JOHNSTON. Are they giving to us all that they receive?

Mr. MORRIS. It may be, Senator. We have asked for certain things, and not only recently. Now, I will be able to answer that question next week, to what extent the testimony they are taking will be available to us.

Senator JOHNSTON. I personally think it would be helpful if we cooperated with them, but we also should have their cooperation with us.

Mr. MORRIS. Very good, Senator. I will carry out your wishes.

General KIRALY. We feel very grateful for this help to our case, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General Kiraly, you took part in war games, did you not, or staff war exercises, when you were in the Hungarian Army?

General KIRALY. Yes.

I was arrested in 1951, August 17.

Mr. MORRIS. August 17, 1951.

Now, before you were arrested——

General KIRALY. Before this I took part myself in war games, in Hungary, of course.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us about those war games you took part in.

General KIRALY. Yes.

In 1951, in the springtime, there were war games in Hungary, and, in general, the war games of an army always project whatever this army wants to act in wartimes.

Now, and even during this war game in 1951, in the spring, the Home Defense Ministry, the top Communist, Farkas, declared that all those high commanders who are participating in these war games must very much take care of what is happening here, because this war game is not a play but a real projection of whatever the Hungarian Army, with the Russians, wants to make.

And in 1951 the aims, the purpose of the attack that was organized, was what this arrow shows [indicating]. It is the Hungarian front here, this little point here. The Hungarian Army was gathered in this area within the Dunapentele River, and the aims, the purpose of this attack, was to cross the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier, to attack through the big cities in Yugoslavia, to cross the Danube River, which he has here, and occupy a mountain chain through Fruska Gora.

It was the task of the Hungarian Army to make a very big so-called military bridgehead for the Russian Army, which wanted to enlarge this bridgehead, and to attack to the source of the Adriatic Sea, and by continuing this, of course, to invade Western Europe.

It was the first game in which I personally partook.

At this time there was great tension between the Soviet Party and the Yugoslavians, and therefore it was very clear that they wanted to attack. Later on, in 1953, there was another very important war game in Hungary, led also by Home Defense Minister Farkas.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell that name for us, please?

General KIRALY. Home Defense Minister Farkas. His last name is F-a-r-k-a-s; his first name M-i-h-a-l-y.

Of course, he was not a military expert. He was a top Communist and had a very high rank, and whatever he did, whatever he told, was whispered in his ear by the so-called chief advisor of Russia, who sits always by the side of him and whispered in his ear what to say.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was he, the chief adviser?

General KIRALY. General Lieutenant Bojao.

This war game was most important than what I told up to now. It was an attempt toward Rijeka. It is on the shore of the Adriatic Sea, and it is very curious because this great attempt led through the so-called Ljublijana Gate. It is a strategical gate in this area (inciting), and it is a gate such as a gate between the Po Plain and Central Europe.

This war game, this attack has been led through this Ljublijana Gate, and just in this area there is very great agitation from behind the Iron Curtain, out of which everybody, who carefully reads newspapers, was able to find out how the Russians are mixing together strategical aims with political agitation.

In that time they accented very much how great a role has the Italian and the French Communist Party, even in these strategical purposes and plans of the Soviet Russia. They count on a great strike in Italy, with a great strike in France, led by these 2 Communist Parties when war would have commenced, and by these great strikes in Italy and France they wanted to paralyze the mobilization of these 2 principal western parts, you know, and in the meanwhile Russia—

Mr. MORRIS. Just a minute. What was that word?

General KIRALY. Paralyze.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, as part of these war games, there would be as a supporting gesture for paralyzing strikes by Italian Communist Party and the French Communist Party, in concert with this maneuver, and that was part of the war game?

General KIRALY. Yes. To paralyze the mobilization, and the moving armies, the NATO armies in Italy and in France, and during these strikes they wanted to run in through this very important strategical gate, the Ljubljana Gate, and have so great an advance which, if the strikes later on will cease, would not have been counterbalanced by the Western Powers.

This war game is very important and very characteristic how the Russians, how the Communists are exploiting the western Communist Parties, not only in political reasons and causes but even in strategical ones.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General Kiraly, there were also war exercises involving the general staffs of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary,

Rumania, Bulgaria, all under the personal command of Marshal Zhukov, were there not, at some later time?

General KIRALY. Two such great maneuvers occurred, one in 1955, early autumn time, and the other in 1956, springtime. Both of these have been led by Marshal Zhukov, the Home Defense Minister of Russia.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us what you know about those particular exercises and how you came to know what you do know about them?

General KIRALY. Yes.

In that time I was in prison and, therefore, I myself do not partake in these, but when, in last September, I was released from the prison—

Mr. MORRIS. When were you released from prison?

General KIRALY. September, last year.

Mr. MORRIS. One month before the October 23 revolution?

General KIRALY. Yes.

During these months after my release, and before October 23, when I had been released—

Mr. MORRIS. When you were released from prison, did you revert back to your military rank of general?

General KIRALY. No. I had been bereft of all my rank and my position, and only the university youths called me to lead them as commander in chief of the freedom fighters, and only afterward when the university youth and other fighting groups allotted me as the commander in chief of them, the Government accepted me afterward and rehabilitated me and gave back my rank.

So, I acted for some days in the Freedom Fight without any rank, of course, only appointment of the Freedom Fighters; and only afterward the government accepted me also and gave back my rank.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General, will you tell us what you did know about these military games in 1955 and 1956, which you say were directed by General Zhukov?

General KIRALY. Yes. In both military maneuvers the general staffs of all the European satellites took part. All the home defense ministries of these European satellites personally took part in these war maneuvers.

The first has been carried out in Carpathian Russia, in the inside of the Carpathian Mountain chain, which territorially belonged between the two World Wars to Czechoslovakia.

The second which has been carried out in 1956 has been held in the Ukraine, in the western Ukraine, near to Polish border, and to the Czechoslovakian border. It was the most interesting, this maneuver, which has been held in 1956. The situation was constructed so that the Western Powers had defended themselves, even the fundamental supposition has been constructed that the Eastern part was that which attacked the Western part.

In these war games the Western part played a role in defense.

Now, the Western part have a counterattack against the Russians, and then the Russians annihilated this defensive counterattack and began a hideous attack against the Western parties.

This war game was very curiously organized. Both parts of the fighters have been represented. The most part of the satellites, of course, played the role of the Warsaw Pact, the Warsaw Pact army, and it is a funny thing of history that the Hungarians have been appointed to play the role of the Western part, and not only in general

the Western part but it was very curious that the Hungarian Army played the role of the American Army itself. It was a funny of history, so to say.

In general, this maneuver was held in the spirit of an attack against the West. When they finished this maneuver, Zhukov, Marshal Zhukov, had delivered a speech about the experiences of this maneuver and about this general situation of the Red army.

Mr. MORRIS. What did he say at that time?

General KIRALY. He told that in the first case, the Russian Army is obsolete concerning the mechanization and motorization. The Russian Army must make a very urgent effort to become in this respect, a completely modern one. Therefore—

Mr. MORRIS. The first point, General, is that Zhukov told the assembled staff officers that the Russian Army, based on its war games—this is the 1955 war games, or was it 1956?

General KIRALY. 1956.

Mr. MORRIS. Was obsolete, and was in urgent need of modernization?

General KIRALY. Obsolete concerning the mechanization and motorization. Only this point, he pointed out. In these two respects it is obsolete, by the declaration of Zhukov.

They were urged by great effort to supply this defect, and they will modernize the Russian Army concerning its mechanization and mobilization.

The second point he told, to lead big mechanized and mobilized army groups, it is a special sector of the military science, and in this respect a lot of the Russian generals are not skilled enough and a lot of the Russian generals do not do their best to have enough capability to lead such great mechanized groups; a lot of the Soviet generals are living out of their merits in the Second World War. They think that to be the hero of the Soviet Union it is fully enough for the end of their life, but Zhukov declared that if these persons, even being heroes of the Soviet Union, will be kicked out—excuse me for this slang—kicked out of the army, if they will not get enough skill and capability to be able to lead such great mechanized groups.

And the third, what he declared was that the Russian Army is obliged to study the atomic warfare and make the Russian Army capable to exist and act among the circumstances of an atomic war.

These three points I know out of his declaration.

Senator JOHNSTON. In other words, he was calling to the attention of the people that the need of the Russian Army was mechanized and mobilized armies. They were behind in that field; is that right?

General KIRALY. Yes. He declared that it is obsolete in these two respects, and immediately added that they will do their best to make in this respect modern the Russian Army.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, how did you come to learn this, General? Not only these particular war games, the early ones, but—

General KIRALY. I had a month after my release, and before the commencement of the national democratic revolution and freedom fight of Hungary. During these months I met a lot of soldiers and other people with whom I was in connection before my arrest.

A lot of high-ranking soldiers considered something will happen, and being opportunists, began to advise me and give me a lot of information about the army, and I talked to two persons who partook

in these military maneuvers. It is the source wherefrom I know anything about it.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, General.

Now, you have prepared a statement, have you not, General?

General KIRALY. Yes, I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Johnston, the witness has prepared a summation. It will take about 30 minutes, 35 minutes, to read it, and I wonder if we might receive this statement of his case as facts to be known by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

Senator JOHNSTON. I think it would be well for you to give that to the committee. Go ahead and read it.

General KIRALY. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen of the Senate, Judge Robert Morris, I am deeply thankful for this committee's interest in the true nature of the Hungarian national democratic revolution and in the welfare of the freedom fighters.

It is a great event in my life to be meeting with this high body of the United States Congress. We consider the United States Congress always the real embodiment and representation of the ideals of America's people. Just these ideals and their realization were what we wanted to establish in Hungary during our national democratic revolution and freedom fight.

We know that the American Declaration of Independence in 1776 was the very first event in the history of humanity where the assurance of human rights was codified and, with it, the age of modern democracy commenced. Since this day the Congress of the United States of America has, fully and without any breach, represented the real and sincere democracy and the highest ideals of humanity. Just, therefore, all the people of the globe who like liberty look with sympathy, honor, and trust toward this high body in which I am appearing.

Therefore, I feel myself compelled to tell you whatever I know about the Hungarian national democratic revolution and freedom fight in order to add data for you. Because we Hungarians are aware of and proud of your interest in our case, I know you already know a lot about our freedom fight.

As a soldier, I shall try to limit myself to those important events which have tragically influenced the outcome of the Hungarian revolution and war of independence.

I do not think it necessary to tell you in detail what happened in my country, because you know very well that the Hungarian people made a desperate effort to shake off the rule of a foreign power.

The people had no constitutions, democratic way of bringing about a change, because the regime imposed on them was a so-called "dictatorship of the proletariat"—a one-party system, police terror, and Communist government. Every free expression of public opinion, the organization of parties, and all forms of free assembly were not only forbidden but punished by heavy penalties.

In the darkest times of this Communist terror, in the years when Stalin's Hungarian proconsul Matyas Rakosi ruled, even the Communists' own comrades were not trusted, and one after another they were liquidated.

Together with many other Hungarian patriots, I was jailed and condemned to death. I was freed from prison by that revolutionary

atmosphere which pervaded the Hungarian people long before the outbreak of the armed struggle, and before which Communist power finally had to retreat.

The armed revolution which broke out on October 23 brought down the Communist state power, and revealed the true sentiments and demands of the Hungarian people. The demands of the spontaneously-formed revolutionary councils, point by point, prove that the movement was democratic, and that both the Communists and the Russians for a short time recognized its national and democratic character.

1. THE RUSSIAN INTERVENTION

Hungary was occupied by Russian troops for two reasons: (1) to assure Communist rule, and (2) in the event of an attack on Western Europe, Hungary would serve as an advance Soviet base.

The argument brought up before the United Nations by the Soviet Union was that the Hungarian government had called for Russian military intervention to restore order. The Hungarian Government presumably had a right to do so, and the Soviet Union therefore only fulfilled its obligations under the Warsaw Pact when it crushed the revolution.

I should like to ask the question: whether this statement is true or not; and immediately I give the answer—No, it is not.

I would like to quote two sources on the intervention of Soviet troops. The first is the announcement made over Radio Kossuth, Budapest, on October 24 at 0900. This declaration is as follows:

* * * In accordance with the terms of the Warsaw Pact, the (Hungarian) government applied for help to Soviet formations stationed in Hungary. In compliance with the government's request, these Soviet formations are taking part in the restoration of order.

A similar report was published in Pravda (official organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and in Izvestia (official organ of the Soviet Government) on October 24, on page four in both papers.

At the moment radio Kossuth was announcing that Russian troops had been called in, the Prime Minister of Hungary was Imre Nagy. Actually, however, he was not yet Prime Minister when the agreement was made between the Hungarian and Soviet Governments. On October 29 in a new publication, Egyetemi Ipjubag (University Youth), an article explained the fact, as follows:

The Soviet troops were called in by Andras Hegedus, former Prime Minister, on Tuesday (October 23) night. He said so himself to the writers' delegation
 * * * Imre Nagy was fooled and outwitted by the Gero clique which gave orders in his name and behind his back.

This fact was subsequently acknowledged by Imre Nagy himself in an interview recorded on October 31 for radio Vienna. He said then:

It was not I—

said Imre Nagy—

that much I can say. I was not Prime Minister at that time. I was not a member of the central committee of the party.

In contradiction to the broadcast and the reported announcement, I must state that on October 23, at 1 p. m., Erno Gero, first secretary of the Communist Party of Hungary, applied for Russian military aid, but this measure was kept secret.

As is known, on this day the students of Budapest planned to stage a demonstration of sympathy for the bloodless Polish national democratic revolution. This event had such an effect on the Hungarian people that Gero and his friends, frightened of the consequences, instructed the Minister of the Interior not to permit the demonstration.

This was announced on the state-controlled Budapest radio at 12:57 p. m. At 1:23 [the ban was] repealed. There was nothing else to be done, because by that time the streets of Budapest were flooded with young people, students, and workmen, and the demonstration could not be stopped.

Gero had obviously acted out of panic, and at his request a Russian armored division stationed in Transdanubia started out for Budapest at 4 p. m. The division arrived in the vicinity of Budapest in the late evening, and intervened in the fighting during the early morning hours of October 24.

In those states which go by the name of proletarian dictatorships, the Communist Party has priority over the government both constitutionally and functionally. And consequently the first secretary of the party has more power than the prime minister. However, the text of the Warsaw Pact is negotiated not between Communist parties but between the governments, and even the radio Budapest announcement of October 24 and the Pravda and Izvestia reports of October 25 uses the term "Hungarian Government," and not party. Nevertheless, it was not the Hungarian Government which called in Russian troops, but the first party secretary, Erno Gero, who is a well-known MVD agent.

Let me be allowed to stop here a while and tell something about this man, who called in the Russian troops to break down the Hungarian people's struggle for freedom. This man, Erno Gero, was arrested in Hungary on 1922 and sentenced to 14 years in prison for publishing a Communist newspaper. Two and one-half years later he was released and permitted to go to the Soviet Union as an exchange political prisoner.

Thereafter, he was variously in the U. S. S. R. in 1939 and remained there until 1944 at which time he reentered Hungary with the Red army. He served on the Comintern during the thirties. He spent some time in France carrying on organizational work in the French Communist Party. According to Le Figaro, September 16, 1949:

Gero has played for many years a very important behind-the-scenes role for the GPU. * * * He is Agent No. 1 of the MVD now. * * * During the civil war in Spain he was in control of all Soviet party activities in Spain. * * * After his return to the U. S. S. R. in 1939, he became secretary to Manuilsky (a Comintern official).

This was the article in Le Figaro, and was signed "XXX."

Le Monde carried a series of articles in December of 1949 and January of 1950 which were signed by Enrique Castro Delgado, formerly a member of the central committee of the Spanish Communist Party and later a Comintern official in Moscow, and which substantiate the above-cited article in Le Figaro except that Delgado said that Gero was secretary to Dimitrov himself.

In the Delgado article, it is said that Gero controlled the activities of the Hungarian Government on behalf of the Soviet secret police (MVD) in his inconspicuous early role as Minister of Transport and Communications in the postwar Hungarian Government.

According to "Newsletter From Behind the Iron Curtain" in "Stockholm" issue of October 28, 1949, Gero was the top MVD agent in Hungary at the time of the Rajk trial and accepted Soviet citizenship during the 1930's. This information seems to bear out the facts given by Delgado and "XXX" in the two French newspapers cited. It is this man who called in the Russian troops during our freedom fight in Hungary.

I must also point out the fact that the Russians took part in the Budapest fighting prior to that October 24 official announcement calling for their intervention. Even more important is the fact that even under the broadest interpretation of the terms of the Warsaw Pact, the units of the Red army stationed in Hungary could not legally be used for the purposes of putting down a Hungarian revolution. Article 8 of the Warsaw Pact, signed on May 14, 1955, reads as follows:

The contracting parties declare that they * * * will be guided by principles of mutual respect, independence, and sovereignty, and will not interfere in each other's internal affairs.

Under the pact, all parties must be consulted immediately in "the case of armed aggression":

The parties to the treaty will immediately consult each other in order to take joint measures necessary to establish and preserve international peace and security (par. 2, art. 4).

In accordance with the correct interpretation of the Warsaw Pact, the agreement between the Soviet and Hungarian Governments did not furnish sufficient basis for using Russian troops in Hungary. The political consultative committee should have been convened, and only after all of the parties had given their approval could military action have legally begun.

The fact that the Russian military intervention was illegal becomes even clearer from the text of the Soviet Government's declarations issued on October 30 and published on the front pages of the October 31 issues of Pravda and Izvestia. I quote the relevant passage verbatim:

* * * The Soviet Government proceeds from the general principle that stationing the troops of one or another state, which is a member of the Warsaw Treaty, on the territory of another state which is a member of the treaty, is done by agreement among all its members and only with the consent of the state on whose territory and at whose request these troops are stationed, or where it is planned to station them.

Second, the measures put into effect (in this case the military intervention into the internal affairs of Hungary) must be halted when the case is taken before the U. N.

Paragraph 4, article 4, provides:

These measures will be stopped as soon as the Security Council takes the necessary measures for establishing and preserving international peace and security.

The Soviet Union itself felt the action to be unjustifiable and, in the Government declaration of October 30, virtually assured the Hungarian Government of the right to veto the presence of Soviet troops:

Having in mind that the further presence of Soviet military units in Hungary could serve as an excuse for further aggravation of the situation, the Soviet Government has given its military command instructions to withdraw the Soviet

military units from the city of Budapest as soon as this is considered necessary by the Hungarian Government.

At the same time, the Soviet Government is prepared to enter into the appropriate negotiations with the government of the Hungarian People's Republic and other members of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary.

The legal Prime Minister was then Imre Nagy, who on October 25, at 3:25 p. m., announced over radio Budapest:

As Prime Minister I wish to announce that the Hungarian Government will begin talks with the Soviet Union concerning the relations between the Hungarian People's Republic and the Soviet Union and, among other things, concerning the withdrawal of Soviet forces stationed in Hungary.

On October 28, at 7 p. m., Imre Nagy announced an armistice over radio Budapest, as follows:

The Hungarian Government has come to an agreement with the Soviet Government whereby Soviet forces shall withdraw immediately from Budapest, and simultaneously with the formation of our new army shall evacuate the city.

On November 1, the Nagy government announced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and the neutrality of Hungary, and also asked the United Nations to put the Hungarian issue on its agenda.

First official word that the situation in Hungary was being brought to the attention of the United Nations came on the afternoon of Saturday, October 27, 1956.

Three permanent members of the Security Council—France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—asked for an urgent meeting pursuant to article 34 of the United Nations Charter, which empowers the Council "to investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction, or give rise to a dispute" to determine whether its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

On the basis of the above-mentioned facts, not even using its own arguments, can the Soviet Union justify its military intervention in Hungary? Actually, a state of war existed between two countries, and this fact should have been handled accordingly.

Mr. MORRIS. The point you make, there is actually—there is now a state of war between Hungary and the Soviet Union?

General KIRALY. It was a state of war between two states.

Mr. MORRIS. And the evidence, you contend—

General KIRALY. I beg your pardon?

Mr. MORRIS. And you have now just set forth the conclusion that there is a state of war existing now between Hungary and the Soviet Union?

General KIRALY. The consequence was that a great power having about 200 million inhabitants attacked a little country having only about 10 million inhabitants. War between two such sort of countries is, without any question, settled in the first minute.

This real war has been finished with a complete annihilation of the freedom fighters of Hungary. And, of course, it was the victory of this Soviet army, if such an action may be mentioned with this word victory. They subdued us completely, and it was entirely clear at the first day when they used this big army unit in Hungary.

The charge of counterrevolution: Because the Russians and the Hungarian Communists could not use the Warsaw Pact as a basis

for effective argument, they branded the Hungarian revolution as a counterrevolution and a Fascist plot. Obviously, their reason for doing this was so that they could use certain provisions of the peace treaty as excuses for their brutal and massive intervention.

Article 4 of section 1, part 11, of the treaty of peace with Hungary, dated February 10, 1947, Paris, reads as follows:

Hungary, in accordance with armistice agreement, has taken measures to dissolve all organizations of a Fascist type existing on Hungarian territory, whether political, military or paramilitary, as well as other organizations conducting propaganda, including revisionist propaganda, hostile to the United Nations, and shall not in future permit the existence and activities of such organizations, whose aim is to deny the people their democratic rights.

An examination of the program, the action and the personnel of the revolutionary forces in the Hungarian uprising follows, and more than demonstrates how distorted an interpretation of this paragraph of the peace treaty was invoked to impute a nonexistent Fascist and counterrevolutionary character to the Hungarian patriots.

The resolution of the October 22 meeting of the students of the Builders' Technical University is evidence of the fact that the Hungarian Revolution was national and democratic and never went beyond such sort of goals. This resolution, containing 16 demands, has now become a historic document. It was scheduled for broadcast by radio Budapest on the day following its proclamation, October 23. When the students were denied the right to have it broadcast, demonstrators clashed with police and the demonstration turned into a revolution.

Every demand formulated by the university students on October 22-23, and later from October 25 on, stressed—

perfect equality in relations between the Soviet Union and Hungary, and restoration of the principle of noninterference in internal affairs between the two countries.

Every demand, from October 22 to the very end, emphasized the sovereignty and independence of the country. Certain of the demands—for example those made in Miskole on October 31—urged the declaration of the country's neutrality. Between October 28 and 31, a number of radio stations mentioned Austria and Switzerland as examples of such neutral states. On October 31 the Miskole Workers Council demanded:

That our fatherland become a member of the Danube Confederation as planned by Kossuth a century ago.

From October 25 on, until the end, radio Kossuth and stations throughout the Hungarian countryside demanded "free and secret elections." On October 28, for example, every radio station, without a single exception, stressed this demand repeatedly.

A recurring demand throughout the whole period was for "establishment of a multiparty system."

On October 28 radio Kossuth and the Miskole and Gyor stations demanded:

The reestablishment and freedom of activity of all those parties which existed in 1945.

The various revolutionary councils and broadcasting stations continually demanded that:

The Government grant full freedom of the press, of assembly, and of religion.

For example, the Szatmar County Workers' Council declared on October 31:

Our aims include respect for human rights, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, the right of assembly, and the right to strike.

The revolutionary party of Hungarian youth, in a proclamation issued on November 2, voiced the following five demands:

1. Full independence and neutrality of our homeland;
2. Political freedom, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion;
3. Discontinuance of the class struggle;
4. Raising of the living standard of our people; and
5. Preservation of the results achieved by the national democratic revolution.

The various committees and broadcasting stations continuously demanded a revision of the security organs. Can the demand for revision of a system responsible for the organized torture of human beings be classified as a Fascist demand, particularly when precisely this method of torture is characteristic of the Fascist system?

The claims voiced by the students, as well as the economic demands made between October 23 and 28 included:

Revision of the planned economy, revision of industrial workers' norms and wages, introduction of a workers' autonomy in the plants, reform of agriculture, and support of individual peasant farmers.

Let me finally quote the resolution of the Revolutionary Committee of the Forces of Public Order—my own military organization—broadcast by Radio Free Kossuth on Saturday, November 3, 1956, at 2:25 p. m.:

The committee supports our country's independence and neutrality. We shall resist all aggression directed against our independence and neutrality, pending free, democratic elections, we shall help to preserve order with all our strength.

Since strikes cause serious harm to our country's defense potential, we recommend that the strike be ended and organized work begun, with the proviso that national-guard formations keep their weapons nearby even while working, so that in case of aggression, they can be ready for immediate battle against the aggressors.

As of today, persons belonging neither to the army nor to the police are permitted to carry arms only if they belong to the national guard. Persons belonging neither to the army, the police, nor the national guard will be disarmed by us in the interests of the consolidation of peace and order.

I conclude and emphasize from the foregoing that never and nowhere did the revolution show counterrevolutionary tendencies, proclaim a counterrevolutionary program, or voice such sort of claims.

III. Russian tactics and cover negotiations to conceal their real intentions and the second Russian aggression.

The changing Russian views were finally resolved during the negotiations with the Hungarian Government on the withdrawal of troops and recognition of Hungary's independence. Suslov and Mikoyan, both "experts" on satellite politics, arrived in Budapest to begin negotiations as early as October 24. It was they who effected the changes of personnel within the Communist Party, e. g., the replacement of First Secretary Erno Gero with Janos Kadar, the present Prime Minister. In the final phase of the revolution they discussed withdrawal of Russian troops with Communist and non-Communist politicians—Zoltan Tildy, for example.

The chronology of the Russian troop withdrawal negotiations is as follows: On October 25 and 28: Nagy announces negotiations between

the Hungarian Government and the Soviet Union, during which, among other questions, the withdrawal of Soviet troops would be discussed.

October 31: Nagy requests the Soviet Government to state the time and place for negotiations between all parties to the Warsaw Pact regarding withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, in the light of the Soviet statement of October 30 on relations between the Soviet Union and other Socialist states.

Meanwhile, on October 28, 29, 30, and 31, radio Budapest announced that agreement had been reached on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest. Between October 29 and 31, further announcements on the withdrawal of Soviet troops has been made. It was announced that October 31 had been agreed on as the final date for withdrawal from Budapest.

November 1: Nagy demands of the Soviet Ambassador to Hungary that Soviet troops newly arrived from the Soviet Union be immediately withdrawn, gives notice of the termination of Hungarian adherence to the Warsaw Pact, and declares Hungary's neutrality. Nagy informs the Secretary General of the United Nations of these actions, and requests that the question of Hungarian neutrality be placed on the agenda of the United Nations General assembly.

November 2: The Hungarian Government delivers further protests to the Soviet Ambassador to Hungary, and another communication is sent to the United Nations' Secretary General.

November 3: A joint committee of Soviet military leaders and representatives of the Hungarian Government meets in the Budapest Parliament buildings. Radio Budapest announces that the Soviet delegation has promised that no more Soviet troops would cross Hungarian frontiers.

The Russian negotiations served as a cover for the concentration of larger Soviet forces. This Soviet action was necessary because the troops on the spot did not prove strong enough to put down the revolution, the democratic revolution and freedom fighters. While negotiations were being conducted on all levels, and delegations received, combat-ready divisions were being brought into the country. The soldiers in these divisions believed that they were being sent to fight in Egypt or in Western Europe.

Let me be allowed to tell some details about these Russian tricks out of my own experiences to show how treacherous the Russians were. Early in the forenoon of November 2, I got an agitated call from Nagy, Prime Minister of Hungary, himself. He said, "If anyone ever had an important job, you have one now."

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, Nagy called you personally and told you that, in an agitated voice, you now have an important mission?

General KIRALY. Yes, it was Nagy, the Prime Minister of Hungary who called me, by means of the phone.

I have a formal note from the Russian Ambassador. He says bands of Hungarians are raging around his Embassy. If the Hungarian Government cannot control them he, as Ambassador, will be obliged to call in Russian troops. I think you understand the seriousness of this demand—

Nagy told me:

If we cannot maintain order, we will offer an opportunity for a second Russian aggression. Go there yourself.

I ordered a tank company to proceed immediately to the Square of Heroes which was near the Embassy, and sent a mechanized infantry battalion to join them there. Then I rushed to the Embassy.

When I got there the streets were empty and there was no sign of trouble. I went to the office of Ambassador Yuri Andropov. "I have a command from my Premier to check the rioting here," I said, "but I see no rioting," I said to the Russian Ambassador.

The Ambassador appeared embarrassed. He said there had been reports of trouble, but it had stopped. "We Russians don't want to mix in your business," he said. "We understand your troubles and we are on your side," the Ambassador told me.

"Did you know that we have offered to negotiate with your Government? Our Government wants to take its troops out of Hungary immediately, and we want a discussion to arrange the details of the evacuation," the Russian Ambassador told me, himself.

These negotiations were commenced at noon November 3 in the Hungarian Parliament with all the laws and habits of an international negotiation. The members of the Hungarian delegation were in every respect fully credited diplomatic envoys. Nevertheless, they were arrested on the night of November 3 by the Russians.

At 6 o'clock November 3, after the first part of the negotiation with the Russians, I met General Kovacs, the army chief of staff who was a member of the Hungarian delegation. He told me—

It is practically agreed. We agreed, first, Russia will evacuate all her armed forces from Hungary. Second, to avoid disrupting transportation, the Russians want to leave by degrees. A committee of experts will be set up to arrange a timetable for the evacuation. Third, the Hungarian garrisons must cease denying the Russians food and fuel. Fourth, the Russians are not prepared for a winter movement in Hungary and Hungary must be patient; the troops will not be able to leave until January 15. Lastly, they say the Russian Army did not wish to attack the Hungarians but only did what the Hungarian Government asked. Therefore the evacuation must be not only peaceful but friendly. The troops must leave in a festive air and the Hungarians must cheer them as they leave.

Mr. MORRIS. They must even achieve a festive atmosphere when they do it?

General KIRALY. In effect, said General Kovacs, the committee had agreed to all the Russian demands, even the friendly farewell, but insisted that departure date be stepped up by a month. The meeting was to be continued that night at 9 p. m. at the Russian military headquarters at Tokol, on Csepel Island.

All this was a fantastic farce and a striking demonstration of the Russian love for theatrics with their treachery. At this very moment her armored divisions were forming two operational bases on the main highway from Miskolc to Budapest, here, there, Miskolc, Budapest. These two armored groups were formed at this time. And along the main communication line between Budapest and Szeged, establishing a vast frontline fighting force of combat-ready troops and a horde of 4,000 tanks. Yet, as late as 11 o'clock on the night of the 3d, the Russians, negotiating with the committee on Csepel Island, suggested Maletz call me and say that everything was in good order. This he did. We both believed it.

At about midnight we began to get reports from all over the country that Russian troops were on the move on all our highways. Tanks had shot up the barracks at Kiskunhalas and captured the sleeping troops here [indicating on chart].

Russian tanks streamed into the city. They moved to the Kilian Barracks and the Corvin Theater, two main freedom-fighter strong points, and started shelling. I grabbed my direct phone to the premier. It was about 4 a. m. I told him the city was being invaded and begged for orders to open fire. But the elaborate Russian "negotiations" now proved their value. "No," Nagy said, "calm down. The Russian Ambassador is here in my own office. He is calling Moscow right now. There is some misunderstanding. You must not open fire."

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, even then when the Russian mobilized division is moved in, still Nagy said, "The Ambassador is here with me—he is trying to get Russia on the phone—there must be a mistake, don't fire"?

General KIRALY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And you believe that Premier Nagy, believing that these negotiations were in good faith, simply paralyzed his own forces?

General KIRALY. Precisely.

I hung up, bewildered. Suddenly I heard the sound of firing near my headquarters. I phoned again.

"You can hear them. They are firing." I told the Premier. "You can hear the sound yourself. We must return the fire. Please give me orders."

"Your job is to obey orders and not to make decisions," said Nagy. As a soldier I was not empowered to commit my country to war. Ten minutes later I heard the clatter of tank treads in the streets. I saw a Russian column approaching our building. Their lights were on, their hatches closed. I called Nagy again. "Tanks are passing under my window," I said insistently. "They are not attacking us, but they are turning toward your building, toward the Parliament Building."

"Thank you very much," he said, "I will need no further reports from you."

About a half hour later I heard him on the radio.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, this is Nagy?

General KIRALY. Nagy's declaration on the radio.

In the early hours of this morning—

his voice said—

Soviet troops launched an attack against our capital with the obvious intention of overthrowing the legal, democratic, Hungarian Government. Our troops are fighting.

The nation was at war.

This second Russian aggression was an open war against Hungary, and we fought our freedom fight for our liberty, human rights, and our independence.

We did our best to defend our democratic system which we achieved subduing the Communist dictators and their hated armed forces, the security police. We commenced—with pure and high enthusiasm—to build up a political, social, and economic system like yours by the means of which we wanted to make the Hungarian people free and happy.

Our national democratic movements were victorious, and the week of this victory was one of the most worthy of our whole history. These honest efforts and real results have been trampled down by a foreign power, by the Russian Red army. Fighting against these brute

aggressors, we fought for the honesty of all humanity. Thus, our efforts were not a separate Hungarian problem, but in the cause of the entire humanity.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you finished with that statement, General?

General KIRALY. I finished the first part.

Mr. MORRIS. May I ask a few questions?

General KIRALY. Please.

Mr. MORRIS. It is apparent, then, that, in connection with any negotiations that the free nations had been carrying on with the Soviet Union, they can always assume that those negotiations were fraudulent. Would it not appear so on the basis of that statement you have just read?

General KIRALY. Completely agreed.

Mr. MORRIS. Here what happened is, the Soviet Ambassador made representations that there was going to be a peaceful withdrawal, and while you people were relying on the word of the Soviet Ambassador representing the views of Moscow—and even at the last minute, even then, you did not want to open fire against them because you thought they were going to live up to their obligations?

General KIRALY. To issue orders to open fire, when a real danger of an open war is present, it is the decision of the government and not a high military man.

Mr. MORRIS. And the government who relies on those assertions of the Soviet Union is on very hazardous grounds, is it not?

General KIRALY. A human being is unable to think that all these are treacherous things, you know, when diplomatically, in every respect, it was a completely rightful and legal negotiation. When the highest representatives of the Russian Army and the Russian diplomatic service are honestly and smilingly declaring that nothing is happening; you know, even those who lived during the last decade during the Russian oppression may not believe that such cheats—what cheating may come out of the mouth of a human being, you know.

Mr. MORRIS. There are just a few other things I want to ask you. You are sure that in Fiume—that is on the eastern base of the Istrian Peninsula, and Trieste is on the northwestern base?

General KIRALY. Here is Fiume and here is Trieste.

Mr. MORRIS. And in between that is the Istrian Peninsula?

General KIRALY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Trieste, that is internationalized, whereas Fiume is part of Yugoslavia?

General KIRALY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. So this drive was really against Yugoslavia?

General KIRALY. This place [indicating] is so important that it may not be considered as a separate attack against Yugoslavia. If you see this arrow on this map, wherever this is leading, to the heart, so to say, of Europe, you know, in the European territory, if you see it, it only leads toward Yugoslavia territory, but, in general, it means not an attack only against Yugoslavia. It means that they broke through this strategic gate to have an opportunity to invade northern Italy and, through it, of course, the southern part of France. The ancient strategical line; Caesar, himself, led on that line. Napoleon led his campaigns against even central Europe—it is an ancient and always used strategical line, and it does not mean an attack only against

Yugoslavia. It means a great offensive on the ancient strategical lines, which are not to be changed even in modern strategy.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the Albanian forces take part in these war games?

General KIRALY. I do not know. They did not mention to me anything about Albania.

Mr. MORRIS. The ones you participated in, was the Albanian general staff there?

General KIRALY. No, no.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean, Albania has remained loyal throughout to the Soviet Union?

General KIRALY. Of course, of course.

Mr. MORRIS. It, in itself, is in a very strategic position in the Adriatic?

General KIRALY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. It is right in the Adriatic and it appears right at the heel of the boot of Italy?

General KIRALY. Yes; it is a gate of the Adriatic and, therefore, a very important place. And I think so, the Russians count it as an airplane carrier and control base of the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, but I have no information about whether or not they also were present in this maneuver or not.

Mr. MORRIS. General Kiraly, when you were arrested on August 17, 1951, what were the charges against you?

General KIRALY. Against me, that I was an American spy and conspirator; it was the common charge against anybody who they wanted to execute or send to prison.

Mr. MORRIS. And actually, you were not?

General KIRALY. Of course not.

Mr. MORRIS. In this conference that General Zhukov had after the last war, where you say that he wanted to stress the lack of mechanization and the lack of nuclear weapons on the part of the Soviet forces?

General KIRALY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did he disclose that to the satellite military people?

General KIRALY. Because it was not hidden in front of the satellite people because the satellite armies were completely organized according to the Russian system.

Mr. MORRIS. By the same token, he was also criticizing the satellites?

General KIRALY. Of course, it was a program not only for the Russian army, but for the satellite armies, too, the satellite generals and chiefs of staff and ministers to make the effort to mechanize the satellite armies.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything more about General Zhukov that you can tell us; about his attitude toward the West or military prowess, or anything like that? Anything more that you can tell us about General Zhukov?

General KIRALY. General Zhukov?

Mr. MORRIS. What role did he have during the Hungarian uprising?

General KIRALY. He was the commandant in chief of all the Russian forces; therefore, whatever happened in Hungary, he is completely accountable, as every commander in chief is accountable for whatever soldiers are making. Whatever brutality, whatever terror has been

carried out in great abundance—all high military leaders, including Marshal Zhukov, himself, are accountable for that.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether he was personally in Hungary at any time?

General KIRALY. I do not know.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, with respect to this next paper, General—Hungary, a Base of Aggression for the Soviet Union.

General KIRALY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. This is what you took up before the United Nations?

General KIRALY. Not completely. Some details are in it—generally this is what I told them there, of course.

Mr. MORRIS. May I make a suggestion, General? May I suggest that I just read the first paragraph here:

From 1948 to 1956 the Soviet Union has built up Hungary as a base of aggression against the West. At the same time the Soviet Union saw to it that the Hungarian armed forces remain dependent, incapable of undertaking any action of their own; that they remain completely defenseless as opposed to the Soviet military mechanism, and at the same time, a suitable means for aggression against the West, under Soviet leadership.

The above can be proven by the following facts—

and then you go forth and give your evidence to support that particular conclusion, is that right?

General KIRALY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I was wondering, General, if we may just put it into the record at this point as it is now?

General KIRALY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You tell us now that it is adducing your reasons and your supporting facts to your conclusions which I have just read?

General KIRALY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. May we just put it into the record at this time and then you will not have to read it, General?

General KIRALY. Fine.

(The section of General Kiraly's statement: "Hungary, Base of Aggression for the Soviet Union," reads in full as follows:)

From 1948 to 1956 the Soviet Union has built up Hungary as a base of aggression against the West. At the same time the Soviet Union saw to it that the Hungarian armed forces remain dependent, incapable of undertaking any action of their own; that they remain completely defenseless as opposed to the Soviet military mechanism and, at the same time, a suitable means for aggression against the West, under Soviet leadership.

The above can be proven by the following facts:

1. The number and the equipment of the Hungarian Army was determined by the Paris Peace Treaty after World War II. Accordingly Hungary was entitled to dispose of a land army of 65,000 and of an air force of 5,000 men. Hungary was allowed to own 90 fighter planes, including the reserve planes, but bombers were prohibited. In spite of these peace treaty stipulations, from late 1948 on the Soviet regime started to organize a Hungarian Army, which was far larger in peace footing and which was equipped with weapons prohibited by the treaty.

The total strength of these forces amounted to 250,000 men (about 3½ times the amount allowed). This figure, however, does not include the numerous reserves which usually are trained with already functioning regiments. The continuing formation of new units suggested that the strength of the standing army was to be increased.

The air force consisted of 1 air fighter division, 6 single echelons, amounting to 1 regiment with 120 planes, 1 air regiment with only 50 planes and 1 fighter bomber regiment with 37 planes. In 1956 the true strength of the air fighter division certainly exceeded 500 planes.

The feverish modernization of airfields and the speedy construction of numerous new military airfields indicated that the Russians intended to use Hungarian territory as a military airbase against the West.

2. Not only the development of the army was being furthered, but great care was also given to the militarization of the whole country, to the training of the youth, to military and paramilitary training, to the military training at the universities, and MOHOSZ organizations (Hungarian partisan organization), etc.

3. The reconstruction of the army on a Communist basis required that leading military personalities be replaced by persons who were considered trustworthy by the Soviets. This process started in November 1948. The top posts of the army were manned by party members, uneducated from the military point of view, and, at the same time the liquidation of the commanding officers, who had been members of the former army, began.

It goes without saying that given such a supreme military command, the Soviet military advisers assigned to the commanders of the Hungarian Army were the true leaders in power.

4. The first Soviet military advisers arrived in Hungary in late 1948. The Ministry for National Defense and shortly afterward the army corps, the divisions, regiments and also the higher units of the military services, the central organs, officer schools and military academies, were all staffed by a horde of Soviet military advisers.

An example of the extent to which the invasion of Russian advisers and their control over the Hungarian Army had grown: On August 17, 1951, when I was arrested and sentenced to death, the Honved Academy (of which I had been in command) was controlled by Nikolai Voloshin, colonel of the general staff. The academy also had 13 Russian general staff colonels acting as "advisers." This unbelievably high number meant that every single action of the organization was directed by them and that the real commander—myself in this case—had to be sentenced to death, because I had my own independent opinion characteristic of the Hungarian Nation.

It was the task of the advisers—and this task was fully achieved by them—to transform the Hungarian Army as completely as possible according to Soviet standards, to establish the Soviet system of training, to teach the principles of Soviet tactics and military operations, and to rob the Hungarian Army of its national characteristics.

5. As the chief period of development of the army coincided with the anti-Yugoslav campaign of the Cominform, the Hungarian Army—as one of the instruments of Soviet power politics in its territorial structure, in the distribution of garrisons, as well as in political attitude—had been organized according to requirements of an attack against Yugoslavia in the first place, and against Austria in the second.

Maneuvers and the war games, which were joined by higher units and organized by the general staff of the armies for the high command, always reveal the real aims of an army. The war games, arranged in January 1951 in Budapest, at the Hungarian Officer's Club and directed by Soviet Lieutenant General Bojko, were attended by Mihaly Farkas and I, too, was present. Mihaly Farkas, then Minister for National Defense, declared that the week-long study was based on an actual operational plan of the Soviet and the Hungarian supreme command.

The objectives; an attack launched from between the rivers Danube and Tisza against Yugoslavia; occupation of the towns Szabadka (Subotica) and Ujvidek (Novi Sad); crossing the Danube, occupying of the mountain range Fruska-Gora (in Yugoslavia); and holding the territory for a further invasion of larger Soviet forces.

The theme of the war game arranged for an army group in February and March 1953, under the leadership of Mihaly Farkas, Minister for National Defense, was an operation for occupying a coastal sector near Rijeka (Fiume). The Hungarian Army, pushing ahead through the so-called Ljubljana gate, thus was to create a breach for the masses of the Soviet Army and a large-scale invasion of the West.

The same picture of an attack against the West was given in the years 1951 1952, and 1953 in the areas bordering on the southern Hungarian frontier, which was largely fortified. The building of these fortifications meant an excessive financial strain for the Hungarian people.

6. In order to supply the army with weapons, and also to increase the war potential of the Eastern bloc, the Soviet command, from 1948 on, tried to resurrect and expand the then extinct war industry. Hungarian war industry produced almost exclusively on the basis of permits, issued at a high price by the Soviet Union. Establishing a Hungarian war industry also meant decentralization of the Soviet's own war industry.

The Hungarian war industry authorized the manufacture first of infantry weapons and ammunition, and later, artillery weapons, military vehicles, communication instruments and technical equipment, for the Hungarian Army to begin with. Later still, its capacity was expanded to include supplies for the armies of other Soviet satellite countries. For instance, Hungarian tanks were delivered to Bulgaria, as well as a great amount of war equipment to North Korea.

The rapid and significant deterioration of the living standard of the Hungarian population between 1950 and 1953 was partly due to Rakosi's heavy industrial investment program. As is well-known, heavy industry serves as a basis for direct and indirect expansion of war industry. Neither was in proportion to the country's economic capacities.

7. All railroads serving military operations were greatly improved—the Budapest-Zahony line, for example. This included the loading facilities. Similar to the situation on the railroads, the highway system too had been built up according to military interests. During recent years, while secondary road systems of the counties had been neglected, main trunk routes in the main North-South and East-West strategic directions had been built according to the most modern standards.

8. Airfields capable of serving jet planes are part of the system of the attack bases in Hungary. Existing airfields were modernized and developed to this purpose and new airfields established. Such are the airfields of Taszar, Papa, Tokol, etc.

V. THE ARMY, NEVERTHELESS, IS NO DOCILE INSTRUMENT IN THE HANDS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP

In spite of the fact that the army had been developed and trained from its beginning according to the interests of the Soviet leaders, and in spite of the fact that only commanders trained in Soviet military schools were admitted to leading positions, that the whole army was constantly under the ideological direction of the Communist Party and under the strictest control of the AVH, the October Revolution in Hungary has proven that the Hungarian Army was far from being a body functioning automatically, and unthinkingly, a tool in the hands of the Soviets and the Muscovite Hungarian leadership, a formation suitable for breaking down the people's fight for freedom.

1. The military high command, which was considered by the Soviets to be trustworthy, was composed of individuals who had been either in the prewar Communist underground, and who returned to Hungary after training in Moscow after the war. This military leadership was widely separated from the small units, and even from the somewhat larger ones, which exaggerated the innate opposition between the leadership and the rank and file. The leadership did not understand the true spirit of the army, nor did it know its striking power. The younger officers, who had been with the troops, could not and did not disassociate themselves from the temper, both political and economic, which characterized the whole population.

2. These were the conditions which confronted the general staff, when it summoned the army groups into battle to suppress the revolt, and found that with few exceptions, from the very first moments of fighting, its men refused to use weapons against their people, and began actively to joining them. Thus:

(a) as early as the night of October 23/24, mechanized troops which were sent to the radio station to restore order handed their weapons over to the crowd.

(b) the army men who at first displayed sympathetic neutrality in the early days of the revolt, in increasing numbers joined the freedom fighters.

(c) the army supplied the freedom fighters, when not actually joining them, with weapons, ammunition, uniforms, and food.

(d) two of the Hungarian corps commanders, Major General Mikes /in Szekesfehervar/ and Maj. Gen. Lajos Gyurko /Keescemet/, having given orders to fire on the demonstrators, had to flee to nearby Soviet units for protections from the burning hatred of their own troops.

(e) the Revolutionary Council, formed by career officers and the rank and file of the revolutionary university youth, deposed the following persons: General Bata /Minister of Defense/, Lt General Szabo, Major Gen. Lajos Toth, Major General Hazai and Major General Hidvegi.

(f) the Budapest Zrinyi Military Academy went over as a body to the fighters on October 23 to obey the orders of the defense ministry; the entire antiaircraft division of the Budapest Matyas Barracks went over about October 24, and the entire AAA forces gave orders to open fire on the Soviets on November 4.

On and after November 4, great numbers of the officers and troops took part in the fight against the Russians, individually and in groups. North of Obuda, a battle broke out between Soviet and Hungarian armored units. It can be said that the elite of the Rakoci Officers School and the other officer schools and military academies distinguished themselves in support of the revolution.

3. The events of the Hungarian revolt have shown that the Rakosi-ite military high command made it impossible for the entire army to have gone over to the people and thus the old Rakosi military leadership remained. Accordingly, the revolution created its own revolutionary defense committee as a counterbalance. The task of this committee was to direct the military leadership and hasten the de-Rakosization, which it had nearly completed by November 4, but some anti-revolutionary Rakosi elements remained in the leadership, forming a fifth column. Beside the Army and the police, as opposed to the AVH, [the revolution tried to form its own trustworthy army, within the framework of a national guard, drawing on the university revolutionary units and the new factory militias. In course of the revolt, more and more organized units, including army units, joined with the national guard. Thus, had there been no Soviet intervention, the national guard would have developed into a powerful national army.

VI. THE AGGRESSION OF THE SOVIET ARMY

In order to crush the Hungary revolution, the Soviet Army at first used only those troops which it already had stationed on Hungarian soil. But in order to assure a decisive victory, it alerted divisions in Rumania and in the sub-Carpathian Ukraine, some of which it moved into Hungary immediately, for immediate use, and others of which it grouped in positions for use in the infamous stab-in-the-back of the early morning hours of November 4.

In the early days of the revolutions, Soviet troops failed to accomplish what their leaders had expected of them, that is, to drown the young revolution in blood. Accordingly, Soviet troops temporarily withdrew.

Illustrative of the path taken by Soviet aggression are the following points:

1. Before the revolution, the 2d and 17th mechanized (motorized) divisions were stationed in Hungary, having a strength of about 20,000 men and 600 tanks. The 2d Division was moved into Budapest to quell the mounting revolution, while the 17th Division was moved into western Hungary on an alert basis. The Soviet 32d and 34th mechanized divisions from Rumania were alerted on October 23, and thrown into battle by the 24th (92d Infantry). Simultaneously, the sub-Carpathian and Ukrainian based divisions were alerted and moved into Hungary, battle ready. Various reports reaching the revolutionary general staff indicated that by November 3, the Soviets had 7 divisions and about 2,500 tanks. Of this number on and after November 4, it was possible to identify 6 divisions with 75,000 troops and 2,500 tanks.

2. The conduct of the Soviet elements during the first period of the revolution was characterized by an effort to retreat from their initial failure with a minimum of casualties, to abandon use of forces and to try diplomatic negotiations. On October 28 and 29, a cease-fire was negotiated and proclaimed, and Soviet units withdrew to confined areas, while additional divisions were put in various strategic positions throughout Hungary. The Soviets withdrawing from Budapest were replaced by the Honvedseg and National Guard, and a peaceful, victorious mood took hold of the capital city. However, on November 1 and 2, the aerodromes and supply bases were occupied by Soviet troops. On November 2 and 3, the Soviets began to establish two operational bases on the main highway from Miskolc to Budapest in the area of the Matra-Bukk Mountain Range, and along the main communications lines lying between Budapest and Szeged, around Csongrad-Szentesz and Kiskunhalas and in the dawn of November 4, the second uprising began.

3. Soviet intervention was characterized by its ruthlessness and savagery. It has become a proverb in Budapest that the Russians returned the fire of a lone man equipped with small arms with a barrage of cannonfire. It occurred even after the cessation of mass armed resistance that apartment houses were arbitrarily sprayed with gun and machinegun fire. This manner of fighting was coupled with the deportation of the young male population, and in areas of particularly stubborn resistance, even of older men.

Mr. MORRIS. And you have a little two-page summary you want to read?

General KIRALY. Yes; I would be very glad to read that.

My conclusions: The features and future of the Hungarian national democratic revolution and freedom fighters:

A number of opinions and charges have been made about our movements. I should like to review the facts.

1. The Hungarian people began their national democratic movements on their own account without any foreign initiative. During these movements, the nation—showing a unity never seen before in Hungary's history—subdued its inner enemies, the Communist Party and the secret police; subdued the armed forces of the Soviet aggressors in Budapest during the first aggression; and then were trampled down by superfluous armed forces during the second aggression. The Hungarian nation takes all responsibility for starting the national democratic revolution and freedom fight. However, the Hungarian people—who did not want to start a third world war out of this case, nevertheless hoped that the rest of the free world would help them by carrying out the U. N. resolutions in Hungary. Thus, the Soviet would not be allowed to interfere with the business of a free country which was itself a member of the United Nations.

2. The Hungarian freedom fighters got neither instruction, direction, or any other material help from foreign countries.

3. The movement and freedom fight were national and democratic ones, lacking any Fascist or counterrevolutionary character.

4. The situation was ripe for these events on account of the following causes:

(a) The embitterness of the Hungarian people because of the exploitation and suppression;

(b) The Hungarian people's national pride and conscience;

(c) The Hungarian people's love for the liberty which the country has fought for so many times in her history.

(d) The Hungarian people's sincere hope for a democratic system of life.

The Hungarian people tried all means possible to achieve their purposes by peaceful measures, by evolution. Only when, on October 23, the security police and the Soviet aggressors opened fire against peaceful demonstrators did the evolution turn into a national democratic revolution and freedom fight.

5. The Hungarian people's freedom fight was trampled down, but their wish for freedom is never to be subdued. The people at home and we who left Hungary will continue to work incessantly for the liberation of Hungary. The struggle will not be finished until Hungary has achieved complete freedom.

These are the things I know and believe about Hungary's National Democratic revolution and freedom fight. I am now at your disposal to give you any further details you may wish which I am able to furnish.

Thank you very much.

Mr. MORRIS. General Kiraly, is there anything further that you feel we should know now at this session? Is there anything more you should tell us in addition to what you have just told us?

General KIRALY. I think so—I got together everything that is important to my opinion, but if anything is to be questioned, I would be very glad to answer the questions.

Mr. MORRIS. No, I think—speaking for the chairman who had to leave here, the acting chairman who had to leave here—it is very valuable, what you have told us. It goes a long way toward helping the Senate of the United States and the Congress as a whole, to understand the nature of what went on in Hungary and what is still going on there. And, as I say, it does have a direct bearing on the Communist machinery here in the United States which this subcommittee is supposed to learn all about, because the effects of the revolution in Hungary are so profound and deep that they have caused repercussions in the Communist organizations all over the world and it is a question of our trying to forecast what the future will bring.

So, on behalf of the chairman, Senator Eastland, and on behalf of the acting chairman, Senator Johnston, I want to thank you very much for coming and giving this very enlightening expatiation here today.

(At 12:20 p. m. the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Wednesday, February 20, 1957.)

INDEX

NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the names of an individual or an organization in this index.

A

	Page
AAA forces (in Hungary)-----	3402
Abakumov, Viktor S-----	3377-3379
Adriatic Sea-----	3385, 3399
Albania-----	3399
Albanian forces-----	3399
Allied Forces-----	3353
American Army-----	3387
American Embassy (Budapest)-----	3348
American Embassy in Moscow-----	3379
Andropov, Ambassador Yuri-----	3396
Army Counter Intelligence Service-----	3377
Asia-----	3352, 3360
Asian countries-----	3338
Australia-----	3338
Austria-----	3361, 3364, 3393
AVH (secret police of the army in Hungary)-----	3382, 3402, 3403

B

Bacz-----	3348
Bata, General-----	3402
Beria-----	3378-3380
Bibo, Istvan (Petofi Peasant, Peasant Party)-----	3362
Bojko, Soviet Lieutenant General-----	3401
Bojoao, General Lieutenant [sic]-----	3385
Bolshevism-----	3358
British attaché in Moscow-----	3379
Budapest-----	3334,
	3335, 3346, 3348, 3353, 3356, 3357, 3363, 3370, 3372, 3375, 3376,
	3383, 3389-3392, 3394, 3396, 3401, 3403.
Budapest Matyas Barracks-----	3402
Budapest Parliament buildings-----	3396
Budapest-Zahony line (railroad)-----	3402
Budapest Zrinyi Military Academy-----	3402
Builders' Technical University (in Hungary)-----	3393
Bulgaria-----	3355
Bulgaria-----	3386, 3401

C

Caesar-----	3398
Camp Kilmer-----	3353
Carpathians in Russia-----	3382, 3386
Central Europe-----	3385
Ceylon-----	3338
Cominform-----	3401
Comintern-----	3390
Communism-----	3363, 3388
Communist/s-----	3333, 3338, 3348, 3360, 3362, 3382-3385, 3388, 3389, 3401, 3405
Communist government-----	3388

	Page
Communist Party-----	3361, 3381-3383, 3385, 3402
French-----	3385, 3390
Hungarian-----	3389, 3392
Italian-----	3385
U. S. A.-----	3351, 3381
Communist youth movement in Hungary-----	3383
Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R.-----	3378
Csepel Iron Works-----	3334, 3335
Csepel Island-----	3396
Csolkok-----	3341, 3342
Csongrad-Szentes-----	3403
Czechoslovakia-----	3382, 3385, 3386
Czegle-----	3339

D

Danube Confederation-----	3393
Danube River-----	3384, 3401
Declaration of Independence, American-----	3388
Delgado, Enrique Castro-----	3390, 3391
Denmark-----	3338
Dennis, Eugene-----	3382
de Seynes, Phillippe-----	3368
"Dictatorship of the proletariat"-----	3388
Dudas, Joseph-----	3349, 3360, 3361, 3363, 3364
Dunapatelle River-----	3384

E

Eastland, Senator James O.-----	3337, 3338, 3405
Egyesult Izzo Lamp Works (incandescent lamp works of Hungary)-----	3334, 3335
Egyetemi Ipjubag (University Youth), publication-----	3389
Eisenhower, President-----	3355
England-----	3361
Erdei, Rerenc (Peasant Party)-----	3362
Europe-----	3352, 3372, 3398
Ewing, Arthur-----	3368
Exhibit No. 421—Document given to those released from forced-labor camps-----	3343
Exhibit No. 422—Document entitled "The Revolt in Hungary" published by the Free Europe Committee, New York City, page 86-----	3358, 3359
Exhibit No. 423—"To Imre Nagy * * *" from the workers of the Hungarian Optical Works-----	3366
Exhibit No. 424—Joint UN/FAO mission report press release-----	3368
Exhibit No. 424-A—Joint UN/FAO mission report-----	3370

F

Fabregat, Rodriguez (Uruguay representative to the U. N.)-----	3336
Farkas, Mihaly, Home Defense Minister-----	3385, 3401
Fascist-----	3393, 3394, 3404
Figaro, Le (publication)-----	3390
Fischer, Josef (Social Democrat)-----	3362
Fiume-----	3398
Fonagy, Dezso-----	3333, 3362, 3365
Testimony of-----	3333-3353
Four Powers-----	3361
France-----	3361, 3392
Freedom Fighters of Hungary-----	3357, 3358, 3386, 3392
Fruska-Gora (in Yugoslavia)-----	3384, 3401

G

Gabor, General Peter-----	3342
Ganz (Ganz Iron Works, Electrical Works, etc.)-----	3334, 3335
General Assembly-----	3337, 3368
Resolution of December 12 re Hungary-----	3338
United States delegation to the General Assembly-----	3338
Geneva-----	3369
Germans-----	3340, 3341, 3353

	Page
Gero clique-----	3389
Gero, Erno (MVD agent)-----	3389-3391, 3394
Godolo-----	3339
GPU-----	3390
Gyor-----	3393
Gyurko, Major General (Kecskemet)-----	3402
H	
Hazai, Major General-----	3402
Hegedus, Andras-----	3389
Hidvegi, Major General-----	3402
Honved Academy-----	3401
Honvedseg-----	3403
Hruska, Senator Roman L-----	3333, 3351
Hungarian Army-----	3353, 3382, 3384-3387, 3401, 3402
Hungarian communism-----	3363, 3392
Hungarian Communist government (<i>see also</i> Communist Party, Hungarian)-----	3341
Hungarian Government-----	3333, 3342, 3360, 3361, 3370, 3376, 3392
Hungarian ironworkers-----	3345
Hungarian Military Academy (Lutovicum, equivalent to West Point in United States)-----	3353
Hungarian Ministry of Internal Trade-----	3371
Hungarian Ministry of Supplies-----	3370
Hungarian National Council-----	3339
Hungarian national democratic revolution-----	3388, 3404
Hungarian National Government-----	3366, 3367
Hungarian National Revolutionary Council-----	3349, 3365
Hungarian Officer's Club-----	3401
Hungarian Optical Workers-----	3365-3367
Hungarian People's Republic-----	3392
Hungarian Red Cross-----	3370, 3376
Hungarian representatives in the U. N-----	3361
Hungarian Revolution-----	3333-3405
Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament-----	3334-3336, 3344-3348, 3351, 3367, 3402
Hungarian secret police-----	3342, 3354, 3364, 3404
Hungarian uprising, etc-----	3333-3405
Hungary-----	3333-3405
"Hungary, Base of Aggression for the Soviet Union," section of General Kiraly's statement-----	3400
I	
Ilku, Maj. Gen. Pal-----	3382, 3383
International Committee of the Red Cross-----	3368-3370, 3375, 3376, 3383
International Labor Office-----	3370
Iron Curtain-----	3385
Istrian Peninsula-----	3398
Italians-----	3340
Italy-----	3399
Izvestia (official organ of the Soviet Government)-----	3389, 3390
Janko, Dr. Bala-----	3334
Jenner, Senator William E-----	3337, 3338
Johnston, Senator Olin D-----	3337, 3338, 3381, 3405
K	
Kabelgyar (manufacture of cables, wires, etc.)-----	3334, 3335
Kadar, Janos-----	3346, 3394
Kadar government-----	3345
Kadar regime-----	3383
Kecskemet-----	3402
Kelemen, Gyula (Social Democrat)-----	3362
Kethly, Anna (Social Democrat)-----	3362
Khrushchev-----	3355
Kiraly, Gen. Bela, testimony of (major general in the Free Hungarian Army, commander in chief of the national guard established during the Hungarian National Democratic Revolution)-----	3381-3405

	Page
Kiskunhalas	3396, 3403
Kispesti (small town now connected to Budapest which has its own revolutionary council)	3334
Kovacs, Bela (smallholder)	3362
Kovacs, General	3396

L

Lampagyár (factory where lamps are manufactured)	3334, 3335
League of Red Cross Societies	3370
Letter of January 17, 1957, from Senator Eastland to Ambassador Lodge	3337
Letter of January 26, 1957, for Senator Eastland from Ambassador Lodge	3337
Letter of January 31, 1957, from Senator Eastland to Ambassador Lodge	3338
Ljubljana Gate	3385
Lodge, Ambassador Henry Cabot	3336-3338
Lorinci (town outside of Budapest)	3334, 3335

M

Maletter	3396
Mandel, Benjamin	3351, 3377
Manuilsky (a Comintern official)	3390
Marxist ideas	3366
Matra-Bukk Mountain Range	3403
Mav (Hungarian Government steel factory)	3334, 3335
Merkolov, General	3378-3380
Middle East	3337, 3338
Mikes, Major General (in Szekesfehervar)	3402
Mindszenty, Cardinal	3347-3349, 3351
Miners Revolutionary Council	3342
Miskolc	3393, 3396, 3403
Miskolc Workers Council	3393
MOHOSZ organizations	3401
Molotov, V	3379
Monde, Le, publication	3390
Morris, Robert	3333, 3351, 3377, 3381
Moscow	3377, 3382, 3383
Muscovite Hungarian leadership	3402
MVD	3379, 3390, 3391

N

Nagy, Imre	3361, 3362, 3389, 3392, 3394, 3396
Nagy, Imre, government	3361, 3362, 3365
Napoleon	3398
National Revolutionary Council	3360-3365, 3402
NATO armies	3385
Near East	3359
Nepakartat	3383
"Newsletter From Behind the Iron Curtain," article in Stockholm issue of October 28, 1949	3391
North Korea	3402
Nunez-Portuondo (Cuban delegate to U. N.)	3336

O

Obuda	3403
Papa (airfield)	3402
Papai	3357
Paris Peace Treaty after World War II	3400
Parliament Building	3397
Peasants and Farm Workers	3334, 3335
Petofi, Radio	3358
Pfeifer government	3354
Po Plain	3385
Poland	3367, 3385
Polish border	3386
Polish movement	3367
Polish national democratic revolution	3390
Pragai, Dezsö	3334
Pravda (official organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union)	3389, 3390

R

	Page
Radio Budapest	3390, 3396
Radio Kossuth	3389, 3393
Radio Rakoczi (<i>see</i> Petofi)	
Radio Vienna	3389
Raji trial	3391
Rakoci Officers School	3403
Rakosi	3355, 3401
Rakosi, Matyas	3388
Rakospalotai (town close to Budapest)	3334, 3335
Rastvorov, Yuri, testimony of	3377-3380
Revolt in Hungary, The, Document published by the Free Europe Committee, New York City (p. 86). Exhibit No. 422	3359
Revolutionary Committee of the Forces of Public Order	3394
Revolutionary Council of Students and Intellectuals of Greater Hungary	3334, 3335
Revolutionary Workers Council of Greater Budapest	3334
Rijeka (Fiume)	3385, 3401
Rumania	3386, 3403
Rusher, William A.	3333, 3351, 3377, 3381
Russia (<i>see also</i> Soviet; U. S. S. R.)	3339, 3382, 3385
Russians (<i>see also</i> Soviet)	3335, 3352, 3354, 3384, 3396
Russian Army	3385, 3387, 3397
Russian Home Defense Ministry	3383, 3384
Russian occupation troops	3356, 3357
Russian soldiers; troops	3346, 3355, 3356, 3361, 3364, 3383, 3389, 3390

T

Second World War	3387
Secretary General	3375
Sen. Mr. B. R., Director General of FAO	3368, 3369
Sinard, Pierre	3368, 3369
Smallholders Party	3353
Small Home Owners Federation	3354
Small Land Owners Federation	3353, 3354
Soviet, Soviet Union	3337, 3338, 3340, 3342, 3349, 3352, 3353, 3355, 3358-3362, 3367, 3377, 3379, 3383, 3385, 3387, 3390-3392, 3399-3402.
Soviet Ambassador to Hungary	3396, 3398
Soviet military schools	3383
Soviet satellite countries	3402
Soviet troops in Hungary	3356
Soviet troops	3346
Square of Heroes (in Budapest)	3396
Stalin	3377, 3379
Stalinist system	3383
Standard ("evidently an American subsidiary or something")	3334, 3335
State, Department of	3337
Stockholm (publication)	3391
Stockholm, Sweden	3377
Suez question	3345
Suslov	3394
Swedish Foreign Ministry	3377
Switzerland	3393
Szabadka (Subotica)	3401
Szabo, Istvan B. (Smallholder)	3362
Szabo, Lieutenant General	3402
Szatmar County Workers' Council	3394
Szeged	3396
Szekesfehervar	3402
Szeradasi, Jeno	3335, 3349, 3352
Testimony of	3360-3376

T

Taszar (airfield)	3402
Tatabanya	3341
Tildy, Zoltan (Smallholder)	3362, 3394

	Page
Tokol (on Csepel Island)-----	3396, 3401
Airfield-----	3401
Toth, Maj. Gen. Lajos-----	3402
Trieste-----	3398
Tunisia-----	3338
Turani, Gen. Andrew-----	3349, 3352
Testimony of-----	3353-3360
U	
Ugrai, Ferenc-----	3382, 3383
Ujvidek (Novi-Sad)-----	3401
Ukraine-----	3357, 3386, 3403
Sub-Carpathian Ukraine-----	3403
Ukrainian-----	3382
Ukrainian Communist government-----	3340
Ukrainian iron workers-----	3345
Ukrainian National Council-----	3341
Ukrainian Secret Police (AVO)-----	3340, 3341
Ukrainian underground revolutionary movement-----	3341
Ujpesti (town outside of Budapest)-----	3334, 3335
United Kingdom-----	3392
United Nations-----	3335, 3347, 3349, 3352, 3361, 3365, 3367-3370, 3393, 3396
United Nations Charter-----	3392
U. N. Economic Commission for Europe-----	3370, 3376
U. N. Education, Scientific and Cultural Organizations (UNESCO)-----	3370
U. N. Food and Agricultural Organization Joint UN/FAO mission report and press release—Exhibit Nos. 424 and 424-A-----	3368, 3370, 3372
U. N. Relief Fund-----	3368
U. N. Security Council-----	3391
U. N. Special Committee on Hungary-----	3337, 3349, 3383, 3384
U. N. World Health Organization-----	3370
Uruguay-----	3338
Urals-----	3340
U. S. S. R. (<i>see also</i> Soviet; Russia)-----	3334
V	
Varga, Monsignor-----	3341, 3353
Vidovje-----	3353, 3354, 3356, 3357
Vienna-----	3369
Vladivostok-----	3340, 3341
Voloshin-----	3401
Von Cseh, Louis-----	
Interpreter for—	
Dezso Fonagy-----	3333
Andras Turani-----	3353
Jeno Szeradas-----	3360
W	
Wahlen, Dr. F. T.-----	3368, 3369
Wallenberg, Raoul-----	3377-3379
Warsaw Pact-----	3361, 3386, 3389-3392, 3396
Warsaw Treaty-----	3392
West, The-----	3345, 3347, 3352, 3361, 3366, 3367
Western Europe-----	3385, 3389, 3396
Western Powers-----	3349, 3385, 3386
Western World-----	3350
Workers' Council-----	3366, 3367
World War II-----	3353
X	
"XXX" (signature on an article in Le Figaro)-----	3390, 3391

Y

	Page
Yen, Dr. (Chinese representative to the U. N.)-----	3336
Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier-----	338-4
Yugoslavia-----	3384, 3398, 3401
Yugoslavians-----	3385

Z

Zahony-----	3339
Zhukov, Gen. Marshal-----	3355, 3386, 3387, 3399

O

